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The Impossible Observer
Any adequate critical system must take into account its own
assumptions, expectations, and operations regarding four discrete
matters: (1) the reader's experience of texts, (2) what constitutes
a literary text, (3) the manner in which literary meaning is deter-
mined, and (4) the relation of criticism as a distinctly literary
activity to the reader's larger assumptions concerning human na-
ture. Although any one of the four enumerated subjects may re-
ceive within specific critical systems more emphasis than the
others, the foundation, if not the center, of any critical system is
inescapably the reader. Criticism does not write itself; literary
texts do not make themselves; meaning does not create itself.
While it is a truism, if not a cliche, that all the activities associ-
ated with criticism radiate outward from, and therefore assume,
a reader, few critical systems take this fact into account. The
reason for such silence is not hard to find; for it is still the dominant
view of many critical systems that real, which is to say demonstra-
ble and verifiable, knowledge derives only from the ability to
contemplate facts "objectively." And if there is one thing, so the
assumption goes, that does not lend itself readily to objectivity, it is
the reader, who is by definition something wholly subjective. Now
the assumption of objectivity in literary criticism largely derives
from the wish on the part of many critics to approach literary mean-
ing as if it conformed to certain laws of literature (concepts of
genre, for example) which could be verified by means similar to the
empirical procedures associated with scientific method. Such an
approach is conspicuously represented both in Northrop Frye's
Anatomy of Criticism, which treats literature as a closed system,
and in E. D. Hirsch's Validity in Interpretation, which assumes at
the outset a distinction between meaning—something stable, in-
tended, and verifiable—and significance—something indetermi-
nate, associational, and ultimately personal.
2 The Impossible Observer
In this book, however, I shall argue that some of the principal
texts of eighteenth-century English literature elicit their meaning by
deliberately juxtaposing the expectations of rationality, objectivity, and
aesthetic closure against the larger and more problematical experiences
of reading about, and imaginatively identifying with, characters and
situations which are continually human though not consistently deter-
minate. Many eighteenth-century texts do not reinforce the expecta-
tions of "objective" criticism so much as they challenge the reader
into a new or renewed awareness of just how problematical the nature
and formation of all beliefs, assumptions, expectations, and value judg-
ments are. Many eighteenth-century texts, for example, do not reaffirm
the customary expectation of finding meaning in the text, meaning
which is ordinarily assumed to be governed by prior literary conven-
tions that reinforce the expectations of order, stability, and objectivity.
Though I do not intend to throw aside the customary interpretive
activities of criticism, nor the reader's intellectual appreciation of litera-
ture, I do wish to emphasize, because they are so often ignored, those
literary experiences that enlarge, encourage, and evoke the reader's
active participation in literature, rather than his detached observation of
what are abstractly called themes.
Lest my reader charge me with being arrogantly solipsistic and un-
historical, let me say that there is considerable precedent for my essen-
tially affective approach to eighteenth-century prose. A good deal of
scholarship has been devoted to the uses of rhetoric in eighteenth-
century poetry and prose, especially satire; and rhetoric, as one can
easily see in satire, is designed to affect specific audiences. There is
no real point in my arguing that numerous writers in the eighteenth
century were incredibly sophisticated about the theory and practice of
rhetoric. While it is not my intention, nor perhaps within my ability,
to give a detailed history of the influence of Cicero and Quintilian in
English criticism from 1660 to 1800, it was surely a standard idea of
this period that the purpose of the poet, like that of the Ciceronian
rhetor, was to manipulate the responses of his audience. This interest
in the affective dimensions of literature is evident in Addison's The
Pleasures of the Imagination, about which Lee Elioseff has observed,
"The problems raised by many of Addison's essays, especially those
on The Pleasures of the Imagination, are those of a distinctly 'modern'
psychological critic whose immediate concern is the effect of literature
upon its audience."1 Such a concern with affective literary theory,
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whose origins Elioseff suggests "are to be found in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries" (p. 10), also derives from a Longinian
interest in the sublime, so well documented by Samuel Holt Monk.
Moreover, there is a conspicuous habit in much seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century critical theory, running from Dryden to Reynolds,
to use particular artistic figures from past and present as representative
of either an Aristotelian emphasis on aesthetic order and imitation or a
Longinian emphasis on aesthetic energy and invention. This recurrent
contrast is evident in the frequent comparisons of Virgil and Homer,
Horace and Juvenal, Ben Jonson and Shakespeare, Pope and Dryden,
Fielding and Richardson, and even in Reynolds's later comparison of
Raphael and Michelangelo. I am certainly not trying to suggest a mono-
lithic construct, in which all these comparisons are alleged to be the
same; but I am suggesting that they are a revealing habit of mind—one
calculated to distinguish between an Aristotelian interest in aesthetic
form and a Longinian interest in psychological effect.
This affective appeal is precisely what Edmund Burke calls attention
to when he remarks, "In reality poetry and rhetoric do not succeed
in exact description so well as painting does; their business is to affect
rather by sympathy than imitation; to display rather the effect of things
on the mind of the speaker, or of others, than to present a clear idea
of the things themselves. . . .  We yield to sympathy what we refuse
to description."2 What is far less attended to, however, is the way
that such rhetorical sophistication translates into a kind of narrative
which is avowedly affective and problematical, and which so often
anticipates and revises the orderly expectations of objective criticism.
Sir Joshua Reynolds can write, "Reason, without doubt, must ultimate-
ly determine every thing; at this minute it is required to inform us
when that very reason is to give way to feeling,"3 but he continues to
be thought of as the prototypical "Neoclassical" aesthetician. Samuel
Johnson, whose critical system I will examine in other parts of this
book, can write "there is always an appeal open from criticism to
nature,"4 and he can tell us about both reading and living that "in
estimating the pain or pleasure of any particular state, every man, in-
deed, draws his decisions from his own breast, and cannot with cer-
tainty determine, whether other minds are affected by the same causes
in the same manner. Yet by this criterion we must be content to judge,
because no other can be obtained."5 Yet despite these and many other
statements, relatively little attention—only Walter Jackson Bate's The
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Achievement of Samuel Johnson and Jean Hagstrum's Samuel John-
son's Literary Criticism come easily to mind—has been paid to the
affective basis of Johnson's practice as a writer and a critic, and to his
demolition of the criterion of objectivity.6
A recent article, on the subject of modern physics, outlines an
approach that largely conditions the critical procedures of my study.
Interestingly, it is a modern scientist who dismisses the very idea of
an objective observer which dominates so much critical practice.
Richard Schlegel writes:
We have learned that man cannot describe the physical world as if his own
investigations had no effect upon it. The classical physicist who could sit, as
it were, on one side of a translucent screen with his thoughts and experiences,
viewing the world he studied on the other, is now the impossible spectator.
For much of physics the dividing screen is lost, and cannot be replaced . . .
the scientist now finds that he in fact has a role in the creation of the world
that he is describing. It is not, I should hasten to add, that his emotions bias
his results, but rather that his act of observation participates in forming the
natural world.7
Schlegel later speaks of demolishing the idea of "the detached spectator
who has no role in the determination of that which he sees," and this
idea of dismissing the "detached spectator" is precisely the basis on
which I have selected the texts whose affective appeal I shall examine.
Eric Rothstein has, from another angle, addressed himself to what
Schlegel has called the "detached spectator." In his recent article,
'"Ideal Presence' and the 'Non Finito' in Eighteenth-Century Aesthet-
ics," Rothstein has forcefully questioned the notion that "in the eigh-
teenth century the perceiving mind was a passive lackey for the absolut-
ism of the objective eye." Using Lord Kames's term "ideal presence"
to denote the reader's "imaginative expansion of the text," Rothstein
goes on to show how this ideal presence, or what might be called a
"subjective corollary," entails a "degree of indeterminacy" which is
necessary to the full realization of a literary text. Furthermore, Roth-
stein argues that "the doctrine of ideal presence urges the reader toward
deeply personal and yet fundamentally shared imaginative expansions,
which create a bond of sympathy between him and the speaker or poet,
who has typically done the same thing"; this is precisely the reading
process evoked, for instance, in Clarissa and outlined in detail in
The Impossible Observer 5
Rambler 60. Indeed, Rothstein concludes his important article with a
challenge to criticism which my study, however modestly, is designed
to address.
If imaginative expansion, visual and nonvisual, was as widespread and signifi-
cant as I have alleged, modern critical opinion must accommodate it in dealing
with eighteenth-century works, written or painted with formal, affective criteria
so sharply different from those of the aesthetic purism now commonly prac-
ticed. We must develop critical techniques for it better than the simple applause
or frown to which too many practical critics of the eighteenth century resorted
when faced with indeterminacy.8
In three quite precise ways I will discuss how the expectation of
a detached or impossible observer is challenged by the presence of
indeterminacy in eighteenth-century prose. First, all the works I ex-
amine, which cover a wide generic and authorial range, are structured
around one or more spectator characters or authors who wish to observe
or report about a situation, but who eventually become a part of the
very situation they initially set out to describe. In some cases the loss of
detachment is unwitting; in other instances detachment is knowingly
and sometimes willingly abandoned. In every case, however, the ap-
pearance of detachment is designed to elicit a distinction between the
expectation of rational control and the eventual yielding to an experi-
ence whose effect supersedes the strict control of reason. The second
way that the impossible observer appears is in the author's use of what
I call reading paradigms. I am not fond of jargon, but this is the only
term that describes exactly what I wish to say. By reading paradigms,
I mean particular passages, found in every work I will consider, which
are not about the story, the characters, the ideas, or the arguments so
much as they are about the reader and how to read the book. In these
situations the author, for a variety of reasons, anticipates our (that is,
the reader's) customary role of detached observer, and addresses him-
self to our expectations; this is done to draw us into the book, to make
us, willing or not, participants rather than just observers, and to test our
strength in relation to the author's assumptions about human nature.9
Lastly, I will apply the idea of the impossible observer to the way
criticism has attempted to deal with the experience of reading the select-
ed texts. That is, I will measure the results of my affective approach
against prior criticism so as to determine the usefulness of my approach.
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The idea of the impossible observer will, I believe, illumine the dis-
tinction between objective critical expectations and the basically affec-
tive experience of reading.
I should also say that my affective approach is not designed to sup-
plant, but rather to complement, recent studies of eighteenth-century
prose. Some of the most interesting modern criticism of fiction general-
ly, and of the eighteenth-century novel in particular, has focused on
various theories, implied or explicit, of literary response. The writings
of Wolfgang Iser, for example, offer fascinating insights into the phe-
nomenology of reading, and Iser has stressed the importance of the
reader's active participation in, rather than detached observation of,
various literary texts.10 This emphasis on the reader's participatory
acts—on the sympathetic appeal of fiction—has also been applied, in a
number of ways, in three books devoted exclusively to eighteenth-
century prose: John Preston's The Created Self (New York: Barnes and
Noble, 1970), John A. Dussinger's The Discourse of the Mind in
Eighteenth-Century Fiction (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), and Eric
Rothstein's Systems of Order and Inquiry in Later Eighteenth-Century
Fiction (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1975). In each case, though from different methodological points of
view, these works have repeatedly stressed the activity of reading and
the affective appeal of eighteenth-century fiction. In the latter two
books, moreover, Dussinger and Rothstein have attempted, with vary-
ing degrees of success, to establish relationships between the affective
appeal of eighteenth-century prose and the prevailing epistemological
constructs of the century.
I certainly see my own book as participating in, and benefiting from,
the arguments of the above books. At the same time, however, I must
say that my affective approach takes its primary impetus from the criti-
cal works of Samuel Johnson. From Johnson's criticism I have cheer-
fully drawn the following critical formulations, all of which flow from
the basic distinction, established in The Life ofCowley, between be-
holding and partaking of literature. Although I will examine Johnson's
criticism in more detail in chapters 6 and 9, I am convinced that he is
opposed to the idea of what I call the impossible observer. I believe
this is why he prefers Richardson's "characters of nature," whose
affective appeal is directly related to the powerful indeterminacy of
much of Richardson's fiction, to Fielding's "characters of manners,"
who conform more readily with a self-contained, highly Aristotelian,
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and easily recognizable aesthetic design. Indeed, it is especially reveal-
ing to watch how Johnson associates "characters of manners" with
simple entertainment and superficial observation: "Sir, (continued he,)
there is all the difference in the world between characters of nature and
characters of manners; and there is the difference between the charac-
ters of Fielding and those of Richardson. Characters of manners are
very entertaining; but they are to be understood, by a more superficial
observer, than characters of nature, where a man must dive into the
recesses of the human heart."11 Although I do not share Johnson's
view that Fielding is superficial, I do think that Johnson is attempting
to describe, however unfairly, two different kinds of narrative: the one
oriented to character and psychology and thus tending toward indeter-
minacy, the other oriented to plot and overt action and hence much
more determinate. We might also recall, critical opinion notwithstand-
ing, that Johnson claimed he "read Fielding's Amelia through without
stopping"—for reasons that should be clear when I discuss Clarissa
and Amelia.1*
Moreover, I believe that Johnson is opposed to an excessive pre-
occupation with genre and with critical taxonomy generally, as we can
see in his Shakespeare criticism, because an obsession with generic
distinctions and rules often blunts the powerful affective appeal of liter-
ature. This is why Johnson, in his edition of Shakespeare, so often
attacks Warburton's strictly literary understanding of Shakespeare. Fur-
thermore, I am attracted to Johnson's formulation of a common reader,
though it is an extremely slippery concept: the common reader, as I
understand it, is less a verifiable who than an experiential how—that is,
not a specific person, but rather a general process of reading literature
which supersedes rational objectivity even as it asserts a cognitive and
moral basis for the affective appeal of literature. This sense of a "uni-
formity of sentiment" is the basis of Johnson's keen understanding and
vigorous defense of Shakespeare's use of tragicomedy. In my view,
then, Johnson is ultimately less important as a critic of literature—that
is, as one who systematically explicates or theorizes about a literary
work—than as a reader of literature who insistently focuses on its affec-
tive appeal, and who repeatedly debunks objective critical expectations.
Finally, the critical model that Johnson employs has led me to
believe that, though the authors I include go about their appeals to
human experience in a variety of ways, there rests beneath this variety
a fundamentally similar challenge. This challenge is addressed to what I
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call the impossible observer—to the critical procedure, not to say
human expectation, which assumes, consciously or unconsciously, that
the exercise of reason is a satisfactory tool for understanding and assess-
ing the appeal of imaginative literature. Both in their represented
actions and in their effects on the reader, the works I shall discuss con-
tinually evoke and test the reader's awareness of the problematical
aspects of human reason, and they often require the reader's abandon-
ment of critical objectivity to the more compelling, though less deter-
minate, claims of human feeling. All the works I shall deal with con-
struct occasions where the reader inevitably becomes a part of the very
literary representation he may have expected only to observe. This is
done not only to challenge the reader's assumed sense of superiority,
which is often based on the self-sufficiency of reason, but to remind him
that this life, as Richardson said, is "a State of Probation," where the
expectations of readers and characters alike are continually the focus
of examination.13
Swift and the Problematical
Nature of Meaning
The main problem I shall discuss in this chapter has been raised
most acutely by F. R. Leavis in his essay "The Irony of Swift."'
Leavis begins by examining the disjunction between Swift's
ostensible themes, including the moral content of his writings,
and the effects his writings have on readers. This disjunction, if
we accept it as such, raises important critical questions not only
about the kinds of irony and satire that Swift employs, but about
the overall moral purpose of Swift's use of irony and satire. And
lest we think these questions are the recent invention of modern
criticism, let me quote from one of Pope's letters to Swift which
establishes some important distinctions between the different uses
of irony and satire. Pope writes to Swift: "I have not the courage
however to be such a Satyrist as you, but I would be as much, or
more, a Philosopher. You call your satires, Libels; I would rather
call my satires, Epistles: They will consist more of morality than
wit, and grow graver, which you will call duller."2
If I read Pope's observations correctly, he is saying that his
practice of satire differs from Swift's both in kind and purpose.
Swift's satire is courageous, libelous, and witty, which is to say
that it is very aggressive and quite often personal. On the other
hand, Pope's satire is philosophical, epistolary, and grave—all of
which implies, I think, that its appeal is primarily intellectual. To
some extent Pope may be echoing the old distinction between
Juvenalian and Horatian satire; or, if we want to adopt Edward
Rosenheim's useful distinction, we might say that Swift's satire
veers toward the "punitive," Pope's toward the "persuasive."3
In any event, Leavis, too, is quite aware of such distinctions, but
unlike Pope and Rosenheim he extends their essentially descrip-
tive distinctions into an evaluative model for judging the relation
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between the moral content and the literary effects of Swift's writings.
Thus Leavis writes:
There are writings of Swift where "critical" is the more obvious word (and
where "intellectual" may seem correspondingly apt)—notably, the pamphlets
or pamphleteering essays in which the irony is instrumental, directed and
limited to a given end. The Argument Against Abolishing Christianity and the
Modest Proposal, for instance, are discussible in the terms in which satire is
commonly discussed: as the criticism of vice, folly, or other aberration, by
some kind of reference to positive standards. But even here, even in the Argu-
ment, where Swift's ironic intensity undeniably directs itself to the defense of
something that he is intensely concerned to defend, the effect is essentially
negative. The positive itself appears only negatively—a kind of skeletal pres-
ence, rigid enough, but without life or body; a necessary precondition, as it
were, of directed negation. The intensity is purely destructive, (pp. 16—17)
I have quoted Leavis in such detail because he has raised the central
question of whether Swift's use of irony and satire is "discussible in
the terms in which satire is commonly discussed." Clearly, we can dis-
cuss Swift's satire, both in his poems and prose, as a criticism of vice
and folly, but sometimes we cannot do so "by some kind of reference
to positive standards." For example, the history of reader responses to
A Tale of a Tub and Gulliver's Travels suggests that Swift certainly
vexed the world, but the vexation may itself have been prompted by
Swift's inability or unwillingness to sustain a satisfactory "positive
standard."4
Thus, comparing Gibbon's irony with Swift's, Leavis argues that
the "pattern of Gibbonian prose insinuates a solidarity with the reader,"
whereas "the implied solidarity in Swift is itself ironical—a means to
betrayal." Leavis further observes that Gibbon's irony "habituates and
reassures," while Swift's is "essentially a matter of surprise and nega-
tion; its function is to defeat habit, to intimidate, and to demoralize"
(pp. 17-18). The main example that Leavis uses to support the idea that
Swift's irony betrays the reader comes from section 9 of A Tale of a
Tub, specifically the two famous paragraphs on deception and mad-
ness.5 What Leavis attempts to demonstrate (I think quite persuasively)
is that the operative thematic distinction between "curiosity" and
"credulity" finally cancels itself out, leaving the reader to his own re-
sources. That is, the reader is initially lured into believing that Swift is
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attacking "curiosity" in defense of the "common forms" associated
with the Church of England and, by implication, with "credulity."
This part would accord well with Swift's claim that he wrote the Tale
"to expose the Abuses and Corruptions in Learning and Religion" (1:6).
But by the end of the second paragraph, which concludes, "This is
the sublime and refined Point of Felicity, called, the Possession of
being well-deceived, The Serene Peaceful State of being a Fool among
Knaves" (1:110), the alternative, or, if you will, the positive standard
of "credulity" has itself been undermined.6 The reader is thus left in a
state of intellectual disorientation, unless, of course, we delight in being
called "a Fool among Knaves."
Now I will be the first to concede that this is a local instance from
A Tale of a Tub, but I would also argue that it is a characteristic effect
of the work; and, far more decisively, Swift's "Apology" confirms his
awareness that the effect of A Tale of a Tub was a good deal more
problematical than he evidently intended. Indeed, the "Apology" sug-
gests that Swift miscalculated in at least two distinct ways: he under-
estimated the effect of his own invention and he overestimated the
sagacity of his readers. Throughout the "Apology," for example, Swift
distinguishes between "Men of Tast" (1:1), otherwise referred to as
"the judicious Reader" (1:3, 8, 10), and the "Reader of Tast and
Candor" (1:6), as opposed to those readers "who have neither Candor
to suppose good Meanings, nor Palate to distinguish true Ones" (1:2)
and "prejudiced or ignorant Readers [who] have drawn by great Force
to hint at ill Meanings" (1:4). But the telling point is that Swift is
unable to control how these various readers respond to A Tale, even
though he can declare that the work "celebrates the Church of England"
(1:2). In fact, the "Apology" concludes with Swift's concession that
in future readings "it is not unlikely he [Swift] may have the Pleasure
to find twenty Meanings, which never enter'd into his Imagination"
(1:11).
What Swift fails to acknowledge in the "Apology" is the power of
his satire to evoke a wide range of meanings, even though he mocks the
idea that a text may be interpreted as being "wondrous Deep, upon no
wiser Reason than because it is wondrous Dark" (1:133). That is, at
the same time that Swift ridicules corrupt readings and interpretations,
especially in the allegory of the coats, he continues to taunt and tanta-
lize his readers into further interpretations, with no end in sight. The
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"courteous Reader" is advised "to peruse with a world of Application,
again and again, whatever I have written upon this Matter" (1:48), and
a passage like this is the rule, not the exception, in A Tale. Swift will
mock "learned" commentators when he cautions them "to proceed
with great Caution upon certain dark points, wherein all who are not
Vere adepti, may be in danger to form rash and hasty Conclusions"
(1:70). But when he later divides readers into three classes—"the
Superficial, the Ignorant, and the Learned"—he unwittingly predicts,
and I would say provokes, the kinds of interpretation he worries over
in the "Apology": "It were much to be wisht, and I do here humbly
propose for an Experiment, that every Prince in Christendom will take
seven of the deepest Scholars in his Dominions, and shut them up close
for seven Years, in seven Chambers, with a Command to write seven
ample Commentaries on this comprehensive Discourse. I shall venture
to affirm, that whatever Difference may be found in their several Con-
jectures, they will be all, without the least Distortion, manifestly de-
duceable from the Text" (1:117-18).
Although it is clear that Swift was dismayed by the range of reader
responses to A Tale, there is considerable evidence to suggest that in
some of his subsequent satires—specifically, Gulliver's Travels and
A Modest Proposal—he calculated for and counted on such distortion,
which is to say he revised his expectations about his readers. While it
is hardly fresh news to say that Swift's satire frequently implicates his
readers, it is important to talk about how he does so, and about what
distinguishes such satires as The Battle of Books, The Argument against
Abolishing Christianity, and The Drapier's Letters from Gulliver's
Travels and A Modest Proposal. For example, I will argue that one of
the differences between the former and latter satires is that Swift's
developing anticipation of reader "distortion" is a measure both of his
increasing mistrust of the reader's reason and of his diminished expec-
tation of reform. In the former satires Swift relies on the reader's reason
to discern the object of his satire, and thus the theme of the satire, if
you will, is correspondingly determinate. Another way of stating this
matter is to say that in The Battle of Books, The Argument against
Abolishing Christianity, and The Drapier's Letters Swift serves as a
middleman who simultaneously defends something of value—be it Sir
William Temple, ancient learning, the Test Act, or Ireland—as he cas-
tigates whatever threatens that value—William Wotton, modern learn-
ing, repeal of the Sacramental Test, or England's oppression of Ireland.
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But in Gulliver's Travels and A Modest Proposal Swift is less a middle-
man or intermediary than he is an aggressor and adversary who, more
than anything else, attacks his readers because he no longer trusts them.
The difference between these two modes of satire is the difference
between the expectation of reform and its corresponding reliance on
reason, and the desire to "vex" the reader which signals both the aban-
donment of reform as well as Swift's bitter acknowledgment of distor-
tion—textual, moral, intellectual—as the "normal" state of affairs.
Thus Swift declares in An Answer to a Paper called a Memorial (1728):
I have now present before me the Idea of some Persons, (I know not in what
Part of the World) who spend every Moment of their Lives, and every Turn of
their Thoughts while they are awake, (and probably of their Dreams while they
sleep) in the most detestable Actions and Designs; who delight in Mischief,
Scandal, and Obloquy, with the Hatred and Contempt of all Mankind against
them; but chiefly of those among their own Party, and their own Family; such,
whose odious Qualities rival each other for Perfection: Avarice, Brutality,
Faction, Pride, Malice, Treachery, Noise, Impudence, Dulness, Ignorance,
Vanity, and Revenge, contending every Moment for Superiority in their Breasts.
Such Creatures are not to be reformed; neither is it Prudence, or Safety to
attempt a Reformation. Yet, although their Memories will rot, there may be
some benefit for their Survivers, to smell it while it is rotting. (12:24-25)
This is the characteristic tone of Gulliver's Travels and A Modest
Proposal, and the underlying reasons for Swift's abandonment of refor-
mation and reason are illumined by P. K. Elkin, who observes: "Au-
gustan satire was firmly rooted in the comforting conviction of the age
that men are free and responsible beings, who can set about improving
themselves and their society by the exercise of reason. . . .  Such faith
in free will and the efficacy of reason made men unusually eager to
increase knowledge and to raise themselves and society to a more highly
civilized level; and with notable exceptions, like Swift and Mandeville,
it made them extraordinarily confident of their ability to achieve such
a goal."7 Elkin is right to mark off Swift (in some of his satires) and
Mandeville as exceptions, though Mandeville's satire, as I shall later
argue, addresses its readers in a way different from Swift's. But the
critical question that Elkin's observation suggests is, How does an
attack on "the efficacy of reason" affect and implicate the reader's
relation to satire? In other words, how do we talk about satires where
the subject is the audience for whom the satire is intended—where the
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meaning, so to say, is not an object in the text, but the responses evoked
by the text?
For example, on the most practical and obvious levels Gulliver's
Travels and A Modest Proposal continually address themselves to the
subject of the reader's response.8 They do so, in large measure, by
presenting observer narrators who, though initially confident of the self-
sufficiency of reason, willingly or unwillingly become participants, and
sometimes victims, of the very actions they wish to describe with ra-
tional detachment. On a more complicated level, the affective appeal of
Gulliver's Travels and A Modest Proposal depends heavily on their
establishment of a sense of bewilderment or shock which challenges
our habitual ways of reading and thinking. Moreover, I believe that
Gulliver's Travels and A Modest Proposal, in the most uncanny way,
are written in anticipation of the reader's subsequent needs for, and at-
tempts to discern, meaning. They are works whose largest subject is the
problematical nature of meaning. Thus, I do not wish to advance some
single interpretation of either of these works so much as to deal with
some of the ways that Swift plays with and rearranges the reader's
expectations of apprehending some discernible meaning even if it is not,
strictly speaking, within the text.
The kinds of meaning I have in mind are highly provisional simply
because they tend to be evoked, rather than contained, by the text.
These meanings are not like objects waiting to be found in the text;
they are a set of experiences, doubtless varying with each reader, which
grow out of the interaction between the reader's rational expectations
and assumptions and the various "events"—including single words
and sentences—which establish the affective appeal of Gulliver's Trav-
els and A Modest Proposal. When I talk about "meanings," then, in
Gulliver's Travels and A Modest Proposal I am simply trying to call
attention to some of the ways in which these two works do not so much
construct a stable meaning in the form of clearly stated, coherent, and
verifiable truths within a text, as they present contexts or occasions for
the reader to supply meanings in response to what occurs within the
text. Furthermore, while I accept the usefulness of Rosenheim's formu-
lation that "satire consists of an attack by means of a manifest fiction
upon discernible historic particulars," I am going to concentrate on how
Swift "breaks" his manifest fictions to widen the effects of his satire.9
First, let me take up the relationship between the manifest fictions
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Swift sets up in books 1 and 2—these fictions being Gulliver's size in
relation to the Lilliputians and Brobdingnagians—and the statements in
the text which are, presumably, outgrowths of the manifest fictions. I
use the term "manifest fiction" simply to contrast the seemingly pal-
pable apperance of Swift's literary fictions—so conspicuously fictional
as well as so seductively simple—with their frequently complicated
effects. Many critics, especially rhetorical and generic critics, have
argued for the need to discriminate between Swift and Gulliver and
between Swift's fictional forms and what might be called realistic repre-
sentation.10 We all know about the quarrels concerning how to construe
the Yahoos and Houyhnhnms, but I wish to start with the effects of
phrases and sentences in order to show how Swift extends the range of
effects by broadening the apparent simplicity of the manifest fictions.
Indeed, the simplicity of these fictions is often a parody of rational dis-
tinctions, as I shall discuss later. It is my belief that if Swift kept con-
stantly to the maintenance of his manifest fictions, Gulliver's Travels
would remain primarily self-referring, which is to say the reader would
respond to the text as pure fantasy.
For example, a sentence such as the following is completely deter-
mined by the big/little fiction of book 1 and hence simply calls atten-
tion to its own fiction; about his visit to Mildendo, Gulliver writes: "I
stept over the great Western Gate, and passed very gently, and sideling
through the two principal Streets, only in my short Waistcoat, for fear
of damaging the Roofs and Eves of the Houses with the Skirts of my
Coat" (11:46). At most, this sentence encourages the reader to imagine
a picture of Gulliver's size, wholly consistent with the manifest fiction
of book 1, which is both fantastic and humorous. For the reader, enter-
tainment seems to be the principal effect of this passage. A slightly
more complicated sentence, in terms of effect, occurs when the Lilli-
putian soldiers walk across Gulliver's body: "I confess I was often
tempted, while they were passing backwards and forwards on my Body,
to seize Forty or Fifty of the first that came in my Reach, and dash them
against the Ground" (11:24). Such a sentence again preserves the
manifest fiction of size but it introduces some recognizably human emo-
tions—emotions the reader has doubtless known. We know what it
feels like to be threatened and some, if not all of us, have felt the urge
to be violent. Even with these associations, however, this sentence
remains basically self-referring inasmuch as the passage, compared
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with others to be discussed, does not in any serious way address itself
to the reader's expectation of and search for meaning.
On the other hand, the well-known sections of book 1 dealing with
rope-dancing, the high and low Heels, and the Little-Endians and Big-
Endians are of a rather different order than the two sentences hitherto
mentioned. It is not so much the relations of size, in accordance with
Swift's use of manifest fictions, as the consequence of establishing at
once rational and trivial distinctions which appears to be the principal
subject of these sections. To put it another way, these passages are
constructed in such a way that the reader is encouraged to break the
manifest fictions and extend their significance beyond the text. The
reader is compelled to translate back and forth between the manifest
fictions and his experience of his own world and the world at large. The
reader moves, that is, from detached observation to active participation,
for the effect of such passages is to widen the text's meaning beyond
Gulliver's observations. The following passage on rope-dancing is a
good example.
This Diversion is only practised by those Persons, who are Candidates for great
Employments, and high Favour, at Court. They are trained in this Art from
their Youth, and are not always of noble Birth, or liberal Education. When a
great Office is vacant, either by Death or Disgrace, (which often happens) five
or six of those Candidates petition the Emperor to entertain his Majesty and the
Court with a Dance on the Rope; and whoever jumps the highest without
falling, succeeds in the office. (11:38)
We need not tie this activity down either to the fictional world of
Lilliput or to specific historical persons, though I am not denying either
interpretive possibility. But the opening sentence does permit us to add
numerous examples from the past or present to the general category of
"Persons, who are Candidates for great Employments, and high Favour,
at Court." With the exception of the term "rope-dancing" everything
in this passage can refer to the reader's, and not just Gulliver's world,
and the sheer familiarity of external references surrounding the manifest
fiction of rope-dancing encourages the reader to translate the fictional
image into the human arena of political aspirations and ambitions gener-
ally. Thus, what initially appears to be a purely fictional description
is also the occasion for a much larger, and more problematical, appeal
to the reader's awareness.
For example, to the extent that the reader is a person rigidly com-
Swift and the Nature of Meaning 17
mitted to the numerous and often trivial abstractions of politics, reli-
gion, and class distinctions, Swift's explanation of the high and low
Heels and the Big- and Little-Endians may set off a good deal of un-
easiness, simply because what was expected to remain a self-referring
fiction suddenly intrudes upon our personal convictions. Of course, we
can always say that Swift is really referring to Whigs and Tories, High
Church and Low Church, but then Swift early realized that readers have
a habit of beholding "every body's Face but their Own" (1:140). Never-
theless, observations such as "He [the Emperor of Lilliput] is taller by
almost the Breadth of my Nail, than any of his Court; which alone
is enough to strike an Awe into the Beholders" (11:30), or "His Majes-
ty's Imperial Heels are lower at least by a Drurr than any of his Court;
(Drurr is a Measure about the fourteenth Part of an Inch.)" (11:48)
evoke the reader's awareness not only of the arbitrary niceties that
are the domain of royalty, but of some of the dubious distinctions—
as well as the seemingly rational habits which lead to their creation—
that the reader may unconsciously accept or consciously sustain.11 If
such a response is provoked, the reader is no longer an observer; like
Gulliver, he becomes a participant, possibly even a victim, of the very
action that he only wished to observe and describe. Indeed, one of the
ironies of critical debates over book 4 of Gulliver's Travels is that some
critics have duplicated Swift's fictional premise of Big-Endians and
Little-Endians by aligning themselves into the so-called "hard-school"
and "soft school," or what might be called the "Hard-Endians" and
" Soft-Endians"—all of which is wonderfully reminiscent of Swift's
droll observation that "Satyr being levelled at all, is never resented for
an offence by any, since every individual Person makes bold to under-
stand it of others, and very wisely removes his particular Part of the
Burthen upon the shoulders of the World, which are broad enough, and
able to bear it" (1:31).
So far I have been talking generally about how Swift breaks and
extends the frame of reference of his manifest fictions to establish a
larger, affective appeal to the reader's own experiences. I have tried to
emphasize, albeit briefly, the variety of effects Swift's text produces
simply because such variety seems to me strong evidence that Gulliver's
Travels is not written with any one effect in mind, other than to violate
or vex the reader's expectations of coherent, rationally formulable
meaning. Rather than reading Gulliver's Travels as if it were proceed-
ing towards some one coherent and unifying goal, it may be truer to the
18 Swift and the Nature of Meaning
reader's experience of the text to speak of a succession of moments that
yield varying effects. In book 2, for example, the manifest fiction of
size can yield a self-referring and humorous sentence such as, "She
[the farmer's daughter] was very good natured, and not above forty Foot
high, being little for her Age" (11:95), or a more potentially offensive
passage which grows out of, but extends beyond, the manifest fiction's
ostensible frame of reference—"I must confess no Object ever disgust-
ed me so much as the Sight of her monstrous Breast, which I cannot
tell what to compare with, so as to give the curious Reader an Idea of
its Bulk, Shape and Colour. It stood Prominent six Foot, and could not
be less than sixteen in Circumference. The Nipple was about half the
Bigness of my Head, and the Hue both of that and the Dug so varied
with Spots, Pimples and Freckles, that nothing could appear more nau-
seous. . . .  This made me reflect upon the fair Skins of our English
ladies" (11:91-92). Here the transference from manifest fiction to the
reader's experience is not simply encouraged; it is, perhaps dismay-
ingly, insisted upon.
One of the most famous sections of book 2—Gulliver's praise of
his "own dear native Country" to the king of Brobdingnag—gains
much of its effectiveness by continually crossing and finally obscuring
the lines between the established manifest fiction of size, Gulliver's
descriptions of England, and the reader's uneasy intervention into the
process. The reader may not agree either with Gulliver's praise or the
king's subsequent condemnation of the bulk of mankind, but the locu-
tions of this sixth chapter of the book—i.e., "Conspiracies, Rebellions,
Murders, Massacres, Revolutions, Banishments; the very worst Effects
that Avarice, Faction, Hypocrisy, Perfidiousness, Cruelty, Rage, Mad-
ness, Hatred, Envy, Lust, Malice and Ambition could produce"
(11:132)—are sufficiently familiar to the reader that he cannot fail to
recognize an aspect of his own world even if he feels compelled to attach
explanations, provisos, and even apologies throughout the entire chap-
ter. Indeed, this very compulsion to explain testifies to the effectiveness
of the chapter. The one seemingly fictional assertion referring back to
size in the last paragraphs of chapter 6—that "the Bulk of your Natives
[are] . . . the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin that Nature
ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth"—joins the osten-
sibly separate levels of fiction and fact in the most paradoxical way.
Men are not literally "vermin," but the reader is led to understand,
and may even endorse, the literal applicability of this seemingly figura-
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tive expression. The king's concluding remarks strike me as a fine
example of the multiple collision between the various modes of writing
Swift employs, the affective appeal of the text, and the reader's attempt
to determine, and possibly deflect, the meaning of the passage. We may
wish to introduce affirmative examples to deny Gulliver's descriptions
of the king's accusations, we may reject or defend the king's perora-
tion as either unwarranted or justified misanthropy, we may wish to
argue for or against the fictional consistency or inconsistency of this
chapter as part of a literary satire, and there may be, depending on the
reader, numerous additional responses. But one thing is clear: the reader
is compelled to react to this section in terms that extend beyond a purely
fictional or literary frame of reference; we are no longer observers of a
fiction, but participants in it. In this respect Swift has successfully
forced us into a form of reexamination where ratiocination alone simply
will not do. The meanings of this section, in other words, are not so
much within the text as in the reader's response—emotional and intel-
lectual—to the text.
Having established my own position with respect to some of the
effects of Gulliver's Travels, I would like to direct some attention to
two larger questions which have vexed general readers and critics alike.
Again, I entertain no hope of solving these "problems," because I
believe that Gulliver's Travels, among other things, renders highly
problematical the reader's expectation of arriving at rational "solu-
tions" to his own uneasiness. The first of these two questions relates
to the function of book 3 both in terms of its content and its larger
structural position with respect to the other three books; the second,
to the matter of how to interpret the Houyhnhnms. My general position,
based on the affective appeal of Gulliver's Travels, is that we should
be neither surprised nor distressed by the varying and sometimes contra-
dictory positions taken with respect to these two problems. They are
problems and will remain problems because the determination of mean-
ing in Gulliver's Travels is not strictly amenable to rational inspection.
Book 3, we know, was written last, and yet Swift does not place
it in this position. The fact that Swift does not place it last may tell us
something about his attitude to formal coherence—namely, that there
never was a developing pattern or an evolving plan which would ex-
plain the sequence of books 1-4, other than the general intention to vex
the reader. I have emphasized that Swift will use and perhaps abuse
his manifest fictions in a variety of ways to gain multiple effects ranging
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from comedy to declamation. So I am no longer surprised that book 3
occupies its particular structural position, simply because I do not be-
lieve the structure of Gulliver's Travels was, in any formal sense,
ever determined by building toward any one coherent pattern. In fact,
here I would enlarge the significance of what is evident in individual
phrases and sentences of books 1 and 2 and argue that we should make
a distinction between formal coherence within a text (what might be
called embedded meaning) and the reader's rational expectation of de-
tecting such coherence. The former kind of coherence is virtually non-
existent in Gulliver's Travels—I say "virtually" because I suppose one
could say that books 1 and 2 employ a manifest fiction of comparative
size which accounts, in part, for their structural sequence. The latter
expectation of coherence certainly exists because we as readers are
always looking for what a literary text is about and how it makes sense.
In this latter respect, however, I would say it is the reader rather than
the text who substantially creates the meaning.
Thus, if one looks for a pattern within book 3 it appears that Gulli-
ver for long periods of time—in his attacks on the Academy of Lagado,
politicians, and modern history—seems very reliable, in Wayne Booth's
sense of the term. Moreover, Gulliver utters sentences and attacks posi-
tions and activities which Swift himself has attacked in his nonironic
essays and in his correspondence. But just when the reader believes he
may have achieved a fixed position on Gulliver's reliability, Swift in-
troduces the Struldbrugg episode which, among other things, mocks
Gulliver's expectation of immortality and thus creates for the reader
another occasion where detached observation lapses into unwitting par-
ticipation. The arguments, therefore, over the apparent "disunity" of
book 3 are really confirmations of the view that the appeal of Gulliver's
Travels actually exceeds and eludes the grasp of rational predictability.
Once again Swift has used book-reading habits and conventions—that
is, the confidence that books evolve coherently toward a determinate
conclusion—to violate the reader's expectation of meaning so as to ex-
tend the effect of the manifest fiction from a purely literary frame of
reference to the more problematical nature of the reader's attempts to
discern and sustain meaning.
For me to speak in such lofty philosophical terms as "the problem-
atical nature of meaning" involves the risk of making Swift out to be a
philosopher of sorts, and we all know that Swift rarely expressed
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admiration for the "transcendentals" of philosophy. But the evidence is
irrefutable that throughout his career Swift demonstrates an understand-
ing of language—of how it can create and destroy meaning—second
to that of few authors in the history of English literature. To think of
Swift's writing career is to think of the career of a prose writer who
achieved the widest spectrum of literary effects, and that spectrum is
contained in miniature in Gulliver's Travels. It is precisely because this
range of literary effects, as distinguished from the concentrated effect
of, say, An Argument against Abolishing Christianity, is used in Gulli-
ver's Travels that Swift achieves in this work a unique anticipation of
the very distortion that so dismayed him in A Tale of a Tub. Meaning
becomes problematical in Gulliver's Travels because Swift chooses to
put all his verbal skills on display—his skills for fantasy, humor,
mimicry, parody, attack, ridicule, and just convolution for its own
sake—and they are not directed toward any one specifiable meaning.
This is why, for example, so many different and apparently contradic-
tory critical approaches have been applied to the Houyhnhnms. Strictly
speaking, the Houyhnhnms are not in the least problematical: they are
a manifest fiction employed by Swift, the nature of their representation
being, generally, "the Contemplation and Practice of every Virtue"
(11:258). This, at any rate, is their ostensible meaning within the text.
But as with so many other manifest fictions in Gulliver's Travels, Swift
does not keep the Houyhnhnms on a purely self-referential level; they
become occasions for a much larger appeal. He breaks the manifest
fiction repeatedly—either through Gulliver's extension of their frame of
reference or by encouraging or forcing the reader to extend the range of
their significance.
Insofar as the following passage refers to the exclusive fictional
properties of the Houyhnhnms, it is not problematical; but as soon as
any point of human reference emerges, the passage reflects outward to
the reader, and may evoke (indeed, has evoked) a variety of responses:
As these noble Houyhnhnms are endowed by Nature with a general disposition
to all Virtues, and have no Conceptions or Ideas of what is evil in a rational
Creature; so their grand Maxim is, to cultivate Reason, and to be wholly
governed by it. Neither is Reason among them a Point problematical as with us,
where men can argue with Plausibility on both Sides of a Question; but strikes
you with immediate Conviction; as it must needs do where it is not mingled,
obscured, or discoloured by Passion and Interest. I remember it was with ex-
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treme Difficulty that I could bring my Master to understand the Meaning of the
Word Opinion, or how a Point could be disputable; because Reason taught us to
affirm or deny only where we are certain; and beyond our Knowledge we cannot
do either. (11:267).
The first sentence of this passage defines the Houyhnhnms both in
terms of their self-referential fictional quality and in terms of a radical
contrast with their fictional counterparts, the Yahoos, whose disposition
is to nastiness and dirt. But the first quoted sentence does more than
simply define and distinguish virtue and vice, Right Reason and the
defective uses of reason: it engages the reader and his experience by
employing terms that customarily belong to the world at large, the
world of so-called reality. Thus, to the extent that such terms as reason
and evil are used by us with confidence, the meaning of this first
sentence becomes problematical, both because these familiar terms en-
courage us to break the fiction and translate back and forth between
our world and the world of the Houyhnhnms and because in extending
the fiction's frame of reference, we become aware of how difficult it is
to arrive at any universally acceptable definition of such terms as reason
and evil, even though we may feel that we know what reason is. The
fact is we do have "Conceptions or Ideas of what is evil," and while
we may share the Houyhnhnms' laudable desire for the cultivation of
reason we may also wonder whether we are or ever have been "wholly
governed by it." In other words, before we know it we are responding
to a manifest fiction because that fiction is implicating us; like Gulliver,
we, too, end up conversing with, or at least about, horses. Once again,
we move from observation to participation, whether we like it or not;
in fact, observation becomes the occasion for participation. Lest we
have any doubts about our being implicated by Swift's fiction, the
second sentence of this passage begins: "Neither is Reason among them
a Point problematical as with us." Who is "us?"—certainly not Gulli-
ver and the Houyhnhnms, nor even Gulliver and the Yahoos, but
Gulliver and his readers. Again, the self-referential dimension of the
fiction is broken and explicitly widened. This passage, it turns out, is
about "us"—maybe even more so than about the Houyhnhnms. We are
compelled, possibly even coerced, to answer back, for reason is indeed
a "Point problematical" with "us." We are, after all, literary critics!
And the third sentence taunts our understanding of reason, for we do
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traffic in "Opinions" and we find it impossible "to affirm or deny only
where we are certain." We may find it impossible precisely because it is
our opinion that rational certainty is unavailable.
What I am trying to say—what this passage encourages me to say—
is that as the text itself denies uncertainty and insists on clarity, mocking
perhaps the reader's customary expectation and need for closure and a
sense of certitude, I am compelled to qualify, if not reject, its clarity
and plead for uncertainty, at least partly to save my own skin. Such a
response, strictly speaking, is not empirically verified by the text, for
my response does not exist in a one-to-one relation with some sort of
meaning within the test. Rather, the text coerces me to respond and
forces me to become a participant in its action, a participant who pleads
for the limitations of rational observation, even as he laments the loss of
"Right Reason." I do feel uneasy with this passage—I still do for a
variety of "reasons." So I begin to explain and I think Swift expects me
to do so. But as I explain, I am really testifying, like it or not, to the
affective appeal of Gulliver's Travels, for it has evoked from me the
consciousness of the problematical nature of reason as a tool for deter-
mining and asserting meaning.
To this point I have not tried to specify a single all-inclusive defini-
tion of satire in Gulliver's Travels, mainly because I wish to resist the
tendency of critics to have some formula in mind before they set out to
discuss this work. In emphasizing the variety of its effects (maybe satire
is a "mixed dish"), I have tried to loosen up this formulaic impulse.
However, I believe that Gulliver's Travels, insofar as it raises in the
reader's mind the consciousness of the problematical nature of meaning,
violates our formulaic procedures in order to expand the reader's aware-
ness of his own personal needs, public commitments, and intellectual
habits and expectations. Swift does not simply tell us to rethink or re-
examine this and that position or assumption; rather he continually
creates occasions in the text which change the reader from an observer
to a participant by leading him to an awareness of the limitations of
reason. The use of reason, for example, is not simply a topic in Gulli-
ver's Travels (i.e., "I have got materials Towards a Treatis proving the
Falsity of that Definition animal rationale; and to show it should be
only rationis capax").12 Rather it is the principal occasion for Swift's
compelling challenge to one of the fundamental bases of the reader's
life. We are never permitted for long to remain detached, because this
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would presume the superiority of the reader's reason; instead we are
sucked into the maelstrom of Swift's epistemological challenges and
hence we frequently feel disoriented and uneasy. In fact, maybe this is
what Swift had in mind when he wrote Pope, "I tell you after all that I
do not hate Mankind, it is vous autres who hate them because you
would have them reasonable Animals and are Angry for being dis-
appointed" (Correspondence, 3:118). One implication of this quota-
tion is that Gulliver's Travels is designed to elicit the reader's sense of
disappointment when he cannot rationally explain, nor remain detached
from, the cumulative effect of Swift's satire.
Here I am tempted to mention, very tentatively, a procedure (not a
definition) that may be operating in some of Swift's satires. The proce-
dure is this: that in many of these works Swift tends to employ manifest
fictions as a device for exposing, analyzing, and often undercutting the
latent fictions—such as the uninspected reliance on reason—of ordinary
human life. I would take this description one step further and remark
that many of Swift's satires begin with a manifest fiction—be it a pro-
posal or the creation of a fictional world—that initially seems totally
foreign to the reader's ordinary life (a sort of external embodiment of
detached observation), but as the satire proceeds Swift continually de-
creases the distance between the manifest fiction and the reader's world
in order to draw the reader into participating in what he only expected
to observe.
Let me try to make this description more concrete by looking briefly
at a more concentrated work, A Modest Proposal, which is narrated by
another observer figure. There are at least two movements in this work
whose rationale Swift has well described in A Short View of the State
of Ireland: "There is not one Argument used to prove the Riches of
Ireland, which is not a logical demonstration of its Poverty" (12:11).
In other words, the same method of reasoning, with respect to the state
of Ireland, can be used to produce contradictory conclusions. But it is
not so much the contradictory conclusions which matter; it is that these
conclusions are the result of a process—the law of the excluded middle,
for example—which the reader expects to lead to one consistent mean-
ing rather than several contradictory meanings. Moreover, the text of
A Modest Proposal does not simply tell us that this is so; the experience
of reading the text yields these contradictory conclusions, and in doing
so elicits from the reader some peculiar effects.
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Roughly the first quarter of A Modest Proposal deals with the os-
tensible subject of "the present deplorable State of the Kingdom" (12:
109). The speaker logically demonstrates the poverty of Ireland, and
from this logical demonstration he draws a conclusion sufficiently
shocking that the reader, or at any rate most readers, will respond to his
proposal of cannibalism as a palpable fiction designed for shock pur-
poses. A certain amount of uneasiness sets in at this point—first be-
cause the proposal itself is shocking and secondly because it has been
arrived at through the apparently bona fide processes of reasoning. At
this point the reader is perhaps left muttering, "This proposal can't be
serious," because though the proposal is demonstrably rational, it is
also morally appalling. Roughly the last three-fourths of A Modest
Proposal logically demonstrates, among other things, that the very
poverty of Ireland may be used as a source for, and proof of, its
riches. The fact of starvation is here shown to be a potential source of
food, clothing, and revenue. Once again, it is not just the conclusion
drawn by the speaker which matters, but the manner in which he arrives
at his conclusion. He has employed the kinds of processes we associate
with reasoning, but because we may find his proposal morally appall-
ing, we are left in a state of mind psychologists call "approach-avoid-
ance." We are at once attracted to the method—to the extent, at any
rate, that we regard ourselves as logical, reasoning people who think,
moreover, that conditions of poverty ought to be ameliorated—but we
are repelled by the conclusion because cannibalism, at least in Western
society, is wholly rejected.
But Swift does not stop here, for there still exists some distance
between the reader and the speaker's proposal. Instead, as in so many
places in Gulliver's Travels, Swift breaks the apparently fictional pro-
posal of cannibalism and insinuates, if not insists on, its virtual authen-
ticity. The italicized section beginning after the statement "Therefore,
let no man talk to me of other Expedients" (12:116) in fact enumerates,
as other commentators have noticed, the many and diverse proposals
Swift made in his own person concerning the deplorable state of Ire-
land. Just a cursory look, for example, at A Proposal for the Universal
Use of Irish Manufacture, or A Short View of the State of Ireland, or
An Answer to a Paper Called a Memorial will demonstrate the irrefut-
able correlation between the italicized section and Swift's, as opposed
to his speaker's, real convictions. But the far more important matter
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concerns why Swift chooses to break his fiction and call attention to his
own biographical presence. One possible answer, which bears directly
on my description of Swift's procedures, is that he wishes to decrease
and eventually obscure the distinction between the speaker's modest
proposal and Swift's own prior proposals in order to emphasize that
there is a real (as opposed to fictional) sense in which the proposal
approaches historical certitude. It is not that Swift wants cannibalism or
believes in cannibalism, but rather that given the actual historical facts
—including the present state of Ireland and Swift's prior proposals for
improving the state of Ireland—there is sufficient plausibility in the
speaker's proposal of cannibalism because it is almost the only method
of "improvement" left to be tried.
The italicized section, in other words, momentarily collapses our
customary distinctions between satire and straightforward belief in
order to demonstrate that all other avenues of improving Ireland's de-
plorable state have been exhausted. Out of this awareness emerges the
problematical and necessarily disorienting effect of A Modest Proposal:
namely, that what initially appeared to be a grotesque but palpable
fiction, advanced by an ostensibly fictional speaker, may also be con-
strued as a reasonably accurate historical estimate of, and solution to,
the deplorable state of Ireland. The manifest fiction has approached fact
and the reader necessarily squirms with uneasiness. For precisely at the
point where the observer narrator declares his rational impartiality, his
detachment dramatizes the moral insufficiency of the use of reason he
so confidently defends: "I profess, in the Sincerity of my Heart, that
I have not the least personal Interest, in endeavouring to promote this
necessary Work; having no other Motive than the publick Good of my
Country, by advancing our Trade, providing for Infants, relieving the
Poor, and giving some Pleasure to the Rich" (12:118). The effect of
this passage is to discredit pure reason as a grotesque fiction by appeal-
ing to the very "personal Interest" the narrator disclaims. The use of
reason and the experience of reading here collide with one another. That
is, A Modest Proposal satisfies all the conditions of reasoning, but the
effect of the work is to make the reader dissatisfied with such dis-
passionate reasoning. Like the narrator, the reader may wish and expect
to remain a detached observer, but the conditions of such observation
would require a grotesque sacrifice of "personal Interest."
Thus the affective appeal of A Modest Proposal, like that of Gulli-
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ver's Travels, derives from Swift's ability to enlarge the reader's aware-
ness by creating a variety of occasions where the reader is led to expect
one kind of meaning which is presumed both to exist within the text
and to be essentially separable from the reader's life, only to have this
expectation violated by Swift's persistent attempts to move back and
forth from a seemingly closed system of coherent fictional references to
the open and problematical world of the reader's experiences and
expectations.
3
Mandeville and the
Force of Prejudice
The experience of reading Swift's satire suggests two things: that
the principal effect of satire is some experience of disorientation,
and that the attempt to define satire reconfirms the original effect
of disorientation. The paradox of satire, as both Gulliver's Trav-
els and A Modest Proposal imply, may well be that at its best it
evokes a broad range of effects by moving the reader from a posi-
tion of rational observation to a discomfiting experience of active
participation. To put it another way, satire often generates its
meaning by dramatizing the disappointment—to use Swift's word
—of the reader's expectation of rationality. At one point in Free
Thoughts on Religion Mandeville writes, "Few People are ac-
quainted with the force of Prejudice: They are not capable of
examining any thing which is rooted into them by Education and
Custom."' This statement summarizes both the great challenge
posed by Mandeville's works and the primary intention from
which his works derive their perplexing effects. Mandeville di-
rectly confronts his readers with the force of their prejudices,
particularly their uninspected assumptions about reason, and he
does so by scrupulously examining the foundations of education
and custom. To understand and appreciate the perplexing effects
of Mandeville's vision requires, therefore, the reader's frequent
revision or abandonment of prejudices and preconceptions, in-
cluding our assumption of formal or aesthetic coherence of liter-
ary texts. For Mandeville explicitly acknowledges that The Fable
of the Bees is "a Rhapsody void of Order or Method."2
Between the appearance in 1705 of "The Grumbling Hive"
and its reappearance in 1714 as part of The Fable of the Bees,
Mandeville obviously decided to establish a more intimate contact
with the reader's experience. He later specifically attributed (1:
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409) the Fable's notoriety to his inclusion in 1723 of "An Essay on
Charity and Charity-Schools." No matter how controversial and intim-
idating the poem qua poem may have been, it clearly took on new and
wider dimensions when it appeared in 1714 as only a part of—and
possibly just the occasion for—a more detailed prose commentary.3
Mandeville could rail all he wanted about a "vain/EUTOPIA seated in
the Brain" (1:36), but this was familiar and expected stuff coming
from a poetic beast fable. Even the octosyllabic couplets—with their
rich tradition already exploited by, among others, Rochester and Butler,
and subsequently the source of so many of Swift's later satiric poems—
no longer had the capacity really to shock a reader, unless, like Swift,
the poet employed obscenity to overcome the equilibrium of octosyllab-
ic satires. But Mandeville, to judge by his procedures in "The Grum-
bling Hive," appears uninterested in obscenity, or unwilling to use it.
The content of his poem may be controversial, but the method, in light
of Restoration poetic tradition, is predictable and the result is all too
familiar. Thus not one of the couplets, not one verse paragraph, in
"The Grumbling Hive" has the explosive appeal of the opening sen-
tence of the prose preface to the poem which was added in 1714:
Laws and Government are to the Political Bodies of Civil Societies, what the
Vital Spirits and Life itself are to the Natural Bodies of Animated Creatures;
and as those that study the Anatomy of Dead carcases may see, that the chief
Organs and nicest Springs more immediately required to continue the Motion of
our Machine, are not hard Bones, strong Muscles and Nerves, nor the smooth
white Skin that so beautifully covers them, but small trifling Films and little
Pipes that are either overlook'd, or else seem inconsiderable to Vulgar eyes; so
they that examine into the Nature of Man, abstract from Art and Education,
may observe, that what renders him a Sociable Animal, consists not in his de-
sire of Company, Good-nature, Pity, Affability, and other Graces of a fair
Outside; but that his vilest and most hateful Qualities are the most necessary
Accomplishments to fit him for the largest, and according to the World, the
happiest and most flourishing Societies. (1:3-4)
Unlike a grumbling hive, with its busy bees performing functions
analogous to those of human beings within the poetic structure of a
beast fable, this sentence, which is also based on analogy, both seizes
the reader's attention and, very likely, assaults his expectations. Hobbes
may have generally spoken this way in Leviathan, but Mandeville is
the master of particulars and, appropriately, of clinical details. In this
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sentence Mandeville achieves a stunning effect by inserting such explo-
sive content within the apparent equilibrium of so well-ordered a struc-
ture.4 The sentence, syntactically, is indeed a tour de force, but its
content, I would argue, is designed to demolish the syntactic beauty.
There are "Political Bodies" and "Natural Bodies," a verbal distinc-
tion which by the end of the sentence will be collapsed, but Mande-
ville's principal interest is in how both these bodies function, analo-
gously, as "Machines," and how, to take the analogy further, the
"Machines" are put into motion.
One might wish to argue at this point that Mandeville's use of
analogy performs a function similar to, say, Swift's manifest fictions,
but I think such an argument is fraught with inconsistencies.5 It is true
that Swift, like Mandeville, is fond of anatomizing mankind, either to
shock or to amuse the reader. But Mandeville's sentence goes beyond
mere shock to the introduction of a basically unfamiliar, or at any rate
unwelcome, system of knowledge which he chooses not to mention and
drop, but to examine, develop, and apply in a basically empirical
manner. As Robert Adolph has noticed, "Mandeville has the sociolo-
gist's instinct to reveal 'what really goes on' under the surface rather
than the outrage emanating from a moral center which characterizes
most satire."6 The focus, in short, is on the prejudices about reason
the reader has acquired through education and custom, especially the
prejudice that reason and morality go hand in hand. With Mandeville's
Fable, therefore, we need to establish a basic distinction between a
manifest fiction as it appears in Swift's satire, and a latent fiction (or
"prejudice") as it appears in the Fable. I do not use this distinction as
a comparison of kinds, but as a way of differentiating between Swift's
use of literary satire and Mandeville's far more empirical approach to
his subject and his readers.
A manifest fiction is a palpably fictional construction—call it Lilli-
put, Brobdingnag, or rope-dancing—that is used as the occasion for sig-
nifying content, public or personal, which the reader has access to or
is already aware of. A manifest fiction does not have a known meaning
in and of itself; it has meaning only to the extent that it points to some-
thing else.7 A latent fiction, as I use the term, is not a literary con-
struction, although it may be the subject of literature; rather it is a tacit
human assumption whose existence is so unquestioned that it has taken
on the status of a truth, or at least appears to be "common sense." Thus
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Robert Hopkins, for example, has argued that "Mandeville's use of
paradox is intended to highlight in public consciousness the unstated
ambiguities of the compromises in a possessive individualistic soci-
ety." 8 When a latent fiction is examined it is inspected for its own sake,
not for what it signifies or symbolizes about something else. Unlike a
manifest fiction, a  latent fiction has a primary meaning of its own; it is
not a secondary vehicle or literary construct for some other primary
meaning. The disorientation, shock, or disturbance that occurs when a
latent fiction is examined—and this does not hold just for satire—
derives from the experience that what the reader, and sometimes the
author, assumed to be a truth is made problematical.9 We are shown
and made to experience that the primary meaning of a latent fiction is
either more or less than what we assumed it to be. Thus the examina-
tion of a latent fiction has the capacity to generate new knowledge—for
example, M. R. Jack has suggested that Mandeville "anticipates the
modern school of behaviorist psychology"10—because such an exam-
ination consistently employs methods of verification, claiming to de-
scribe the reader's world. Moreover, since a latent fiction claims the
status of fact, it is often challenged with facts.11
If we go back to the one-sentence paragraph already quoted, we can
see the difference, albeit in miniature, between a manifest fiction and
a latent fiction. Under certain circumstances the asserted analogies be-
tween "Political Bodies" and "Natural Bodies," and between the
"Anatomy" of physical and political "Carcases" and the concomitant
idea that political and natural bodies both are organized like machines
by principles of motion, all contain the potential of being metaphors
and hence manifest fictions. But Mandeville shortcircuits this fictional
usage by insisting on a radical principle of exclusion: first, when he
says that he will examine "The Nature of Man, abstract [my italics]
from Art and Education," and second, when he declares that "when I
say Men, I mean Neither Jews nor Christians; but meer Man, in the
State of Nature and Ignorance of the true Deity" (1:40). Although it
may be tempting to view Mandeville's use of "man in nature" as a
manifest fiction, I  share Robert Hopkins's view that Mandeville's
"'State of Nature' represents an image of early eighteenth-century
London society as it really was." Moreover, Mandeville's principle of
exclusion enables him to concentrate, as M. R. Jack has argued, on
"considering in detail the behavior of fallen man."12 Such an exclusive
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examination of human behavior deprives the reader of the essential
sources of fictional equilibrium. Take away art, education, and religion,
as Mandeville has clearly done, and man, "meer Man," has been
quickly demythologized and is on the verge of being debunked. The
possibility of sustaining manifest fictions, which derive from fictional
procedures, has been effectively removed by Mandeville, chiefly be-
cause art, education, and religion are the sources of the very "preju-
dices" he calls into question.
From my point of view, this paragraph, despite the potential fiction-
al properties of its analogies, is presented as a straightforward analysis
designed to assault the reader's rational expectations. The paragraph is
not, in the mode of Gulliver's Travels, intended as literary satire,
though it frequently has the effect of satire. It is not satire because it
does not employ manifest fictions; nor is it failed satire, like Defoe's
Shortest Way with Dissenters, because Mandeville at every step is con-
scious that he is examining latent fictions and challenging their status
as facts with some facts of his own. What Mandeville is also aware of,
however, is that his examination of latent fictions can have an effect
similar to satire because his examination employs many of the stylistic
procedures associated with satire. The juxtaposition, for example, of
"hard Bones, strong Muscles and Nerves," "smooth white Skin,"
over against "small trifling Films and little Pipes," has both the appear-
ance and the effect of a satiric distinction, only Mandeville is capital-
izing on such a distinction not to point to something else beyond the
distinction (i.e., that all that glisters is not gold), but to increase our
consciousness of (and tolerance for) the arbitrary but necessary basis
of the distinction itself. Being the nominalist that he is, Mandeville,
like a satirist, deflates noble generalities with mundane particulars, but
the generalities he deflates—"good Nature, Pity, Affability"—he does
not always wish to destroy. He simply wants to heighten our con-
sciousness of their latent fictional properties, at the same time that he is
willing to concede their necessity as fictions that confer meaning on a
well-ordered, flourishing society.
One could say, perhaps, that Mandeville is a nonfiction satirist.13
That is, he uses verifiable details, rather than manifest fictions, to exam-
ine the latent fictions of society. But Mandeville rarely attacks or ridi-
cules the need for latent fictions, so long as they are acknowledged as
fictions; indeed, he defends their necessity and usefulness. What he
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does attack and ridicule is the belief or expectation that latent fictions
are natural, unchanging facts. Even so, MandeviUe, unlike Swift, does
not attack man's pretension to reason; rather, he assumes that capacity
to reason and chooses to widen the reader's understanding of reason.
MandeviUe continually raises the expectation and promotes the notion
that the Fable of the Bees will proceed as a wholly rational inquiry
devoid of manifest fictions because he expects his reader to be rational.
What produces the disorientation—the ostensibly satirical effect—of
the inquiry is that, having excluded art, education, and religion, on
which so many latent human assumptions rest, he can take familiar
concepts thought to be stable, unassailable truths and redefine them in
an apparently reasonable manner. Mandeville uses reason to redefine
reason and the traditional distinctions that are its products, but he does
this not just to ridicule reason, but to give it empirical precision and
to provide the reader with a verifiable mode of self-examination, even
if such self-examination clashes with one's prejudices.
Mandeville's use of reason is to the traditional uses of reason in
his time what logical positivism is to traditional metaphysics: a con-
ceptual reorientation so sweeping in magnitude that it runs the risk,
knowingly, of disorientation because it challenges what were taken to
be established truths. Like a modern positivist attacking traditional
metaphysics, Mandeville writes: "One of the great Reasons why so few
People understand themselves, is that most Writers are always teaching
Men what they should be, and hardly ever trouble their heads with
telling them what they really are" (1:39). A sentence like this has the
potential of appearing to be a satiric distinction, a distinction designed
to humiliate the reader. Traditional satires, after all, do frequently
measure events against an assumed standard of "ought." But Mande-
ville will have none of this: "ought" in the Fable of the Bees takes on
the status of a manifest fiction. It is purely a device, not a natural fact,
and its claim as a natural fact is automatically dismissed. Mandeville's
world is the world of "is," where the ethical oughts of art, education,
and religion are replaced by the arbitrary "is" of political necessity.
In "An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue," for example, the
idea of civilization, which is so often associated with art, education,
and religion, and which is thought to be a well-established and affirma-
tive fact of nature, is shown to be the product of human action and
subsequently human design.14 Instead of considering civilization as a
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fact rooted in nature, Mandeville treats its creation as a logical conse-
quence of man's rational awareness of his individual deficiencies. Men
had to be taught to be civilized in order to channel their basically
destructive instincts into the domain of established public order. Man
was not born rational, as so many people thought; he was taught to be
rational for the good of society:
Those that have undertaken to civilize Mankind, were not ignorant of this;
but being unable to give so many real Rewards as would satisfy all Persons
for every individual Action, they were forc'd to contrive an imaginary one.
. . . They thoroughly examin'd all the Strengths and Frailties of our Nature,
and observing that none were either so savage as not to be charm'd with Praise,
or so despicable as patiently to bear Contempt, justly concluded, that Flattery
must be the most powerful Argument that cou'd be used to Human Creatures.
(1:42-43)
The chief creations of this process of flattery were "the fine Notions
[Men] had receiv'd concerning the Dignity of Rational Creatures"
(1:45). Reason was made the principal latent fiction on which civiliza-
tion and social order were based. From the manipulation of reason "the
first Rudiments of Morality, broach'd by skilful Politicians, to render
Men useful to each other as well as tractable, were chiefly contriv'd
that the Ambitious might reap the more Benefit from, and govern vast
Numbers of them with the greater Ease and Security. This Foundation
of Politicks being once laid, it is impossible that Man should long
remain unciviliz'd" (1:47).
The temptation is strong, even in our day, to react to Mandeville's
argument as literary satire. This is because many of us still hold to the
assumption that reason is a fact, not a fiction. But Mandeville's argu-
ment is no more satirical, in my view, than B. F. Skinner's arguments
in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, where, from the point of view of a
behavioral psychologist, he attempts to demonstrate that freedom, dig-
nity, and the notion of an autonomous reasoning man, are simply words
representing latent fictions that are no longer socially viable because
they cannot account for, and frequently distort, observable facts.
The picture which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a body with a
person inside, but of a body which is a person in the sense that it displays a
complex repertoire of behavior. The picture is, of course, unfamiliar. The man
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thus portrayed is a stranger, and from the traditional point of view he may not
seem to be a man at all. . . .  What is being abolished is autonomous man—the
inner man, the homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the
literatures of freedom and dignity.
His abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man is a device used to
explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed
from our ignorance, and as our understanding increases, the very stuff of which
he is composed vanishes. Science does not dehumanize man, it de-homuncu-
lizes him, and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of the human species.
To man qua man we readily say good riddance. Only by dispossessing him
can we turn to the real causes of human behavior. Only then can we turn from
the inferred to the observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the in-
accessible to the manipulable. (pp. 190-91)
Very much like Skinner's arguments, Mandeville's examination has
the effect of satire because it shakes the equilibrium of familiar con-
cepts which have gained the status of facts. Like Skinner, Mandeville
de-homunculizes and ridicules traditional views of man, and his argu-
ments proceed in the same manner as Skinner's. Mandeville, too, turns
from the inferred to the observed, from the miraculous to the natural,
from the inaccessible to the manipulable. The effect of both books is
one of uneasiness and disorientation, for both books demand a radical
conceptual reorientation and invite the reader's participation in an un-
familiar, and perhaps unwelcome, form of inquiry. To hear someone
speak of civilization as a technology of behavior, to watch someone
reduce the concept of reason to the status of a latent fiction, is to feel
the effect of satire, because so many readers wish to sustain their own
form of rational observation.
This effect of satire arises, both in Mandeville and Skinner, from
their uncanny and unsettling ability to make the reader self-conscious
by associating reason, thought to be a natural good, with the conscious
manipulation of human behavior. Mandeville's vocabulary of con-
sciousness, just in the recent passages I have cited, is relentless: "un-
dertaken," "give," "contrive," "examin'd," "observing," "concluded,"
"used," "broach'd," "render," "reap," "govern," "laid." This is con-
sciousness with a vengeance, so much so that the use of reason takes
on the air of a conspiracy to defraud man of his dignity. What is just
as annoying and disorienting is that Mandeville has not only used the
tool of reason to illumine its status as a latent fiction, but he has used it
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so effectively that his account of reason, whatever our biases may be,
is, at the very least, plausible. Like a persuasive hypothesis, his exami-
nation can account for a large number of phenomena; his account is
probable because it has predictive capacity, in the sense that it can be
used not only to examine but to anticipate human conduct. That is,
Mandeville's frequent anticipation of the reader's response is designed
to confirm the applicability of his hypothesis.
It is a requirement of reasoning, for example, that one must define
terms. This Mandeville does—given his hypothesis about the origin of
moral virtue—in an altogether plausible and consistent manner, but not,
perhaps, in a welcome and familiar way. Let me cite several defini-
tions spread over the length of The Fable of the Bees:
To call every thing, which, without Regard to the Publick, Man should commit
to gratify any of his Appetites, VICE; if in that Action there could be observed
the least prospect, that it might either be injurious to any of the Society, or
render him less serviceable to others. . . . to give the Name of VIRTUE to
every Performance, by which Man, contrary to the Impulse of Nature, should
endeavour the Benefit of others, or the Conquest of his own Passions out of a
Rational Ambition of being good. (1:48-49)
To define then the Reward of Glory in the amplest manner, the most that can
be said of it, is, that it consists in a superlative Felicity which a Man, who is
conscious of having perform'd a noble Action, enjoys in Self-love, whilst he
is thinking on the Applause he expects of others. (1:55)
Pride is that Natural Faculty by which every Mortal that has any Understanding
over-values, and imagines better Things of himself than any impartial Judge,
thoroughly acquainted with all his Qualities and Circumstances, could allow
him. We are possess'd of no other Quality so beneficial to Society, and so
necessary to render it wealthy and flourishing as this, yet it is that which is
most generally detested. (1:124)
Honour in its Figurative Sense is a Chimera without Truth or Being, an Inven-
tion of Moralists and Politicians, and signifies a certain Principle of Virtue not
related to Religion, found in some Men that keeps 'em close to their Duty and
Engagements whatever they be; as for Example, a Man of Honour enters into a
Conspiracy with others to murder a King; he is obliged to go thorough Stitch
with it; and if overcome by Remorse or Good nature he startles at the Enormity
of his Purpose, discovers the Plot, and turns a Witness against his Accomplices,
he then forfeits his Honour, at least among the Party he belong'd to. (1:198-99)
Mandeville and Prejudice 37
Charity is that Virtue by which part of that sincere Love we have for ourselves
is transferred pure and unmix'd to others, not tyed to us by the Bonds of
Friendship or Consanguinity, and even meer Strangers, whom we have no obli-
gation to, nor hope or expect any thing from. (1:253)
All these definitions conform with Mandeville's empirical and ra-
tional principle that "it is impossible to judge of a Man's Performance,
unless we are thoroughly acquainted with the Principle and Motive from
which he acts" (1:56). Reason, in other words, presumes both con-
sciousness and choice; to deny this, according to Mandeville, is to be
irrational. Unlike Swift's many definitions in Gulliver's Travels, which
grow out of the construction of manifest fictions—the effectiveness of
the term "Yahoo," for example, depends considerably on the definition
of its fictional counterpart "Houyhnhnm"—Mandeville's definitions
are not fictional vehicles referring to something external to the fiction.
Mandeville's definitions, while they are shown to be latent fictions that
are the products of a latent fiction "reason," are at the same time
defended as necessary public facts, as opposed to natural facts. These
latent fictions, in and of themselves, have meaning, but it is arbitrarily
assigned meaning, in keeping with Mandeville's consistent nominal-
ism. What makes the definitions disorienting is that what were assumed
to be natural facts—vice, virtue, pride, honor, charity—are asserted
to be the consequence of rational acts and thus subject to human manip-
ulation. What makes these definitions have the effect of satire is that
Mandeville backs his reader into a logical dilemma: namely, that if
reason presumes consciousness and choice, then all rational definitions
must themselves be accessible to consciousness and choice in order to
be rational. If, in short, definitions do not yield themselves to empirical
demonstration and verification, then such definitions, by the laws of
reason, are irrational or at least nonrational.
We can see, again, why Mandeville is so insistent about excluding
art, education, and religion from his inquiry; for these forms of knowl-
edge traditionally have been the source of nonrational systems and
objects of value (i.e., myth, folklore, mysticism, metaphysics, alle-
gory, faith, etc.). Mandeville's subject is men in nature, which is to say
men's actions only as they are accessible to the light of consciousness
and demonstration.15 This is why, for example, Mandeville writes in
"Remark (0)": "Thus I have prov'd, that the Real Pleasures of all Men
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in Nature are worldly and sensual, if we judge from their Practice; I say
all Men in Nature, because Devout Christians, who alone are to be
excepted here, being regenerated, and preternaturally assisted by the
Divine Grace, cannot be said to be in nature" (1:166). The key terms
of exclusion are "regenerated" and "preternaturally assisted," for they
are terms whose referents are not subject to rational demonstration and
examination. Mandeville has refined "Devout Christians" out of sight
and mind, and such exclusion has the appearance of satire. Similarly,
the term "Men in Nature" appears to have a satiric effect, but Mande-
ville's definitions are absolutely consistent and reasonable, in light of
his initial premise that reason presumes consciousness and choice.
Because Mandeville excludes all forms of nonrational or supra-
rational systems of knowledge, he must define all terms in such a way
that they conform with man's actions in the public world as distin-
guished from his intellectual expectations. Mandeville reasons, because
he believes it to be in accordance with reason, from practice to prin-
ciple; or in existential terms, he argues that existence precedes essence.
Value is thus not intrinsic. It is created: it is named and denned, not
found and described. Accordingly, Mandeville's definitions have the
appearance of being "unnatural," which they are, in that they exclude
men from allegedly natural sources of value. His definitions are "un-
natural" in at least two respects: first, because they are unfamiliar in
the sense that they defy common expectations, and secondly because
they are fictional creations of man, rather than innate human attributes.
Like all definitions, Mandeville's arrest motion for purposes of inspec-
tion; but they also cause commotion because they violate, in content,
the reader's conventional expectations. Vice and Virtue are no longer
viewed as natural qualities; they are qualities imposed by the state to
maintain social order. Virtue, thought to be a natural quality by some
moralists, is defined as a social good, a proposition with which most
of us can cheerfully agree, but Mandeville goes one step further and
reminds us that virtue, though a social good, is "contrary to the Im-
pulse of Nature." Mandeville's definition of pride, on the other hand,
appears in the first sentence to preserve its traditional aura of disapprov-
al (i.e., hybris, the pride before the fall), but again he goes one con-
sistent step further, a step in defiance of traditional ethics, and argues
that "no other Quality [is] so beneficial to Society, and so necessary
to render it wealthy and flourishing."
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What gives so much of The Fable of the Bees the appearance and
effect of satire is that, like satire, it plays the visible against the latent,
the outside against the inside, the action against the motive. However,
instead of pushing the reader, as conventional satires do, into the posi-
tion of either/or, Mandeville demands our tolerant understanding of
both the inside and outside, the cause and effect, the motive and the
action. For example, he at once appeals to our understanding of hypoc-
risy (a vice in conventional satire) and defends the need for it, as Swift
does in A Project for the Advancement of Religion and the Reformation
of Manners (1709), on the grounds that it preserves social harmony:
It is impossible we could be sociable Creatures without Hypocrisy. The proof
of this is plain, since we cannot prevent the Ideas that are continually arising
within us, all Civil Commerce would be lost, if by Art and Prudent Dissimula-
tion we had not learn'd to hide and stifle them; and if all we think was to be
laid open to others in the same manner as it is to our selves, it is impossible
that endued with Speech we could be sufferable to one another. I am persuaded
that every Reader feels the Truth of what I say; and I tell my Antagonist that his
Conscience flies in his Face, whilst his Tongue is preparing to refute me.
(1:349)
Mandeville anticipates, rightly, a negative reaction to his observa-
tions on the need for hypocrisy, just as there has been controversy
about whether Swift's Project is ironic or straightforward.16 What is
perhaps not so well recognized is that any attempt to categorize the
above paragraph as palpable satire is itself a form of mistaken refuta-
tion, as well as an implied demonstration of the reader's unwillingness
to participate in the truth of Mandeville's assertion. To call this satire
when Mandeville clearly expects "that every Reader feels the truth of
what I say" is to suppress the discomfort of a demonstrable truth in
order to defend oneself against a persuasive, but threatening, observa-
tion. If the reader refuses to participate in the truth of Mandeville's
observation, then he unwittingly confirms the additional truth of Man-
deville's remark that "the nearer the Object is the more we suffer"
(1:256).
The "Essay on Charity and Charity-Schools" seems not so notori-
ous for its examination of the motives behind charity as for its examina-
tion of the social consequences of creating charity schools. Any reader
who has read this far through The Fable of the Bees would expect
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Mandeville to define charity in an entirely rigorous manner and would
expect him, if he got around to it, to examine in great detail Dr. John
Radcliffe's motives for leaving his fortune to Oxford University. It
comes as no surprise, then, that Dr. Radcliffe's motives are examined
in light of Mandeville's observation that "Pride and Vanity have built
more Hospitals than all the Virtues together" (1:261). This is just
another example, by now familiar, of how a private vice may become
a public benefit. What is surprising—and judging from the reactions
of some of Mandeville's contemporaries downright shocking—is his
attack on charity schools, for this attack, among other things, reverses
Mandeville's customary habit of defending a private vice as a public
benefit. Charity schools have the appearance of being a public benefit,
and Mandeville had earlier examined how the impulse behind charity
is fundamentally an expression of the vain desire to achieve immor-
tality; but in the case of charity schools Mandeville clearly reverses
himself, arguing that this allegedly public benefit, which derives from a
private vice, is in fact a public vice because it threatens social order.
Mandeville's argument develops from the premise that "Craft has a
greater Hand in making Rogues than Stupidity, and Vice in general is
no where more predominant than where Arts and Sciences flourish.
Ignorance is, to a Proverb, counted to be the Mother of Devotion, and
it is certain that we shall find Innocence  and Honesty no where more
general than among the most illiterate, the poor silly Country People"
(1:269). Lest we be tempted to regard Mandeville's premise as being
exclusively satirical—something which evidently many of his contem-
poraries were not tempted to think—let me say straightaway that I
believe his argument against charity schools to be no more satirical than
Pope's lines in An Essay on Man:
ORDER is Heav'n's first law;  and this confest,
Some are, and must be greater than the rest,
More rich, more wise; but who infers from hence
That such are happier, shocks all common sense.
Heav'n to Mankind impartial we confess,
If all are equal in their Happiness:
But mutual wants this Happiness increase,
All Nature's difference keeps all Nature's peace.
Condition, circumstance is not the thing;
Bliss is the same in subject or in king,
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In who obtain defence, or who defend,
In him who is, or him who finds a friend:
Heav'n breaths thro' ev'ry member of the whole
One common blessing, as one common soul.
But Fortune's gifts if each alike possest,
And each were equal, must not all contest?
If then to all Men Happiness was meant,
God in Externals could not place Content.
(4.49-66)
I have heard Pope's lines called smug, and they may even be viewed
as an early version of laissez-faire or what would later pass as Social
Darwinism. But I have never heard or seen an argument that Pope's
lines are satiric. Yet virtually everything Mandeville says about charity
schools, in another guise, is either implied or directly expressed by
Pope's lines. Pope directly states that some people are, and must be,
greater, richer, and wiser "than the rest"; what he doesn't say, but
Mandeville does, is that "the rest" constitute most of mankind, and
that many of "the rest" are not simply less wise, less great, and less
rich. Many are ignorant, bestial, and poor. In short, the drift of Pope's
argument is, as a New Republic editorial once put it, that "The Meek
shall inherit the dearth." Just like Mandeville, moreover, Pope argues
that the poor can be "equal in their Happiness," and somewhat like
Mandeville, Pope asserts that "all Nature's diff'rence keeps all Nature's
peace" because if "Fortune's gifts" were "alike possest, / And each
were equal, must not all contest?" Unlike Mandeville's argument, how-
ever, Pope's arguments are enveloped in urbanity; they retain the
equilibrium of a poetic fiction. His statements are poetic assertions,
obviously more refined than Mandeville's in "The Grumbling Hive,"
and hence make little direct claim on the reader's ordinary sense of
reality. If the quoted passage from Pope were flattened out into prose,
as it was by Soame Jenyns, I daresay the lines would increase their
capacity for controversy, though they still would not be as controver-
sial as Mandeville's arguments.
The principal difference, however, between Mandeville and Pope
is that Pope asserts order to be "Heav'n's first law." From this premise
Pope elaborates his distinction between "Nature" and "Fortune," con-
ceding Fortune to the few, though it is an "unnatural" acquisition, and
reserving "Happiness" for the many, which is a natural, not to say
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divine, attribute. Moreover, in the poem Pope occupies the role of
God's spokesman: he simply elaborates "Heav'n's first law." Mande-
ville, as we have seen, systematically excludes religion, though not the
clergy, from his inquiry. Thus, unlike Pope, he deals exclusively with
Nature, not as it is found, but as man makes it. This fundamental
difference between Pope and Mandeville is clearly evident in their
different methods of composition. Pope chooses to write a kind of in-
tellectual poetic epic: his poetic statements have the appearance—the
formal order—of divine truths tumbling down from heaven. Pope is a
kind of messenger of God's order. Mandeville, on the other hand, is
the expositor of man's order; he speaks from ground level, and cor-
respondingly he uses the secular vehicle of plain prose. Instead of en-
countering Pope's beautifully articulated couplets, whose epigramatic
grace virtually hypnotizes the reader into acceptance even though the
couplets carry the same meaning as Mandeville's arguments, the reader
of "An Essay on Charity and Charity-Schools" confronts such bald
assertions as:
in a Free Nation where slaves are not allow'd of, the surest Wealth consists in
a Multitude of laborious Poor. (1:287)
'Tis too much Money, excessive Wages, and unreasonable Vails that spoil
servants in England. (1:305)
Would both Parties agree to pull off the Masque we should soon discover that
whatever they pretend to, they aim at nothing so much in Charity-Schools as
to strengthen their Party, and that the great Sticklers for the Church, by Educat-
ing Children in the Principles of Religion, mean inspiring them with a Superla-
tive Veneration from the Clergy of the Church of England, and a strong Aver-
sion and immortal Animosity against all that dissent from it. (1:309)
Abundance of hard and dirty Labour is to be done, and coarse Living is to be
complied with: Where shall we find a better Nursery for these Necessities than
the Children of the Poor? none certainly are nearer to it or fitter for it. (1:311)
Finally, Mandeville directly forces to the surface what is latent both
in Pope's "heavenly" exposition of happiness and in his fearful ques-
tion that "if each alike possesst, / And each were equal, must not all
contest?"
To be happy is to be pleas'd, and the less Notion a Man has of a better way of
Living, the more content he'll be with his own; and on the other hand, the
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greater a Man's Knowledge and Experience is in the World, the more exquisite
the Delicacy of his Taste, and the more consummate Judge he is of things in
general, certainly the more difficult it will be to please him. (1:314)
Pope lulls us into a consciousness of the law, but he reminds us that
the law is sanctified by God's plan. Mandeville means to jolt us into a
consciousness not just of the law but of what assumptions exist behind
the law, and he instructs us that the law is man-made and designed,
fundamentally, not as an expression of innate goodness, but for reasons
of self-preservation. Pope attempts to create the impression that a well-
ordered society is an expression of the inherent reasonableness and
goodness of God's plan. Mandeville argues that a well-ordered society
is a product of man's manipulation of reason, and that goodness is a
form of flattery through which men are coerced into being lawful.
What is perhaps most disorienting, and a principal reason why Mande-
ville, and not Pope, is responded to with such hostility, is that Pope
believes in reason as a natural good and believes it to be God's gift to
man; whereas Mandeville demonstrates reason to be a manipulatory
device, a necessary fiction, to be used for what Skinner calls "cultural
design."
This matter of "cultural design," and the attendant question con-
cerning the relation between reason and goodness, is the subject of "A
Search into the Nature of Society." In this essay Mandeville system-
atically explicates his memorable assertion that "Private Vices by the
dextrous Management of a Skilful Politician may be turn'd into Publick
Benefits" (1:369). This controversial formulation is the logical conse-
quence of assumptions Mandeville makes and defends throughout "A
Search into the Nature of Society." He attacks Shaftesbury because
Shaftesbury "looks upon Virtue and Vice as permanent Realities that
must ever be the same in all Countries and all Ages, and imagines that
a Man of sound Understanding, by following the rules of Good Sense,
may not only find out that Pulchrum and Honestum both in Morality
and the Works of Art and Nature, but likewise govern himself by his
Reason" (1:324). Mandeville clearly believes the notion of "Virtue
and Vice as permanent Realities" to be a latent fiction. The verbal
distinction between vice and virtue may itself approach permanence in
human society, but the ostensible meaning to which such a distinction
refers is not permanent nor innate; it is a product of human action, if
not of human design. Mandeville is logically committed, as a nominal-
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ist, to resist any version of innatism or Platonism; thus he must chal-
lenge Shaftesbury's assumptions. In addition, Shaftesbury's notion pre-
sents Mandeville with an interesting test case: Which author, through
the exercise of reason, can best explain the facts of human behavior in
such a way that those facts become accessible to reason, demonstra-
tion, and verification? On purely empirical grounds Shaftesbury doesn't
stand a chance, chiefly because he assumes, Platonist that he is, the
limits of empiricism, whereas Mandeville argues that empiricism is all
we have if we wish to exercise what is called reason.
In other parts of this essay I have mentioned Mandeville's nominal-
ism. It is a wholly consistent linguistic and philosophical position for
him to adopt since he quite clearly rejects, as he does in his discussion
of Shaftesbury, any notion of universal truths. This is why Mandeville
deals exclusively with the world of "is," not "ought," and why he can
so confidently proclaim a position of moral relativism toward the end of
"A Search into the Nature of Society": "It is in Morality as it is in
Nature, there is nothing so perfectly Good in Creatures that it cannot be
hurtful to any one of the Society, nor any thing so entirely Evil, but it
may prove beneficial to some part or other of the Creation: So that
things are only Good and Evil in reference to something else, and ac-
cording to the Light and Position they are placed in" (1:367). In The
Fable of the Bees "ought" is really "is" in disguise, and Mandeville
is defending moral relativism as a hypothesis which provides us with a
better description of the facts than does any hypothesis positing man's
innate goodness or the permanence of vice and virtue as universal cate-
gories. With Mandeville, clearly context—rather than any ethical im-
perative—means everything: it is both the principal vehicle and effect
of his inquiry, a fact neatly capsulized in his assertion that "Private
Vices by the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician may be turn'd
into Publick Benefits."lT
Projected against a set of traditional absolutist expectations, Mande-
ville's argument is necessarily disorienting because its affective appeal
exceeds the familiar boundaries of applied reason. But it is disorienting
precisely because he raises latent assumptions to the level of conscious
manipulation and thereby presents an unwelcome picture of human
behavior; indeed, this is how he addresses "the force" of his reader's
"prejudices." Mandeville's is a world of evolving human design,
where change is absolute, where meaning is arbitrary, and where ethics,
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whose stability is so often assumed, is shown to be a fictional, though
necessary, construction.18 Ultimately, Mandeville's world picture is no
more satiric, and no less controversial, than B. F. Skinner's view that
almost everyone makes ethical and moral judgments but this does not mean
that the human species has "an inborn need or demand for ethical standards."
(We could say as well that it has an inborn need or demand for unethical
behavior, since almost everyone behaves unethically at some time or other.)
Man has not evolved as an ethical or moral animal. He has evolved to the point
at which he has constructed an ethical or moral culture. He differs from the
other animals not in possessing a moral or ethical sense but in having been
able to generate a moral or ethical social environment, (p. 167)
One can well understand how Mandeville's procedures and conclu-
sions, like Skinner's, can convey the appearance of satire, chiefly be-
cause they challenge the reader's habitual ways of thinking and acting,
raising latent assumptions to the level of manifest fictions. But we
should also take note that Mandeville, unlike Swift or other satirists,
is continually testing his premises against observable facts in accor-
dance with the standards of rational examination. Many readers may not
wish to acknowledge, or participate in, the truths of such an inquiry; but
the affective appeal of the Fable is such that if the reader repudiates
Mandeville, he does so at the risk of confessing the force of his own
prejudices. For, as Mandeville shrewdly notices, "Calumny, it seems,
is the shortest Way of Confuting an Adversary, when Men are touch'd
in a sensible Part" (1:410).
Defoe, Deliverance,
and Dissimulation
Many commentators have observed that Defoe has the uncanny
and sometimes unsettling ability of identifying with the wide
range of characters and situations he writes about—so much so
that many of his works blur the literary convention of unity of
point of view. Defoe's fiction has been subjected to both secu-
lar and religious readings, and the tension between these views
may itself be endemic to much eighteenth-century fiction. Just a
brief sampling of some recent Defoe criticism indicates both the
variety of interpretations applied to his novels and the broad range
of effects evidently elicited by these novels. Everett Zimmerman,
for instance, has argued that "Defoe's central achievement from
Robinson Crusoe to Roxana is the same: with great power and
some precision, he presents characters who have been taught to
assume souls but have difficulty in finding them."1 Zimmerman
further notes a dissonance between Defoe's ostensibly spiritual
structures and his enactment of distinctly secular experiences;
thus he argues that in Robinson Crusoe, "The religious structure
has not resolved the psychological problem: Crusoe's story has
been organized according to a traditional pattern that does not
explain his behavior" (p. 35). Rather, what Zimmerman sees is
that "Defoe surrounds Crusoe with fragments of meaning; the
bare character is chaotic energy" (p. 44).
This "chaotic energy," to take another critical example, is
precisely the interest of John J. Richetti, only he calls the energy
"unmediated personal experience."2 Like Zimmerman, Richetti
senses a disjunction between secular and religious views in
Defoe's fiction, but he goes on to argue that it is the function of
all novelists to reveal "that process whereby experience is sepa-
rated from ideology and becomes conscious of itself as the power-
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ful if often undirected opposite of ideology" (p. 18). Thus Richetti later
argues, concerning Moll Flanders, that "beneath the conventional
language of repentance, we can easily read the language of self-asser-
tion" (p. 136). If there is a critical consensus to be extracted from these
views on the role of secular and religious experiences in Defoe's fiction,
it has perhaps been most forcefully and flexibly stated by G. A. Starr,
who, speaking of Defoe's use of casuistry, has observed: "It is largely
by eschewing the schematic, whether in its wordly or otherwordly
versions, that Defoe manages to register (if not always to resolve) so
many of the moral tensions and complexities of his characters' ca-
reers." 3 In short, what Defoe does throughout his fiction is to draw the
reader into the processes of thought—religious and secular—of his
characters, thus decreasing the distance between the reader and the
characters he ostensibly observes, because, as Starr notes, "Defoe's
view of life [is] intensely problematic" (p. viii).
I use the term dissimulation, in this regard, to characterize both the
authorial procedure and the problematical effects of many of Defoe's
works. Defoe's dissimulation breaks down any sense of narrative dis-
tance, first, by apparently projecting the author totally into a character
in order to authenticate the way that character thinks and acts, and
secondly, by luring the reader not merely into observing, but participat-
ing in, the way a particular character's mind works. The cumulative
effect of this procedure is that both author and reader are led into a
mutual process of dissimulation whereby, voluntarily or involuntarily,
we become, even if only for a moment, active participants in thoughts
and actions which in our conscious life and in our conventional moral
habits we might otherwise reject. Like the author, the reader becomes,
if only temporarily, what Defoe's characters either are or pretend to be.
In this respect, one might say that the very process of dissimulation
which makes the Shortest Way with the Dissenters, from one point of
view, a failed satire, is also the very process that enables Defoe to write
his most successful fiction.
I call this process of entrapment dissimulation, rather than either
imitation or ambiguity, because on the one hand I do not believe that
Defoe mimetically represents characters so much as he imaginatively
becomes them. Mimetic representation suggests both authorial distance
and conscious control, whereas I believe Defoe neither preserves dis-
tance nor consistently exerts much authorial control. On the other hand,
I do not use the term ambiguity to describe this narrative process
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because ambiguity suggests uncertainty among several choices. A liter-
ary work is ambiguous when a reader senses divergent possibilities of
meaning and is uncertain which possibility constitutes the primary
meaning. But with Defoe all meaning is primary because all experience,
despite religious or ethical codes, has a claim to authenticity, and this
is where I think Defoe and Richardson part company. In Defoe, the sole
literary criterion of truth is experience, not correspondence to exterior
perspectives or norms. Meaning is what emerges from the expression
of diverse thoughts, and the truth of such meaning is left to the reader
to determine, if he so chooses.
I can think of no better way of describing Defoe's authorial pro-
cedures than by briefly looking at two of his letters. In a letter to
Robert Harley, Defoe advises him:
In your Perticular Post Sir you may So Govorn, as That Every Party shall
believ you Their Own. . . .  This is the Dissimulation I Recommend, which is
Not Unlike what the Apostle Sayes of himself; becoming all Things to all Men,
that he might Gain Some. This Hypocrisie is a Vertue, and by This Conduct
you Shall Make your Self Popular, you shall be Faithfull and Usefull to the
Soveraign and belov'd by The People.4
Later, acting as a secret agent for Harley, Defoe reports from Scotland:
I am Perfectly Unsuspected as Corresponding with anybody in England. I
Converse with Presbyterian, Episcopall-Dissenter, papist and Non Juror, and I
hope with Equall Circumspection. I flatter my Self you will have no Com-
plaints of my Conduct. I have faithful Emissaries in Every Company And I
Talk to Everybody in Their Own way. To the Merchants I am about to Settle
here in Trade, Building ships & c. With the Lawyers I Want to purchase a
House and Land to bring my family & live Upon it (God knows where the
Money is to pay for it). To day I am Goeing into Partnership with a Membr
of Parliamt in a Glass house, to morrow with Another in a Salt work. With
the Glasgow Mutineers I am to be a fish Merchant, with the Aberdeen Men a
woolen and with the Perth men a Linen Manufacturer, and still at the End of
all Discourse the Union [of England and Scotland] is the Essentiall and I am
all to Every one that I may Gain some. {Letters, pp. 158-59)
While two quotations do not necessarily make a case, Defoe has
outlined his position in sufficient detail in the privacy of correspondence
that I think we can take his dissimulation as being entirely sincere. It
is tempting to attack Defoe as a hypocrite, but such an attack, as I
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shall argue, represents a denial of the peculiar effects that Defoe's
fiction elicits from his readers. The kind of dissimulation Defoe both
recommends and boasts about to Harley he clearly believes to be a
"Vertue." This conviction is so strong that Defoe in both letters alludes
to 1 Corinthians 9:22—"I am made all things to all men, that I might
by all means save some"—in support of his own position. It is also
tempting to draw from Defoe's citation of scripture the further implica-
tion that he thinks of himself and Harley as, in some sense, apostles
of the public good, the public good in this case being the union of
England and Scotland. From one point of view it could be argued that
such a position represents a debasement of scripture, but there is no
questioning the sincerity of Defoe's convictions. The virtues that de-
volve from his political interpretation of scripture all point to the de-
sirability of certain public attributes: in Defoe's words, "By This
Conduct you shall Make Your Self Popular, you shall be Faithfull and
Usefull to the Soveraign and belov'd by The People." But these public
attributes are merely the social surface of a larger private secret: the
secret of dissimulation.5
Although it is no part of my argument that there exists a simple
one-to-one relation between what Defoe says in his correspondence and
what he enacts in his fiction, it is the central thesis of this chapter
that the very dissimulation Defoe recommends in the two letters quoted
carries over, in varying degrees and for a variety of purposes, to his
fiction, and is the source of his affective appeal. This matter may be
stated another way: conventional morality tends to regard dissimulation
as hypocrisy, as something akin to vice, but Defoe's fiction frequently
represents dissimulation as the necessary means of achieving and con-
solidating public success, as well as the occasion for expressing the
secret desires and needs of his own readers. Defoe's dissimulating
characters act out what is at least latent in the lives of many of his
readers: the need to dissimulate in order to preserve secrets and the
desire to know the secrets of others as they dissimulate in public life.
Indeed, as Mandeville so well demonstrates, it is impossible to go
through public life without dissimulation, but the dissimulation of
Defoe's fiction is often made palatable to his readers, unlike the hypoc-
risy in Mandeville's Fable, because we are induced to believe that the
dissimulation, once we finish the book, becomes a thing of the past.
That is, through the narrative device of presenting his novels as recol-
lections or memoirs, we are made to witness the acts of looking back
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upon a period of past dissimulation, but we are similarly encouraged at
the conclusion of the novels to anticipate, if not participate in, a deliv-
erance—perhaps providential, perhaps not—from dissimulation.
The one exception to this pattern—in its results, not in its outline—
is Roxana, and it is an important exception. In this work, which is in
many respects Defoe's most "modern" novel, the dissimulation never
ceases, for the process of recollection, both formally in Roxana's nar-
rative and psychologically in the reader's experience of her narrative,
is frustrated by the denial of an anticipated resolution. The novel, in
other words, is not only about dissimulation; it is dissimulation, and
Roxana is condemned to her own hell. The presence of dissimulation
is made so manifest, with the sense that it is a process without end,
that many readers, expecting Defoe to follow his usual procedures of
"saving" or delivering his central character as well as his reader, have
been affronted and disoriented by the novel's rigor, and in reaction they
have attempted to sidestep the book's affective appeal by quibbling
about whether it is a finished book or whether its conclusion is at all
plausible.
Let me return, however, to the original pattern of dissimulation and
to how Defoe constructs a work so that it can (and has) become all
things to all men. When I say "constructs" I do not intend to imply
that Defoe knows at every step what he is doing; he is clearly not the
great conscious craftsman that Fielding is, but it does not follow from
this comparison that Defoe is therefore not a fine novelist. At least two
of his novels have achieved a wide audience, both in and out of the
academic community, and it seems to me valuable to try to talk about
what has made these books so popular and, in many ways, rewarding
to such a diversity of readers. Perhaps Virginia Woolf is right when she
observes about Defoe's fiction that "we find for ourselves meanings
which he was careful to disguise even from his own eye,"6 for this
process is inevitable if Defoe's view of life is as problematic as G. A.
Starr has suggested. The diversity of interpretations of Defoe, which is
as much evidence of his ability to be "all things to all men" as it is
evidence of his readers' critical shortcomings, was well and truly
prophesied by Defoe's contemporary, Charles Gildon, when he ven-
tured to predict:
The Fabulous Proteus of the Ancient Mythologist was but a very faint Type of
our Hero, whose Changes are much more numerous, and he far more difficult
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to be constrain'd to his own Shape. If his Works should happen to live to the
next Age, there would in all probability be a greater Strife among the several
Parties, whose he really was, than among the seven Graecian Cities, to which
of them Homer belong'd: The Dissenters first would claim him as theirs, the
Whigs in general as theirs, the Tories as theirs, the Nonjurors as theirs, the
Papists as theirs, the Atheists as theirs, and so on to what Sub-divisions there
may be among us.7
One need only mention the various and influential readings of
Robinson Crusoe to demonstrate both how accurate Gildon's prediction
is and how successfully Robinson Crusoe has become "all things to all
men." Maximillian Novak and John Robert Moore provide important
social and economic readings of Robinson Crusoe, G. A. Starr and
J. Paul Hunter supply important religious dimensions, and Ian Watt has
written a singularly influential essay on the story as a myth.8 The ques-
tion to be asked is not whether they can be all right or all wrong, for
criticism, finally, is not subject to the law of the excluded middle. All
these essays should be welcomed as having brought to our attention the
unique and various appeals of Defoe's fiction, and it is the broad appeal
of Robinson Crusoe, I gather, that prompted Virginia Woolf to declare
about the novel that it "resembles one of the anonymous productions
of the race rather than the effort of a single mind; and as for celebrating
its centenary we should as soon think of celebrating the centenaries
of Stonehenge itself" (CE, 1:62). Evidently, Defoe's singular accom-
plishment is to use specific events, with particular and recognizable
contexts (religious, moral, social, psychological), which evoke the
reader's capacity to project larger experiences and patterns of meaning
on the events of the book.
If we focus for the moment on one recurrent term which weaves
throughout Robinson Crusoe—"deliverance" (also "deliver" and
"delivered")—we can see how this term may elicit diverse, and some-
times contrary, effects.9 This term, as the OED demonstrates, has
diverse meanings, but the principal meaning of "deliverance" is, to
quote the OED, "The action of delivering or setting free, or fact of
being set free; liberation, release, rescue." Johnson's dictionary defines
deliverance as meaning, among other things, "The act of freeing from
captivity, slavery, or any oppression; rescue," and Johnson goes on to
cite Luke 4:18, as well as David's prayer for deliverance in Psalm 64.
The important point to notice is that the term can have secular and
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spiritual meanings simultaneously, for unlike Richardson's Clarissa,
Robinson Crusoe accommodates a variety of readers. If one is pre-
disposed to reading Robinson Crusoe in light of the tradition of spiritual
autobiography, then "deliverance" will mean one thing, and one will
be able to trace in the novel a pattern of fall, repentance, and redemp-
tion. If, on the other hand, one is inclined toward reading the novel in
light of social and economic thought, then the term will take on a
different meaning. But to limit the term in either way is to deprive it of
its resonance and to deny the dimensions of experience the term may
elicit.
Fairly early in Robinson Crusoe, Robinson starts reading the Bible
and comes upon Psalms 50:15—"And call upon me in the day of
trouble: I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me."10 Robinson
ponders the verse, initially construing deliverance as complete freedom
from the island, but then it occurs to him "that I pored so much upon
my deliverance from the main affliction that I disregarded the deliver-
ance I had receiv'd . . .  Have I not been deliver'd, and wonderfully
too, from sickness? from the most distress'd condition that could be,
and that was so frightful to me, and what notice had I taken of it? Had
I done my part?" (RC, p. 79). Here, within the ambience of Robinson's
scriptural reading, two secular meanings of the term are played against
one another: deliverance as complete freedom and deliverance as a
limited freedom from illness, which in turn leads Robinson to thank
God for small blessings. For someone like Bunyan, deliverance points
in only one direction: to the Celestial City and eternal, not secular,
life. For Robinson this term is adjusted to a broad range of secular
experiences within a religious context.
Robinson obsessively returns to variations on Psalms 50:15 and the
notion of deliverance, both spiritual and secular. Recalling this psalm,
he later reminds the reader, "How frequently in the course of our lives
the evil which in it self we seek most to shun, and which, when we are
fallen into it, is the most dreadful to us, is oftentimes the very means
or door of our deliverance, by which alone we can be rais'd again from
the affliction we are fallen into" (RC, p. 146)—a point that is sub-
sequently reaffirmed when we are later told that God "does not leave
his creatures so absolutely destitute but that in the worst circumstances
they have always something to be thankful for, and sometimes are near-
er their deliverance than they imagine; nay, are even brought to their
deliverance by the means by which they seem to be brought to their
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destruction" (RC, pp. 202-203). These passages could be interpreted
cynically as a version of sinning your way to heaven, or as a version
of the paradox of the fortunate fall, or as an example of the short-
sightedness of man, or as a statement of reassurance to the reader that
we are all sinful but, with patience and a good heart, we will all
eventually be delivered from our present afflictions.
It is this last sense of reassurance—at once secular and religious—
which eventually dominates the last pages of the novel, for the reader,
like Robinson, will be "saved" by Defoe. The reader, one could sur-
mise, is a person who has known a sense of sin or guilt or anxiety
and who, in a penitential state of mind, has yearned for deliverance,
be it secular or spiritual, both witnesses and participates in Robinson's
liberation from an extended period of isolation (twenty-eight years, two
months, and nineteen days, to be exact). Moreover, it is fascinating to
observe how Robinson responds to the captain who rescues him from
the island; for the captain, in accordance with the multiple uses of
deliverance, simultaneously appears as a secular presence and a spiritual
vehicle of deliverance:
Then I took my turn, and embrac'd him as my deliverer; and we rejoyc'd
together. I told him I look upon him as a man sent from heaven to deliver me,
and that the whole transaction seemed to be a chain of wonders; that such things
as these were the testimonies we had of a secret hand of Providence governing
the world, and an evidence that the eyes of an infinite power could search into
the remotest corner of the world, and send help to the miserable whenever he
pleased. (RC, p. 219)
This is an expression of the most reassuring form of dissimulation, for
the passage clearly evokes both a secular and a religious meaning with
perfect equanimity, and thereby adjusts itself to a variety of readers.
Such reassurance, I might add, is antithetical to Richardson's under-
standing of deliverance, and it points to a major difference between
Richardson's and Defoe's understanding of religion, as I shall argue in
the next chapter.
In fact, however, the most magnificent act of dissimulation in this
passage may be that it is neither the captain nor God whom we finally
sense as the agent of Providence. As Homer Brown has suggested,
"While Defoe is impersonating Robinson Crusoe, he is also imperson-
ating on another level Providence itself."11 That is, he is himself the
author of a "chain of wonders" which are as well testimonies of his
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"secret hand of Providence governing the world." Obviously all novel-
ists are in some respect providential since they can control their charac-
ters' fate and determine the outcome of their story. But what I am sug-
gesting is that in Robinson Crusoe, and to a lesser extent in Moll
Flanders, Captain Singleton, and Colonel Jack, Defoe himself, mainly
through his remarkable conclusions, either imitates or becomes the in-
visible hand of God, and thereby "delivers" his readers, just as he
saves his characters. I would further suggest that many readers intuitive-
ly sense this to be Defoe's basic appeal, and thus they come to expect
a mysterious deliverance to occur at the end of Defoe's novels (includ-
ing Journal of the Plague Year, even if it is not regarded as a novel).
The expectation of deliverance is frustrated once—in Roxana—and I
would say this is a sure sign that here Defoe abandons his providential
role as a deliverer, just as he abandons Roxana to her own agonizing
fate.
What Moll Flanders seeks, for example, is precisely what Robin-
son originally abandoned and took twenty-eight years to recover: the
middle state of life, where one satisfies both secular and spiritual
needs.12 Moll tell us: "I knew what I aim'd at, and what I wanted,
but knew nothing how to pursue the End by direct means; I wanted to
be placed in a settled State of Living, and had I happen'd to meet with
a sober good Husband, I should have been as faithful and true a Wife
to him as Virtue it self could have form'd: If I had been otherwise,
the Vice came in always at the Door of Necessity, not at the Door of
Inclination" (MF, p. 101). But Moll is unlike Robinson in two im-
portant respects, which in turn point to her defense and need of dis-
simulation. Robinson frequently attributes his own conduct to "a meer
wandring inclination" (RC, p. 6), and he further asserts that "I was
under no necessity of seeking my bread" (RC, p. 71). Moll, on the
other hand, says she is moved by necessity, not by inclination. Now we
need not believe Moll totally to appreciate that the novel works some-
what differently from Robinson Crusoe. Even if Moll is moved by
necessity, it is clear that many of her actions delight both her and her
reader's inclinations, but more of this later when we examine the novel's
preface. The point is that Moll in this passage is building up a case for
dissimulation (i.e., other than "direct means") on the grounds that she
is a woman, and she is justifying her dissimulation as a means to
achieve the very middle state Robinson rejected.
As a woman in a male-dominated society, Moll is just as isolated
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as Robinson on the island. She does not enjoy the social reassurance
that would be provided 250 years later by the woman's movement. To
this extent, Moll's isolation would and should have considerable reso-
nance for her female readers. But Moll also has the capacity, like
Robinson, to be all things to all men, for her use of dissimulation to
achieve "a settled State of Living" represents a desire that many read-
ers both know and share. What is more remarkable about Moll is that
she does not simply state her case abstractly; rather, she turns the fact
of her isolation into an instrument—possibly of casuistry—to implicate
the reader in her own dissimulation.13 She turns to the reader as her
confidant, and if, after hearing her out, we read on, then we have
tacitly endorsed her actions:
I found by experience, that to be Friendless is the worst Condition, next to
being in want that a Woman can be reduc'd to: / say a Woman, because 'tis
evident Men can be their own Advisers, and their own Directors, and know how
to work themselves out of Difficulties and into Business better than Women;
but if a Woman has no Friend to Communicate her Affairs to, and to advise
and assist her, 'tis ten to one but she is undone; nay, and the more Money she
has, the more Danger she is in of being wrong'd and deceiv'd. . . . In the
next place, when a Woman is thus left desolate and void of Council, she is
just like a Bag of Money, or a Jewel dropt on the Highway, which is a Prey
to the next Comer; if a Man of Virtue and upright Principles happens to find it,
he will have it cried [advertised], and the Owner may come to hear of it again;
but how many times shall such a thing fall into Hands that will make no
scruple of seizing it for their own, to once that it shall come into good Hands.
(MF, pp. 100-101)
I have already remarked on how Moll implicates the reader as her
sympathetic confidant. But even if we are not sympathetic, this passage
forestalls any attempt the reader might make to put some distance be-
tween himself and Moll. Moll forces a recognition of her condition on
the reader. She is alone in at least two respects: she is without friends,
and, as a woman, she is isolated in a male-dominated society. But she
turns her apparent social weakness as a woman into an affective strength
as she deals with her reader. That is, insofar as this passage is directed
to men she uses her vulnerability as a woman as the occasion for flatter-
ing male social prowess: "'Tis evident Men can be their own advisers,
and their own Directors, and know how to work themselves out of
Difficulties and into Business better than Women." But what is this
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special knowledge that males possess? Social power certainly, but is not
social power frequently exercised through dissimulation? Harley and
Defoe know so, and I suspect the reader does as well. This mutual
awareness of dissimulation between the reader and Moll is still further
underscored by her comments on money. Money alone will not solve
Moll's problems, for "the more Money she has, the more Danger she
is in of being wrong'd and deceiv'd." Wronged and deceived by
whom? If men dominate social and political power, it follows that men
are more likely to wrong and deceive a woman; in short, the bond of
dissimulation is tightened still more, and the male reader must at least
recognize what she is saying, even if he chooses not to be implicated.
This appeal is directed to the reader's own observations and experi-
ences—to the reader's own use of dissimulation—and we are even pro-
vided with a test by which we can estimate our own position with
respect to Moll's arguments. What would we do if we happened upon
a bag of money or a jewel dropped on the highway? Would we keep
it or return it? Granting the possibility of the latter, Moll nevertheless
suggests the probability of the former. In keeping with Defoe's use of
dissimulation, this test grows out of a perplexing analogy: that is, if
Moll in her present condition is like a bag of money or a jewel, then
the question becomes, Whose hands will she fall into—both within
and without the novel? What will the reader do with her? The analogy
suggests that Moll, though presently discarded, is valuable. What is her
value, and what is implied about the reader's understanding of her value
in the tantalizing sentence, "But how many times shall such a thing fall
into Hands that will make no scruple of seizing it for their own, to once
that it shall come into good Hands?" Isn't it possible for something to
be seized as our own and yet fall into "good Hands?" Seeing this
question in relation to Moll's later summation of the moral of her his-
tory and the preface to the novel will illumine Moll's relationship to
the reader and the larger affective appeal of the novel.
Toward the end of the novel, Moll summarizes the value of her
recollections in this way: "The Moral indeed of all my History is left
to be gather'd by the Senses and Judgment of the Reader; I am not
Qualified to preach to them, let the Experience of one Creature com-
pleatly Wicked, and compleatly Miserable be a Storehouse of useful
warning to those that read" (MF, p. 210). Few readers, so far into the
novel, believe that Moll is either "compleatly Wicked" or "compleatly
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Miserable." She is not completely wicked because the more we know
about any person—the more information we accumulate about a per-
son's past (and we certainly know a lot about Moll's past)—the more
difficult it is to pass the inflexible judgment of wickedness on him.
Moreover, because the reader is implicated by Moll's dissimulation he
is likely to temper his judgments on the prudent grounds that he knows
the complexities of his own motives and is not about to condemn him-
self without qualification. Nor is Moll completely miserable, though she
surely knows misery. She is too energetic, too alive, to be completely
miserable. Does it then follow that Moll is a liar in this and similar
passages, or that Defoe is being ironic? I think not. This passage is
an instance of her (and Defoe's) dissimulation in the sense that the
meaning of the passage points in several directions. Moll's seeming
condemnation of herself satisfies any moral inclination to judge her
according to conventional ethical standards; in a sense she disarms us
with her candor. But at the same time the cumulative effect of her
experiences severely qualifies the usefulness or applicability of such
detached standards. This is a classic example of how Defoe's charac-
ters, as Everett Zimmerman has argued, "present their own cases and
demand our sympathy. We are not put in the position of detached
observers who overlook the instructive collapse of a puppet."14
Moreover, this dissimulation with the reader is suggested by the
distinction Moll makes between "the Senses and Judgment of the
Reader." "Judgment" may refer to the reader's use of reason and ob-
servation, but it can also refer to the moral tendency either to approve
or condemn an action. "Sense" could refer to good sense or common
sense, but Moll uses the plural form "Senses," which suggests to me
that she is alluding to how we feel about her, how we experience her.
In this reading, judgment and sense, or the tendency to evaluate ab-
stractly as distinguished from experiencing emotionally, may well come
into conflict, and I daresay many readings of Moll Flanders, as well
as readings of other works of Defoe, tend to veer between sympathy
and judgment, to use G. A. Starr's useful distinction.15 The reader
hesitates between the apparent poles of judgment and sympathy, obser-
vation and participation, and he is left in this condition because, like
Moll, he emotionally feels the need for dissimulation, though he may
abstractly disapprove of it.
This reading receives considerable impetus from the novel's pref-
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ace, which acts as a paradigm of the reader's subsequent experience of
the novel. At the heart of this paradigm is the implication that the
reader, like Moll, is both familiar with and an agent of dissimulation:
What is left 'tis hop'd will not offend the chastest Reader or the modestest
Hearer; and as the best use is made even of the worst story, the Moral 'tis
hop'd will keep the Reader serious even where the story might incline him to be
otherwise: To give the History of a wicked life repented of, necessarily requires
that the wicked Part should be made as wicked as the real History of it will
bear, to illustrate and give a Beauty to the Penitent part, which is certainly
the best and brightest, if related with equal Spirit and Life.
It is suggested there cannot be the same Life, the same Brightness and
Beauty, in relating the Penitent Part, as is in the Criminal Part: If there is any
Truth in that Suggestion, I must be allow'd to say, 'tis because there is not
the same taste and relish in the Reading, and indeed it is too true that the
difference lyes not in the real worth of the Subject so much as in the Gust
and Palate of the Reader.
But as this work is chiefly recommended to those who know how to Read
it, and how to make the good Uses of it, which the Story all along recommends
to them, so it is to be hop'd that such Readers will be much more pleas'd with
the Moral than the fable, with the Application than with the Relation, and with
the End of the Writer than with the Life of the Person written of. (MF, pp. 3-4)
The preface is both an instance of, and a stimulus to employ,
semantic juggling. Verbally, as well as psychologically, the whole
passage is built on dissimulation. If we focus on the distinctions
established in this passage, we can see how, individually and collective-
ly, they not only express paradoxes but cumulatively induce a kind of
mental paralysis, where the process of rational observation is overtaxed
with distinctions. That is, how many distinctions can a rational reader
sustain simultaneously? How many terms can the reader juggle before
he loses his grip? We are told that the "best use" may be made of the
"worst story," that the "Moral" may keep the reader "serious," even
if the "story" might incline us to be "otherwise," that the "wicked
Part," if it is to be authentic, must be really wicked, but the "Penitent
part" will have the greater "Beauty"; but if the reader should prefer
the wicked part, it is not the writer's fault—it is the fault of "the Gust
and Palate of the Reader." Assuming that all readers, to varying ex-
tents, possess a gust and palate, we are nevertheless cautioned that this
book is chiefly recommended to those "who know how to Read it, and
how to make the good Uses of it," and presumably those readers who
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know how to read the book properly will be more pleased with (and
capable of sustaining throughout the novel) the following distinctions:
the "Moral" rather than the "Fable," the "Application" rather than
the "Relation," the "End of the Writer" rather than the "Life of the
Person written of." Such distinctions are a virtual parody of what I
call the impossible observer.
This passage has it all ways and in fact meshes well with Moll's
dissimulation and her ability to implicate the reader. Like Moll's analo-
gy of the bag of money and jewel, the passage creates problems in the
guise of providing solutions to them. It is possible, abstractly, to sus-
tain all the distinctions contained in the preface. But we might also
remember what Kierkegaard said about abstract thought: it is thought
without a thinker. Defoe can tell us abstractly how to read his book,
but he cannot control how we experience it, especially when his novel
is so evocative. He knows very well that the gust and palate of the
reader will largely determine his response to the novel, and it is pre-
cisely Moll's gust and palate—her ability to experience and to stimulate
experiences in her readers, rather than her thoughts, which are barely
disguised platitudes—which have endeared her to so many readers. The
distinctions so well summarized in the preface are, finally, not exclu-
sive but inclusive, and this is what makes reading Moll Flanders such
a satisfying, albeit morally perplexing, experience.16 The reader, to use
Moll's analogy, can both make no scruple of seizing her experience for
his own and at the same time assure himself, as Moll and Defoe assure
us, that she does "come into good Hands"—for an ostensibly moral
purpose.
It is precisely this ability to enact, evaluate, and absorb all these
distinctions that characterizes the dissimulation of Moll Flanders. The
dissimulation I have been examining is not simply a matter of literary
ambiguity, though ambiguity is certainly a part of it. Ambiguity, in my
view, functions as a device for expressing either uncertainty or diver-
sity, both of which appear in Defoe's fiction. Defoe's dissimulation in
Moll Flanders and Robinson Crusoe, however, is not merely a manipu-
lated device, but an inclusive vision stimulating within the reader
thoughts and feelings that transcend or break apart the conventional
categories of morality and society at the same time that these categories
appear to be sustained. Defoe's fiction can be all things to all men only
so long as it stimulates, but eventually resists, the reader's urge to make
it into some one thing for some one person. To borrow a distinction
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from Virginia Woolf, Defoe's dissimulation is most effective when it
gives the reader a sense of both "the freedom of fiction" (i.e., the
ability to participate imaginatively in an experience) and "the substance
of fact" (i.e., the reassurance of detached observation) (CE, 4:234).
But the tendency of Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders to resolve
themselves by having it both ways is not characteristic of Roxana,
whose massive inclusiveness impedes, for several reasons, Defoe's
customary sense of deliverance.
The inclusiveness and dissimulation of Roxana, unlike those of
Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders, do not lead toward deliverance—
secular or spiritual—either for Roxana or the reader. They lead toward
progressive concealment, frustration, and disillusionment. Step by step,
Defoe leads Roxana and the reader up the rungs of the social ladder,
only, paradoxically, to guide her and us to the bottom of our souls.
This dual process, which is an extension of Defoe's dissimulation,
should not be mistaken for inconsistency. Rather, as G. A. Starr has
argued, we should recall that "elsewhere in his writings, Defoe quotes
approvingly the apostolic principle of being all things to all men so as to
gain some, and a good bit of the inconsistency in what Roxana says
of herself might be regarded as Pauline doctrine put into bizarre but
effective practice."17
One way of looking at this dual process in Roxana is to examine
the way the work methodically exhausts the possibilities and conven-
tions of Defoe's earlier novels. While our sympathy is enlisted for
Roxana early in the book, and contempt is elicited in the later stages,
neither response represents an adequate estimate of the novel's diver-
gent effects. This novel, unlike any of the others, presents not just the
public, but the psychic, unfolding of the total range of experience of
Roxana's life. In fact, Roxana initially oscillates between the claims of
public and private life, but as she progressively retreats from public
life, disguising herself as a wealthy widow, a Quaker, and a countess,
the novel withdraws into the inner terror of her mind, where public
disguise and masquerading are merely the social surface of the psy-
chological compulsion to dissimulate. This process of progressive in-
ternalization, in effect, represents a recapitulation, reexamination, and
extension of the conventions that serve Defoe so well in Robinson
Crusoe and Moll Flanders.
The reader's initial sympathy, as G. A. Starr has shown, is aroused
when Roxana is deserted by her husband and left with five children. She
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is penniless, at the point of starvation, and Defoe underscores the sense
of pity through his scriptural references to Job 2:11-13 and Lamen-
tations 2:20. Roxana aptly observes that "the Truth was, there was no
Need of much Discourse in the Case, the Thing spoke itself."18 The
early enlistment of pity somewhat mitigates the reader's attitude toward
Roxana's first adulterous relationship, for there is a sense in which
Roxana enters this affair out of necessity (to use one of Defoe's favorite
terms). At this point Defoe suggests, moreover, that Roxana is not only
vulnerable to, but in part victimized by, both her loyal servant, Amy,
and the landlord, who knows a ripe opportunity when he sees one. To
this extent, Roxana's initial downfall appears to grow out of the same
conventional formula about poverty that informs Moll Flanders:
But Poverty was my Snare; dreadful Poverty! The Misery I had been in, was
great, such as wou'd make the Heart tremble at the Apprehensions of its Return;
and I might appeal to any that has had any Experience of the World, whether
one so entirely destitute as I was, of all manner of all Helps, or Friends, either
to support me, or to assist me to support myself, could withstand the Proposal
[of adultery]; not that I plead this as a Justification of my Conduct, but that it
may move the Pity, even of those that abhor the Crime. (R, p. 39)
This passage strikes a delicate balance: Roxana may not be pleading
for justification, but the very mention of her condition is calculated to
elicit the reader's sympathy. It all looks like a repetition of Moll
Flanders, but it isn't. The countermovement in this early section, which
qualifies but does not necessarily discredit Roxana's dread of poverty,
is represented by her loyal servant and friend, Amy (ami). Amy grows
out of another convention that Defoe has earlier put to use in his other
novels: the trusted friend and confidant, be it Robinson's Friday, Moll's
houselady, Singleton's William Walters, or Colonel Jack's sidekick,
Will, or his tutor in America. Thus the temptation is strong to view
Amy as just another repetition of a convention, but she isn't. Amy,
who is one of Defoe's greatest dissimulators, not only serves Roxana;
she also mirrors her social and psychological condition and, most im-
portant, acts out her will. Amy is at once individual and collective
instinct; she represents Roxana's antisocial inclinations, her aggressive
assertion of self, and her concomitant terror of the consequences of her
social defiance. Amy is, as Roxana frequently reminds us, resolute, as
well as possessed of tremendous managerial skill, and she is specifically
associated with the devil. Discussing with Roxana the impending adul-
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terous affair which Roxana initially denies will occur, Amy warns
Roxana, "I'd do anything to get you out of this sad Condition; as to
Honesty, I think Honesty is out of the Question, when Starving is the
Case" (R, p. 28). But Roxana, ignoring Amy's opinion of "Honesty,"
seemingly tries to counter Amy's advice when she apparently chides
her: "But that I know you to be a very honest Girl, Amy, says I, you
wou'd make me abhor you; why, you argue for the Devil, as if you
were one of his Privy-Counsellors" (/?, p. 37).
The reason for my hesitating use of "seemingly" and "apparently"
is that it is not clear whether Roxana at this point does not believe
Amy, is ignoring what Amy has said, or is dissimulating with Amy and
the reader. This point is crucial, not just for understanding Roxana's
subsequent affair with the landlord, but because Roxana eventually
speaks this way when Amy, at the end of the novel, both proposes
and apparently carries out the murder of Roxana's daughter. The ques-
tion of complicity—social, legal, and psychological—represents a new
dimension of Defoe's use and examination of dissimulation, and the
reader must be sensitive to this question in order to reconcile the seem-
ing inconsistencies of Roxana's explanation of how and why she entered
into the adulterous relationship:
Had I consulted Conscience and Virtue, I shou'd have repell'd this Amy, how-
ever faithful and honest to me in other things, as a Viper, and Engine of the
Devil; I ought to have remembered that neither he or I, either by the Laws of
God or Men, cou'd come together, upon any other Terms than that of notorious
Adultery: The ignorant Jade's Argument, That he had brought me out of
the Hands of the Devil, by which she meant the Devil of Poverty and Dis-
tress, shou'd have been a powerful Motive to me, not to plunge myself into the
Jaws of Hell, and into the Power of the real Devil, in Recompence for that
Deliverence. (R, p. 38)
This passage may be read as Roxana's condemnation of Amy for
persuading her into victimization, but such a reading is difficult to
sustain. It is also possible to read the passage as Roxana's fear of the
real persuasiveness of Amy's appeal. That is, Amy has argued soundly,
but Roxana detests the conclusion. Again it is possible to read the pas-
sage as Roxana's grudging and terrifying recognition that Amy's argu-
ments have drawn out and enacted Roxana's latent inclination, an in-
clination which Roxana, when she is no longer a victim of necessity,
later poses as a question: "What was I a Whore for Now?" (R, p. 201).
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Roxana says she should have repelled "this Amy," which is an interest-
ing usage; for she (and Defoe) could easily have said just "Amy."
The French meaning of "friend" is obvious, and I suppose one could
argue that Roxana uses the name sarcastically. But Roxana does not
abandon Amy, just as despite her declarations, she does not abandon
Amy after the apparent murder. Indeed, Amy's "punishment" for her
complicity in the adulterous affair is that Roxana forces her to go to bed
with the landlord—an action characteristic of the novel's unconvention-
al effects. At critical points where rational observation would demand
that the characters pull back from an experience, the novel instead
pushes ahead and makes the reader participate in more bizarre experi-
ences. To put it another way, Defoe plunges not just Roxana, but
the reader, into "the Jaws of Hell," from which there will be no
"Deliverance."
Just as Defoe complicates the convention of necessity in the first
part of the novel, so Roxana's second affair with the prince, which
represents a rise up the social ladder now that she is wealthy, tantalizes
us with another set of conventions appropriate to her inclinations. As
Roxana says, "Tho' Poverty and Want is an irresistible Temptation to
the Poor, Vanity and Great Things are as irresistable to others" (R,
p. 64). But we should not be deceived by Roxana's seeming honesty,
nor should we accept her view that her affair in France makes her "a
standing Mark of the Weakness of Great Men, in their Vice" (R, p. 74).
To do so would be to accept the prince's judgment that no one but
Roxana has "such Skin, without Paint, in the World" (R, p. 72).
Roxana's "Paint" is not conspicuous, because it is like a clear veneer:
we must look through the novel's social surface to its moral and psy-
chological effects. Her affair with the prince is used as a social and
conventional instrument by which Defoe examines Roxana as she
acquires wealth, and this section or stage of her life is clearly marked
out when Defoe has Roxana say: "Now I was become, from a Lady
of Pleasure, a Woman of Business, and of great Business too, I assure
you" (R, p. 131).
What happens in this section and in the subsequent sections at the
English court is that Roxana translates her sexual inclinations into the
acquisition and manipulation of wealth. She is not motivated, like Moll,
Singleton, or Colonel Jack, by a desire to remove herself from neces-
sity and to achieve a settled state of life. Again Defoe widens a prior
convention: Roxana uses wealth and sex to exercise her will and to
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manipulate and consume others with raw power. Her distinction be-
tween "Pleasure" and "Business" is both merged and obliterated by
her devouring will, as we can see in her report of her conversation
with the Dutch merchant: "I that was infinitely oblig'd to him before,
began to talk to him as if I had ballanc'd Accounts with him now; and
that the Favour of Lying with a Whore, was equal, not to the thousand
Pistoles only, but to all the Debt I ow'd him, for saving my Life, and
all my Effects" (R, p. 144). Roxana is here talking to a man who both
delivered her from danger in Paris and who now lawfully wishes to
marry her. Although Roxana's comments may be ungracious, the horror
of the exchange lies in the phrase "ballanc'd Accounts." Roxana
willingly acknowledges that she is a high-class whore, that she believes
she has paid off all debts, but in doing so she has transformed human
feeling, associated with sexuality, into a mercantile abstraction, the
mere exchange of commodities. This is no longer a simple matter, say,
of Moll Flanders's abundant energy, for Moll, unlike Roxana, con-
tinues throughout her narrative to experience pleasure. In the guise of
advancing what looks to be a precursor of the modern argument for
woman's rights, Roxana is dissimulating something more, something
latent in her will which she can express but which she can never fully
acknowledge and assimilate: "I return'd, that While a Woman was
single, she was a Masculine in her politick Capacity; that she had then
the full Command of what she had, and the full Direction of what she
did; that she was a Man in her separated Capacity, to all Intents and
Purposes that a Man cou'd be so to himself; that she was controul'd
by none, because Accountable to none, and was in Subjection to none"
(/?, pp. 148-49).
As I have said, it is tempting to see this passage as an anticipation
of woman's rights, just as it might be tempting to view it as a logical
extension of Moll Flanders's earlier observations on the roles of men
and women in society. On a political level Roxana's arguments have a
singularly modern appeal: she is arguing for equality, for human rights.
But the political level of Roxana's argument conceals a larger psycho-
logical compulsion to dissimulate: Roxana does not just desire equal
rights—she wants to be a man, or her version of a man, and not just
in a political sense.19 She has successfully used her sexuality to acquire
wealth, she has merged her sexuality with wealth (her model man is
Sir Robert Clayton, investment counselor at large), and now she takes
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pleasure in manipulating her wealth in the same way, and with the
same energy, that one achieves sexual satisfaction.
This desire to be a man in the guise of a woman represents a
totally new dimension of Defoe's dissimulation. The affective appeal of
such a desire is troubling, for it not only represents a disorienting use
of narrative conventions but generates a sense of trauma which is never,
and probably never could be, resolved. Roxana says, "And now I be-
gan to act in a new Sphere" (R, p. 172), meaning that she has moved
further up the social ladder to the court, but her actions at court also
represent a new sphere of experience, where her perverse inclinations
directly implicate the highest levels of English society. Masquerading
at court is, of course, an appropriate vehicle for Roxana's translation
of sexual roles. Her famous Turkish dance at court, where she gains
the name of Roxana, elicits the same blend of fascination and disgust
that the British film The Ruling Class reveals and mocks in British
aristocracy. Concerning this dance and the widespread sense of perver-
sity throughout the novel Michael Shinagel has remarked:
Without question Defoe's imagination . . . was beginning to dwell on the per-
verse side of life, and he probably was disturbed by it. Consider the unexplained
and erotic scene where Roxana forces her faithful maid to lie with the landlord.
. . . Such incidents as this or Roxana's lascivious Turkish dance or even the
dark guilt-ridden atmosphere Defoe manages to generate in the closing yet in-
conclusive pages of the story, where the murder of a daughter is plotted and
perhaps executed, all these revealing signs suggest, in short, that Defoe no
longer was able to control his imagination or his material.20
The very approach-avoidance conflict evident in Shinagel's obser-
vations indicates the peculiar effects of Defoe's dissimulation on the
reader. It is a dissimulation that enacts and stimulates not merely
eroticism generally, but the latent erotic basis of social conventions.
The dissimulation of Roxana is such that by its very inability to be
controlled—by Defoe, Roxana, or the reader—the novel generates the
capacity to be all things to all men. It is all things because once the
reader's erotic imagination is stimulated he will project his own latent
fantasies on the events and language of the novel. The reader will see
what he ordinarily represses, and he will respond to what he sees with
varying degrees of recognition and varying acknowledgments of com-
plicity. Shinagel calls the scene with Amy and the landlord "unex-
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plained," but I have suggested that it is artistically and psychologically
plausible. Shinagel refers to Roxana's "lascivious Turkish dance," but
the passage about Roxana's dance reads as follows: "I danc'd by My-
self a Figure which I learnt in France, when the Prince de desir'd
I wou'd dance for his Diversion; it was indeed, a very fine Figure,
invented by a famous Master at Paris, for a Lady or a Gentleman to
dance single; but being perfectly new, it pleas'd the Company exceed-
ingly, and they all thought it had been Turkish" (R, p. 175).
Strictly speaking, the dance is neither lascivious nor Turkish; but the
scene of masquerading, and the stimulus of the word "Turkish," have
the ability to elicit erotic projections from the reader, projections that
evidently disturb Shinagel. The dance itself, seen in the guise of Roxana
dissimulating her latent masculinity (she dances alone) through con-
spicuously feminine dress and gesture, could just as easily be viewed as
Roxana's celebration of her own personal and social defiance. The point
is not, finally, whether Shinagel is right or I am, nor is it just a case of
Defoe not being able "to control his imagination." Rather, the materi-
als of the novel are so stimulating—its affective appeal is so strong—
that the reader has trouble controlling his imagination.
Several critics have, in a variety of ways, drawn attention to the
psychological complexity of Roxana, though they have not spoken
about how the novel stimulates the reader's erotic imagination. Robert
Hume has observed that "the reader is not allowed to stand off and
coolly watch Roxana's agonies. Instead he is thrust into her perplexed
condition and left to flounder." Everett Zimmerman speaks of Roxana's
"confused mind that does not fully comprehend either its own strata-
gems or difficulties"; and Maximillian Novak has argued that "the final
section of the novel reflects Defoe's growing interest in psychology."21
Where I disagree with Novak, in particular, is in his assertion that
"what prevents Roxana from being Defoe's masterpiece is the truncated
ending" (p. 464). The ending appears truncated because, contrary to
his practice in the other novels, Defoe provides no resolution to Rox-
ana's dissimulation. But the conclusion of Roxana is peculiar in an-
other, more important respect. There are two conclusions to Roxana:
the first concludes the formal narrative and the chronological extent of
Roxana's recollections, on page 265; the second, at the end of the
novel, charts Roxana's terror—religious, moral, and psychological—
and encourages the reader's participation in a distinctively unorthodox
manner.
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I began this discussion by remarking on the novel's dual movement:
Roxana's progressive rise up the social ladder and her progressive
descent into terror. By page 265 Roxana has married the Dutch mer-
chant, has amassed enormous wealth, and has achieved the status of a
countess in Holland. In short, she has socially accomplished her highest
point. If this were Moll Flanders, Captain Singleton, or Colonel Jack,
the novel would be over. But Defoe defies his prior conventions, and
Roxana explicitly signals the widening of this convention: "I must now
go back to another Scene, and join it to this End of my Story" (R, p.
265). In other words, the reader will experience a second conclusion.
This second conclusion represents a new psychological dimension in
Defoe's fiction. Ordinarily, as I have observed, Defoe's fiction is con-
structed around a movement of recollection and anticipation. The narra-
tor recollects a dissimulating past, but the conclusion to the recollection
projects both the reader's deliverance from, and anticipated cessation
of, dissimulation. But in Roxana Defoe resists this use of recollection
and denies both to Roxana and the reader the pleasure of an anticipated
resolution. Instead, within the unfolding of Roxana's recollections, he
introduces a second and deeper level of psychological inquiry, and it is
this deepened inquiry into the story of Roxana's two daughters that
occurs between the first and second conclusions. Instead of moving for-
ward in time from the first conclusion on page 265, the story moves
backward and deeper into time. Instead of ascending toward an external
social resolution, the novel descends into Roxana's tormented mind.
Just after Roxana has been married to the Dutch merchant, which
is the first conclusion of the novel, she learns from Amy that her
daughter Susan (this is also Roxana's real first name), may now know
that Roxana is her mother. Several things have thus happened at once
which give this section tremendous psychological resonance. It is,
first of all, Roxana who initiated the inquiry into her daughters' lives;
it is Amy, the trusted friend and servant, who has enacted Roxana's
will to discover a distant part of her past. The fact that Roxana's first
name is the same as her daughter's suggests that Defoe knowingly,
or instinctively, is working with a form of psychological doubling—
and the doubling might be viewed as tripling, if one views Amy as both
the social and psychological instrument and expression of Roxana's
will. The sense of psychological tripling is further complicated because
Susan first thinks that Amy is her mother. Without suggesting that I
can work out the complications of Defoe's psychological interests, I
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simply call attention to their peculiar effects and to the extraordinary
operations the reader must perform in response to the complexity of this
section. The dissimulation is not merely technical but experiential, as
we can see, first, in Roxana's reaction to Amy's proposal of murder,
and second, in her response to her own daughter, who, though she is
not certain that Roxana is her mother, talks about Roxana's Turkish
dress in the presence of the disguised Roxana.
Amy was so provok'd, that she told me, in short, she began to think it would
be absolutely necessary to murther her: That Expression fill'd me with Horror:
all my Blood ran chill in my Veins, and a Fit of trembling seiz'd me, that I
cou'd not speak a good-while; at last, What is the Devil in you, Amy, said I?
Nay, nay, says She, let it be the Devil, or not the Devil, if I thought she
knew one tittle of your History, I wou'd dispatch her if she were my own
Daughter a thousand times; and I, says I in a Rage, as well as I love you,
wou'd be the first that shou'd put the Halter about your Neck, and see YOU
hang'd . . .  nay, says I, you wou'd not live to be hang'd, / believe, I shou'd
cut your Throat with my own Hand; I am almost ready to do it, said I, as
'tis, for your but naming the thing. . . .  (/?, pp. 270-71)
What my Face might do towards betraying me, I know not, because I cou'd
not see myself, but my Heart beat as if it wou'd have jump'd out at my Mouth;
and my Passion was so great, that for want of Vent, I thought I shou'd have
burst: . . . I had no Vent; no-body to open myself to, or to make a Complaint
to for my Relief; I durst not leave the Room by any means, for then she wou'd
have told all the Story in my Absence, and I shou'd have been perpetually
uneasie to know what she had said, or had not said; so that, in a word, I
was oblig'd to sit and hear her tell all the Story of Roxana, that is to say, of
myself, and not know at the same time, whether she was in earnest or in jest;
whether she knew me or no; or, in short, whether I was to be expos'd or not
expos'd. (R, pp. 284-85)
The levels of dissimulation and complexity in these two passages
are fairly easy to sense but extremely difficult to discuss and assess.
Roxana's anger with Amy is clearly and deliberately an echo of her
much earlier anger with Amy's assessment of the landlord's motives.
Once again Amy is likened to the devil, but it is well to recall that she
is Roxana's servant. Moreover, when Roxana finally suspects that the
murder has occurred she neither has Amy hanged nor cuts her throat.
Roxana's anger, in fact, seems less directed at the fact of murder, than
at Amy's "naming the thing." The act of "naming" specifies, particu-
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larizes, and raises to consciousness what Roxana wishes to leave ob-
scure and latent. Here again Amy seems to function as the psycholog-
ical enactment of Roxana's will. Roxana projects, but never explicitly
names, certain desires, and Amy intuits and enacts them. In this respect
Roxana is more terrified by the exposure of her own desires than by
Amy's subsequent enactment of them. Amy is, to borrow a term from
the second passage, Roxana's "Vent." Amy projects and purges
Roxana's will, but she does not, and finally cannot, resolve her mis-
tress's tentative movement toward self-destruction. Whatever the case,
Roxana's recollections are not, for her or the reader, therapeutic. They
are traumatic.
This capacity to stimulate the reader's conjecture and projection,
and yet frustrate the desire for resolution, is appropriate to the novel's
dissimulation. The reader, like Roxana, wants to know: like her, we
feel obliged to sit and hear "the Story of Roxana," and like her we
are fascinated by the compulsive tension between exposure and con-
cealment. We are never completely sure how much has been exposed
and concealed, and in this way the novel stimulates our desires but
never fully satisfies them. One critic has suggested that there are two
Roxanas: "a changing, experiencing character who tends to excuse and
defend her actions and an evaluating narrator who is often repulsed by
her earlier actions."22 But perhaps a prayer in Defoe's correspondence
(which also appears in Colonel Jack) is more helpful in isolating the
traumatic effect of the novel:
Lord, whatsoever Troubles wrack my Breast
Till Sin removes too, let me take no Rest;
How dark soe'er my Case, or sharp my Pain,
O let no Sorrows cease, and Sin remain!
For JESUS Sake, remove not my Distress
Till thy Almighty Grace shall repossess
The vacant Throne, from whence my Crimes depart,
And makes a willing Captive of my Heart.
(Letters, p. 449)
Defoe's comment on the prayer illumines the novel's unconven-
tional conclusion and Roxana's extraordinary condition: "Its a prayer, I
doubt few can make: But the Moral is excellent; if Afflictions cease,
and Cause of Afflictions remain, the Joy of your Deliverance will be
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short." There are many Roxanas because her afflictions, as well as their
causes, are themselves manifold and problematical. The end of the
novel feels formally truncated, though it is affectively expansive, be-
cause there can be no "deliverance" for a character who has been aptly
called "Defoe's only damned soul."24
'Clarissa,' 'Amelia,' and the
State of Probation
It has frequently been noted that Amelia represents Fielding's
altered conception of the novel, especially in light of his under-
standing of Clarissa.1 However, my discussion of Amelia and
Clarissa will focus less on the question of influence than on how
Richardson and Fielding, using such common thematic interests
as the trial of virtue, the possibility of reform, and the uneasy
relation between secular and spiritual meanings, exploit these
thematic interests as a test of the reader's understanding of and
response to what Richardson calls the "State of Probation." By
focusing on their diverse expressions of the "State of Probation,"
expressions only partly determined by their respective uses of
tragic and comic forms, I think we can see that Clarissa un-
flinchingly represents secular life as a condition of indeterminacy,
whereas Amelia, even in light of such indeterminacy, yearns for
a solution to this condition. Moreover, like Defoe in Robinson
Crusoe and Moll Flanders, Fielding eventually saves his principal
characters as well as the reader; but Richardson's view of human
nature is such that the majority of his principal characters, and by
implication a good many of his readers, are left stranded with
their own limited understanding and expectations. Unlike Field-
ing, Richardson deliberately widens the gap between spiritual and
secular meanings, and this may be why he warned that "there are
more Lovelaces in the World, than the World imagines."2
One way to establish the basically different effects of Clarissa
and Amelia is to consider, first, Richardson's understanding of his
tragic novel and its relation to human nature. In his correspon-
dence Richardson writes, "A Writer who follows Nature and pre-
tends to keep the Christian System in his Eye, cannot make a
Heaven in this World for his Favourites; or represent this Life
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otherwise than as a State of Probation. Clarissa I once more averr
could not be rewarded in this World" (SL, p. 108). In Hints of Prefaces
for Clarissa, Richardson again insists that "this Life she [Clarissa]
looks upon as a Life of Probation only," and in the "Postscript" to
Clarissa he contrasts—really drives a wedge between—the expectation
of poetic justice and his own sense of the state of probation: "And after
all, what is the poetical justice so much contended for by some, as the
generality of writers have managed it, but another sort of dispensation
than that which God, by Revelation, teaches us, He has thought fit to
exercise mankind; whom placing here only in a state of probation, he
hath so intermingled good and evil, as to necessitate us to look forward
for a more equal dispensation of both."3
Richardson's distinction between religious and literary dispensa-
tions is particularly revealing because, while both Clarissa and Amelia
deal with the intermingling of good and evil, Fielding finally implies
that good and evil can be sorted out, whereas Richardson believes that
the state of probation, which is the state of human nature, involves not
only defective knowledge but continued uncertainty. Like Richardson,
Johannes Stinstra, who is one of Richardson's most perceptive readers,
similarly attacks the expectation of poetic justice because, as he argues,
"The human intellect is not equal to the dangers to which we are
subject in this life. It is not extensive enough, not intelligent enough,
not penetrating enough to know accurately everything that threatens us
with harm, and therefore to avoid carefully such dangers."4
Now I certainly do not wish to set up Fielding as a straw man; the
design of Amelia forcefully enacts the very defects of the human in-
tellect that Stinstra and Richardson describe. But beneath Fielding's
awareness of human limitations there continues to exist an underlying
assurance of providential design which is partly determined by the
comic form of Amelia and partly a reflection of Fielding's beliefs and
temperament. This sense of assurance, in spite of the problematical
workings of Amelia, is best seen through the character of Dr. Harrison,
who not only represents but speaks for the narrative process of Amelia.
Although Harrison is by no means represented as infallible, he is
demonstrably the moral and religious model of the novel, and in this
respect he serves Booth and Amelia in the same way that Mrs. Norton,
especially, provides religious counsel to Clarissa. On the other hand,
Harrison is very much a part of the world, and thus more tolerant of
human limitations than either Mrs. Norton or Clarissa. In what may be
Clarissa and Amelia 73
a statement of the dominant view of human nature in Amelia, Harrison
chides Amelia when she says "I begin to grow entirely sick of it [the
world] . . .  for sure all mankind almost are villains in their hearts."
Dr. Harrison responds:
Do not make a conclusion so much to the dishonour of the great Creator. The
nature of man is far from being in itself evil: it abounds with benevolence,
charity, and pity, coveting praise and honour, and shunning shame and dis-
grace. Bad education, bad habits, and bad customs, debauch our nature, and
drive it headlong as it were into vice. The governors of the world, and I am
afraid the priesthood, are answerable for the badness of it. Instead of discourag-
ing wickedness to the utmost of their power, both are apt to connive at it.5
What Harrison says, and what the whole of Amelia continually dis-
plays, is that the most dangerous human defects derive from the in-
fluence of corrupt social institutions on individual conduct. This is not
to say that individuals are without their limitations; obviously every
character, including Dr. Harrison and Amelia, makes mistaken judg-
ments, but the moral emphasis of Amelia, unlike that of Clarissa, is
on what Harrison calls bad education, bad habits, and bad customs.
Correspondingly, Fielding devotes his most heated comments not to
Booth's doctrine of ruling passions—which represents, by the way, a
limited understanding of Mandeville—nor to Amelia's naive estimate
of human intentions. Rather Fielding's most acerbic, not to say brutal,
observations are reserved for the likes of Mrs. Ellison, Colonel and
Mrs. James, the noble lord, Murphy, Trent, Amelia's sister Betty, and
other lesser characters who represent such distorted social institutions
as the law (not justice), the concept of a gentleman (that is, a rake),
honor (hypocrisy), and "modern" marriage—that is pimping for your
wife (Trent) or for your husband (Mrs. James). These characters, who
represent corrupt social institutions, continually prey on the likes of
Amelia and Booth, and their actions, unlike those of Amelia and Booth,
are morally culpable because they are consistently premeditated.
Unlike Richardson, then, Fielding emphasizes social institutions
as the prevalent threat against a human nature which, in Harrison's
words, "abounds with benevolence, charity, and pity," and thus Ame-
lia, despite its relatively problematical representation of human life,
continues to focus on basically external threats which are, by implica-
tion, amenable to external solutions. That is, if bad education, habits,
and customs "debauch our nature," it logically—if not in reality—fol-
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lows that the correction, or at least detection, of these essentially social
evils will restore human nature to its expected benevolence. Moreover,
this is why Fielding, unlike Richardson, can subscribe to a doctrine of
poetic justice sanctioned by his strong conviction in providential inter-
ventions in human affairs. In Richardson's view, however, such provi-
dential entrances represent "sudden conversions" which are contrary to
his understanding of human nature, at least as it applies to the problem-
atical design of Clarissa. Thus Richardson simply could not or would
not imagine a reformed Lovelace, though he was willing to portray a
reformed Squire B in Pamela.
Since both Amelia and Clarissa organize their central actions around
the trial of virtue,6 and since both heroines are represented as funda-
mentally innocent characters, it may be revealing to compare Fielding's
and Richardson's diverse views of what constitutes innocence and to
examine their use of the trial of virtue as a reflection of their under-
standing of human nature. Fielding is quite explicit, though seemingly
inconsistent, about this matter in two passages where he openly ad-
dresses his readers on the relation of innocence to a corrupt world. In
the first passage Fielding observes: "Hence, my worthy reader, console
thyself, that however few of the other good things of life are thy lot,
the best of all things, which is innocence, is always within thy power;
and though Fortune may make thee often unhappy, she can never make
thee completely and irreparably miserable without thy own consent"
(2:178).
On the face of it, this passage does not square with Fielding's or
Dr. Harrison's emphasis on social institutions as the root cause of evil.
We are told that innocence is within our "power" and that the loss of
innocence and the misery that attends it involves our "own consent."
The emphasis here seems to fall on individual, rather than social,
responsibility, but the key terms are "power" and "consent." Amelia,
for example, is innocent, but she does not consciously control that
innocence as a power, so much as Fielding allows her mere presence
to exert it. Moreover, when her innocence is threatened by Colonel
James or the noble lord, it is not because she has consented in the
sense that she is a voluntary participant in evil, but only in the sense that
she has unwittingly cooperated with, though finally not participated in,
a corrupt action initiated by someone else. This we can see in the noble
lord's desire to have Amelia attend the masquerade at Ranelagh, or in
Colonel James's offer to have her live with Colonel and Mrs. James
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while Booth is away. Similarly, Booth and Mrs. Bennet are initially
duped by, respectively, Miss Matthews and the noble lord, but their
"consent" involves not only unwitting cooperation but, eventually,
knowing participation.
What I am trying to get at in regard to the first passage on innocence
has been nicely distinguished by J. Paul Hunter when he says: "Booth
and Amelia hold different attitudes toward temptation, he continually
placing himself in harm's way and she doing her level best to avoid
unnecessary trial."7 Amelia's innocence is spared not because it is
strictly within her power, but because Fielding, through other characters
such as Mrs. Bennet, saves her from a trial; this is not, of course,
Richardson's way of trying virtue.
The second quotation on innocence is no less interesting and per-
plexing, especially as it implies the moral culpability of Fielding's
readers.
I must inform, therefore, all such readers, that it is not, because innocence is
more blind than guilt, that the former often overlooks and tumbles into the pit,
which the latter foresees and avoids. The truth is, that it is almost impossible
guilt should miss the discovering of all the snares in its way; as it is constantly
prying closely into every corner, in order to lay snares for others. Whereas
innocence, having no such purpose, walks fearlessly and carelessly through life;
and is consequently liable to tread on the gins, which cunning has laid to en-
trap it. To speak plainly, and without allegory or figure, it is not want of sense,
but want of suspicion, by which innocence is often betrayed. . . . In a word,
many an innocent person hath owed his ruin to this circumstance alone, that the
degree of villainy was such as must have exceeded the faith of every man who
was not himself a villain. (2:213)
The passage seems to imply that only on the basis of prior guilt can a
character or reader anticipate corrupt motives and actions. Fielding dis-
tinguishes between "want of sense" and "want of suspicion," con-
cluding that it is through "want of suspicion" that "innocence is often
betrayed." The dilemma is that "suspicion" can be acquired only
through the loss of innocence, in which case the necessary knowledge
to avoid the machinations of a corrupt world is incompatible with inno-
cence. That is, Amelia must be protected by others who are suspicious,
for her innocence, though desirable, is inadequate in a corrupt world.
We must fall to rise, as it were, and while this is very much a part of
Richardson's design in Clarissa, one wonders whether Fielding realized
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that this idea or implication tends to undermine the value of Amelia's
untested virtue.
Furthermore, it is this very tension between upholding Amelia's
value and protecting her innocence, and yet steadily implying that such
a value cannot cope with the bad education, customs, and habits of the
world, that makes Amelia—perhaps inadvertently—the problematical
novel that it is. Perhaps this is why critics often note an unresolved
tension in the novel. Eric Rothstein remarks on the "general instability
of the world of Amelia," and he further argues that "the narrator of
Amelia has retreated, and our attempts to deal with experience put us
on the same level with the characters, who fumble blindly." C. J.
Rawson comments that "Amelia is special among Fielding's novels
precisely in that it records irresistible factualities which cannot be mas-
tered by displays of authorial understanding," and, possibly echoing
Rawson, J. Paul Hunter suggests that "the radically different tone of
Amelia seems to me to involve a diminished vision of rhetorical possi-
bility." Such a diminished vision, Hunter later observes, implies "a
radical shift in Fielding's view of human nature—from a sense of super-
ficial perversity that goodness could outwit to an overwhelming sense of
bad nature prevailing," and this may be what Andrew Wright is refer-
ring to when he says, "Amelia is the work of a Christian fatalist who
was losing his faith in art."8 All these comments certainly imply that
the narrative process, as opposed to the ostensible intent, of Amelia was
closer to Richardson's understanding of human nature than Fielding was
prepared consciously to admit.
On the other hand, Richardson is both explicit and consistent in his
view of what constitutes innocence and the trial of virtue. In his corre-
spondence Richardson tells Miss Frances Grainger that "Clarissa was
not perfect, but Clarissa could accuse herself in instances where she
thought she ought not to be acquitted," and he then goes on to declare:
"Calamity is the test of virtue, and often the parent of it, in minds
that prosperity would ruin. What is meant, think you, Madam, by the
whole Christian doctrine of the Cross? Ask the people who frequent
Vauxhall and Ranelagh if they found themselves fiddled and danced and
merry into virtue? What meant the Royal Prophet when he said that it
was good for him to be afflicted?" (SL, p. 151). In addition, Richard-
son clearly anticipated that the trial of Clarissa's virtue and her attendant
fall would also be a trial of the reader's understanding of the relation
between calamity and the exercise of virtue. That is, by writing the
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novel in such a way that the reader fully participates in Clarissa's trial,
Richardson tests the strength of the reader's, as well as the characters',
virtue.
This test takes different forms, as we can see in Hints of Prefaces
for Clarissa, where Richardson distinguishes between "the present
light Taste of an Age immersed in Diversions, that engage the Eye and
the Ear only, and not the understanding," as opposed to the aims of
Clarissa which are "to investigate the great Doctrines of Christianity,
and to teach the Reader how to die, as well as how to live" (PHP,
p. 5). Further evidence of how Richardson designed Clarissa as a test
of the reader may be seen in the laconic remarks that "those who blame
Clarissa for Over-niceness, would most probably have been easy prey
to a Lovelace," and "many Persons [are] readier to find fault with a
supposed perfect Character, than try to imitate it: To bring it down to
their Level, rather than rise to it" (PHP, p. 5). This echoes Richard-
son's bitter retort when he rejects the idea of Clarissa marrying a
"reformed" Lovelace after the rape: "And is a Clarissa to be reduced
to bear so common a Lot?" (SL, p. 124). But perhaps the most reveal-
ing insight into Richardson's estimate of his reader is contained in the
observation: "Clarissa an Example to the Reader: The Example not to
be taken from the Reader" (PHP, p. 5).
If we apply some of these observations to the characters in the
novel, we can see why Richardson finally mistrusts many of his charac-
ters and readers, who seem mere allured by the eye and ear than en-
lightened by the novel's understanding. Elizabeth Brophy has shrewdly
noted that "each confidant acts as a surrogate for the reader," and it
is fascinating to see how Richardson measures and tests the reader's
understanding in the same way that the spectrum of characters responds
to Clarissa's ordeal.9 For example, Anna Howe—not Clarissa—is the
first to realize the depth and probable intent of Lovelace's superficially
pleasing actions. Early on she warns Clarissa:
But, O my friend, depend upon it, you are in danger. . . . Your native generos-
ity and greatness of mind endanger you: All your friends, by fighting against
him with impolitic violence, fight for him. And Lovelace, my life for yours,
notwithstanding all his veneration and assiduities, has seen further than that
veneration and those assiduities (so well calculated to your meridian) will let
him own he has seen—Has seen, in short, that his work is doing for him more
effectually than he could do it for himself. . . . In short, my dear, it is my
opinion, and that from the easiness of his heart and behaviour, that he has seen
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more than / have seen; more than you think could be seen;—more than I
believe you yourself know, or else you would have let me know it.10
Not only is Anna right, but paradoxically, the strength of her percep-
tion is determined in large part by her too easy identification with Love-
lace's motives, even though she cannot fathom the full extent of his
contrivance. Richardson enables Anna to detect Lovelace because,
throughout Clarissa, we get numerous versions—positive and negative
—of "It takes one to know one," and this applies to the reader's
response as well. Anna puts it more politely when she tells Clarissa:
"I am fitter for this world than you: You for the next than me;—that's
the difference" (1:63).
Clearly Anna Howe is not a "rake," but Richardson does call her
"a true modern wit, who thinks it not necessary, when it carries the
keenest edge, to retain discretion in its service" (SL, p. 166). Further-
more, we do know that Anna is, to Clarissa's eventual dismay, far more
attracted to Lovelace than to Hickman, who is a man of virtue.11 Anna
is a contriver, especially with her mother, and her cleverness, which is
based on a knowledge Clarissa initially lacks, enables her to anticipate
Lovelace's motives, if not the precise design of his actions. Moreover,
the knowledge Anna possesses is a precise corollary to what Fielding
calls "suspicion."
Throughout Clarissa Richardson distinguishes between "sense"
and "suspicion," except his terms are "theory" and "practice" (or
"experience"). Anna Howe reminds Clarissa of one of Mrs. Norton's
observations, "'that to excel in theory, and to excel in practice, gener-
ally required different talents; which did not always meet in the same
person'" (2:10), but the value of these differing "talents" is perhaps
more problematical than it appears. For one thing, the person with
maximum "experience" is Lovelace, and it is he more than anyone else
who tosses around this distinction. Referring to Clarissa and Anna
Howe, he tells Belford: "Silly little rogues! to walk out into by-paths
on the strength of their own judgments!—When nothing but experi-
ence can enable them to disappoint us, and teach them grandmother-
wisdom!" (3:199). Later Lovelace says of Clarissa, "This dear Lady is
prodigiously learned in Theories. But as to Practics, as to Experi-
mentals, must be, as you know from her tender years, a mere novice"
(3:353); and he repeats this formulation when he asks: "Yet, what can
be expected of an angel under Twenty?—She has a world of knowl-
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edge; knowledge speculative, as I may say; but not Experience! How
should she?—Knowledge by theory only is a vague uncertain light:
A Will o' the Wisp, which as often misleads the doubting mind, as
puts it right" (5:122).
Because Richardson believes calamity is the test of virtue, and be-
cause he believes that this life is a state of probation, he does not,
like Fielding, protect his heroine from "experience." Rather he submits
her to experience—dramatically represented by the rape—in order
finally to celebrate her virtue. The rape, if you will, stands for the way
of the world, just as Lovelace fancies himself the man of experience,
but Clarissa's response to the rape demonstrates the strength of her vir-
tue in the face of an experience more brutal than anything in Amelia.
Just as important, Richardson through Clarissa's trial submits the reader
to a similar test regarding theoretical and practical knowledge, for these
two terms operate in much the same way as what I have called observa-
tion and experience.
One way that Richardson establishes this test, and it is a way that
distinguishes Richardson's narrative process from Fielding's, may be
seen by comparing two critical observations on the problematical work-
ings of Amelia and Clarissa. Robert Alter writes: "The strategies of
Amelia . . . generally lead us toward a closer involvement in the moral
predicaments of the novel, and, to a lesser degree, in the lives of the
characters." In a somewhat similar manner, Mark Kinkead-Weekes
says of Clarissa that "our first experience is one of moral evaluation,
of continuous analysis, of living in a mind that submits every detail of
action and thought to intensive and scrupulous examination."12 Taken
in the abstract, such comments might suggest that Amelia and Clarissa
submit the reader to similar interpretive challenges, and to a certain
extent this is true. In both novels the reader, like the principal charac-
ters, is actively engaged in moral predicaments, but the predicaments
of Clarissa are a good deal more demanding because they are far more
indeterminate.
For example, Amelia tries to convert Booth from his atheistic
principle of self-love by first encouraging him to "converse with Dr.
Harrison on this subject; for I am sure he would convince you, though
I can't, that there are really such things as religion and virtue" (3:127).
Her appeal is wholly to Harrison's reason and powers of persuasion
because her virtue is finally inactive. When Booth is converted to Chris-
tianity by reading Dr. Barrow's sermons—Fielding's deus ex machina
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—Fielding sets up the following conversation between Booth and Har-
rison in such a way that it is calculated to affect the reader, ostensibly
solving one of the novel's moral predicaments. Booth says:
"I have not a doubt (for I own I have had such) which remains now unsatis-
fied.—If ever an angel might be thought to guide the pen of a writer, surely
the pen of that great and good man had such an assistant." The doctor readily
concurred in the praises of Dr. Barrow, and added—"You say you have had
your doubts, young gentleman; indeed, I did not know that—And pray, what
were your doubts?" "Whatever they were, sir," said Booth, "they are now
satisfied, as I believe those of every impartial and sensible reader will be, if he
will, with due attention, read over these excellent sermons." (3:211)
Such a passage is consistent with Fielding's benevolent and rational
expectations concerning human nature, but it is also fair to say that the
reader is left wholly in the position of an outside observer. We do not
know, specifically, what in Barrow's sermons converted Booth, nor do
we, any more than Harrison, know the precise nature of Booth's doubts,
unless we accept the casual formula of self-love. We are simply told
that Booth is "satisfied," though clearly a number of critics are not,
and the reader is explicitly told that he will achieve a similar satisfac-
tion if he reads over "these excellent sermons." The resolution of this
moral predicament, in other words, is entirely exterior, and unlike
Richardson, who subjects the reader to far more demanding tests, Field-
ing ends up doing most of the work for the reader because he, like
Barrow, has a much stronger assurance of providential intervention into
the ways of a corrupt world.
If we take one phrase from the quoted passage—"due attention"—
we can see how Richardson uses his moral predicaments to involve the
reader in sterner, and correspondingly less determinate, tests. Johannes
Stinstra construes attention as one of the key processes through which
Richardson tests his readers.13 Stinstra reduces "everything into one
requirement which this work may justly demand of all its readers. . . .
an exact attention and regard concerning everything we meet in it"
(Stinstra, p. 144), and he goes on to display what such a reading will
attend to:
Through the personalities of the characters we perceive their different moral
conditions, according to which their deliberations, conversations, undertakings,
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and actions are so very different from each other just as the differences in
countenance, features, shape, and bearing are clearly discernible among thou-
sands of people, each from all the others. These are not composed of morally
good or bad qualities only but are also mingled with different natural attributes,
whether these be innate or acquired passively through education, conversation,
and habit. . . . we should trace and deliberate the aims of the author with all
our attention: what he wants to represent and show regarding human behavior
and way of acting by his work in general and in its particular parts and what
he wants to teach and point out to us in these revelations regarding our morals
and actions. These moral aims of the writer must be clearly distinguished from
the aims of the characters whom he introduces through speaking or writing.
. . . [moreover] something else is required of us to comprehend fully the moral
aim of the author. . . .  this is the spiritual sense of the work, as the divines put
it, and without it, all the rest is but dead words. (Stinstra, pp. 151, 155, 156)
Such an attentive reading imposes tremendous hardships on the reader
because it unrelentingly exercises and measures the strength of our
virtue. That is, not only are the moral predicaments of Clarissa fully
internalized by the various characters, but they require a corresponding
assimilation by the reader.
This we can see quite clearly in two passages that display the prob-
lematic workings of the novel. In the first passage Clarissa dramatizes
her predicament in response to Anna Howe's well-meaning but un-
certain advice, and her response further distinguishes between Anna's
external observation and Clarissa's extraordinary entanglement:
Had you, my dear, been witness to my different emotions, as I read your Letter,
when, in one place, you advise me of my danger, if I am carried to my Uncle's;
in another, when you own you could not bear what I bear, and would do any-
thing rather than marry the man you hate; yet, in another, represent to me my
reputation suffering in the world's eye; and the necessity I should be under to
justify my conduct, at the expence of my friends, were I to take a rash step; in
another, insinuate the dishonest figure I  should be forced to make, in so
compelled a Matrimony; endeavouring to cajole, fawn upon, and play the
hypocrite with a man to whom I have an aversion; who would have reason to
believe me an hypocrite, as well from my former avowals, as from the sense he
must have (if common sense he has) of his own demerits:—The necessity you
think there would be for me, the more averse I really was, to seem the fonder of
him: A fondness (were I capable of such dissimulation) that would be imputable
to disgraceful motives; as it would be too visible, that Love, either of person or
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mind, could be neither of them—Then his undoubted, his even constitutional
narrowness; His too probable jealousy, and unforgivingness, bearing in mind
my declared aversion and the unfeigned despights I took all opportunities to do
him, in order to discourage his address: A preference avowed against him from
the same motive: with the pride he professes to take in curbing and sinking the
spirits of a woman he had acquired a right to tyrannize over:—Had you, I say,
been witness of my different emotions as I read; now leaning this way, now
that; now perplexed; now apprehensive; now angry at one, then at another; now
resolving; now doubting;—you would have seen the power you have over me;
and would have had reason to believe, that, had you given your advice in any
determined or positive manner, I had been ready to have been concluded by it.
(2:75-76)
Any reader who attends to this sentence has to participate in its
meaning in order to assimilate and thereby reexperience the trial that
Clarissa undergoes. Although the sentence begins and rewinds to the
subjunctive "Had you," by the time the reader has gone through the
sentence it is a living and present experience. Moreover, because the
questions Clarissa faces and poses are neither easily formulated nor
easily resolved, this sentence, like the novel, produces further and deep-
er entanglements. The very length of this unusual sentence, like the
length of the novel, mirrors and duplicates the complication and in-
determinacy of what Richardson calls the state of probation. In fact,
the only people who continually operate in a distinctly "positive
manner" are the other members of the Harlowe family, who are a gro-
tesque parody of determination; ironically, not even Lovelace nor Sin-
clair, in their most calculating and menacing moments, lack doubt..
Indeed, Clarissa's complicated sentence serves as a kind of para-
digm of the reader's experience, for it invites reasoning at the same time
that it frustrates it, which is to say the reader, like Clarissa, now leans
this way, now that; is now perplexed, now apprehensive; now resolves,
now doubts. It is no wonder that Kinkead-Weekes, commenting on the
novel's indeterminacy, has argued that "the 'meanings' which emerge
from this way of writing are bound to be more tentative and more com-
plicated than in other kinds of fiction, since many more tensions and
problems arise than the author anticipated, or can immediately clarify."
However, if we draw the further conclusion, as Eaves and Kimpel do,
that "the 'meaning' of Clarissa is the experience which the reader
has while he reads the book," then we run the risk of placing too
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much emphasis on the adequacy of the secular self—the characters' as
well as the reader's—without realizing that this self and its capacity
to reason promote the very illusions of control that the novel continually
undermines.14
Anna Howe, for example, proposes a formula for Clarissa's trial
of virtue that is finally inadequate to the novel's and Clarissa's ordeal.
In the first letter of the novel Anna tells Clarissa, "Yet it must be
allowed, that your present trial is but proportioned to your prudence"
(1:3); and after the rape Anna again insists that Lovelace's "attempts
were but proportioned to your resistance and vigilance" (6:199). But
the truth is—and this is why Clarissa is a tragic novel—that the moral
predicaments of the novel are disproportionate to Clarissa's or anyone
else's virtue, for there is no rational way that Clarissa or, by implica-
tion, the reader could successfully anticipate, not to say resist, Love-
lace's premeditated violence. In fact, it is Belford who sees that "the
trial is not a fair trial" (3:265); he tells Lovelace:
Considering the depth of thy plots and contrivances: Considering the oppor-
tunities which I see thou must have with her, in spite of her own heart; all
her Relations follies acting in concert, though unknown to themselves, with thy
wicked scheming head: Considering how destitute of protection she is: Con-
sidering the house [Sinclair's] she is to be in, where she will be surrounded
with thy implements; specious, well-bred, and genteel creatures, not easily
to be detected when they are disposed to preserve appearances, especially by
a young, unexperienced Lady wholly unacquainted with the town: Considering
all these things, I say, what glory, what cause of triumph, wilt thou have, if
she should be overcome? . . . It would be a miracle if she stood such an
attempter, such attempts, and such snares, as I see will be laid for her.
(3:265-66)
As Belford's quotation implies, there is simply too much for Clarissa
or the reader to "consider"—not to say control—and thus our expec-
tations of rational control are correspondingly undermined. A consider-
able part of the novel's "calamity" depends on Richardson's ability to
overload the processes of reasoning, ensnaring both the characters and
the reader in their own rational expectations; this is what Clarissa is
getting at when she distinguishes between her own "wilderness of
doubt and error" and the basically external and limited view of "the
event-judging world" (4:38-39). The "event-judging world," as I
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understand it, basically judges the fact of an action, rather than the mo-
tives behind it; moreover, such judgments presume the self-sufficiency
of reason and what I have called the adequacy of self. But this is
precisely the process which is Clarissa's initial weakness, and which
continues to be the weakness of any readings that assume the adequacy
of self and the proportionate strength of individual reason and reform.
Clarissa condemns herself for "too much indeed relying upon her own
strength," but she speaks for all the characters, and a good many
readers, when she also chastises herself for having "thought I could
proceed, or stop, as I pleased" (2:361).
In short, too much attention has been focused on Clarissa's self or
individuality when this is exactly what she perceives to be her central
and fatal weakness. The novel, for instance, certainly invites psycho-
logical interpretations, but one wonders whether this kind of reading
doesn't finally entrap itself in the very presumption that Clarissa even-
tually escapes. Diverse critics have argued that "the pervasiveness of
fantasy in the creation of character is . . . Richardson's preeminent
contribution to the novel," that both Lovelace and Clarissa "acknowl-
edge, in quite different ways, the freedom of the will, the sovereignty
of self," and that "self-suffering and self-creation is the general mes-
sage of the novel, and Richardson spoke to a world ready for that
message."15 Such insistent secular readings hardly jibe with Mrs.
Norton's counsel to Clarissa: "If you are to be punished all your days
here, for example-sake, in a case of such importance, for your one false
step, be pleased to consider, That this Life is but a State of Probation;
and if you have your Purification in it, you will be the more happy.
Nor doubt I, that you will have the higher Reward hereafter for sub-
mitting to the Will of Providence here, with Patience and Resignation"
(6:128-29).
Mrs. Norton's understanding certainly conforms with Richardson's
declared views on the state of probation, and despite Ian Watt's puzzling
comment about Richardson's "shallow notion of religion,"16 I think it
is evident that the novel leaves such secular readings as his entirely at
the level of indeterminancy, just as Clarissa abandons her initial pre-
occupation with self for the more assured, though less measurable,
future rewards of piety. The "Patience and Resignation" to which Mrs.
Norton refers require an abandonment of self, and it is exactly this
abandonment of self that Clarissa asserts in one of her posthumous
letters:
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I was too apt to value myself upon the love and favour of every one: The
merit of the good I delighted to do, and of the inclinations which were given
me, and which I could not help having, I was, perhaps, too ready to attribute
to myself. . . .  Temptations were accordingly sent. I shrunk in the day of tryal.
My discretion, which had been so cried up, was found wanting when it came
to be weighed in an equal balance. I was betrayed, fell, and became the byword
of my companions, and a disgrace to my family, which had prided itself in
me perhaps too much. But as my fault was not that of a culpable will, when
my pride was sufficiently mortified, I was not suffered (altho' surrounded by
dangers, and entangled in snares) to be totally lost: But purified by sufferings, I
was fitted for the change I have NOW, at the time you will receive This, so
newly, and, as I humbly hope, so happily, experienced. (8:31)
Quite appropriately John Preston writes that "the novel ends by depict-
ing the kind of response it desires," but evidently it is not the kind of
experience desired by some readers, nor understood by a majority of the
characters.17
Interestingly, when Clarissa declares herself to be "so newly, and
. . . so happily, experienced," she has in fact collapsed the novel's
earlier distinction (and Lovelace's obsession) between theory and prac-
tice or experience; for this distinction, we can now see, is inadequate
because it is unable, finally, either to include or explain the kind of
"experience" Clarissa has acquired. Clarissa is not using the term
"experience" to refer to secular life or secular understanding, and this
point is underscored by the fact that it appears in a posthumous letter
when she must be understood as "speaking from the dead" (8:138).
The "NOW" that she mentions, moreover, does not refer to the secular
present time that dominates the novel, but rather to her presence in
another spiritual world which transcends the state of probation. This is
the spiritual sense of the work, and without it, as Stinstra puts it, "all
the rest is but dead words."
Furthermore, Richardson concludes the novel with an apt reading
paradigm that tests the reader's and characters' ability to differentiate
between the spiritual sense and the "dead words" of exclusively secu-
lar readings. Just as Clarissa rejects the temporal solutions to her
ordeal—she neither wishes to prosecute Lovelace in court, nor does she
seek the vengeance that Morden finally inflicts on Lovelace—so the
"meaning" of Clarissa's trial ultimately exceeds the grasp of a variety
of characters who are themselves too immersed in their own preoccupa-
tions with self and rational understanding. This is made especially clear
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in Clarissa's cryptic letter to Lovelace in which she speaks on a wholly
spiritual level:
I have good news to tell you. I am setting out with all diligence for my Father's
House. I am bid to hope that he will receive his poor penitent with a goodness
peculiar to himself; for I am overjoyed with the assurance of a thorough
Reconciliation, thro' the interposition of a dear blessed friend, whom I always
loved and honoured. . . .  So, pray, Sir, don't disturb or interrupt me—I be-
seech you don't. You may possibly in time see me at my Father's; at least,
if it be not your own fault. (7:189-90)
The responses of a variety of characters to this letter serves to
indicate how Richardson, unlike Fielding, refuses to accommodate
Clarissa's trial to the limited understanding and expectations of secular
life. The reforming Belford reads the letter and confesses to Clarissa:
"Indeed, Madam, I can find nothing but that you are going down to
Harlowe-Place to be reconciled to your Father and other Friends"
(7:272). And after Clarissa explains its religious meaning, he chides
himself and Lovelace for their "own Stupidity, to be thus taken in"
(7:273) by their secular preoccupation with a resolution, or happy
ending, in this world. In the same way Lovelace, Morden, and Lord M.
ponder Clarissa's letter, each trying to enforce a meaning on it that
satisfies his expectations but in fact reveals his own conspicuous limita-
tions. Lovelace, for instance, wants to believe that Morden is Clarissa's
"dear blessed friend" (7:301), and Morden is only too happy to com-
ply with this reading, though he still worries that "I know not what to
make of it" (7:302). Lord M. wants to think, though it is phrased as
a question, that "there is something very favourable to my Nephew in
this Letter—Something that looks as if the Lady would comply at
last?" (7:302). But Lovelace finally condemns the letter as deceit,
arguing that "she sat down to write this letter with a design to mis-
lead and deceive. And if she be capable of That, at such a crisis, she
has as much need of Heaven's forgiveness, as I have of hers" (7:329).
Such confusion about the meaning of Clarissa's letter is a powerful
and illuminating way of summarizing and testing not only the charac-
ters', but the reader's, distance from God and immersion in this world.
Fielding can resolve, if not clarify, the moral predicaments of Amelia
with Dr. Harrison's upbeat assertion to Booth that "your sufferings are
all at an end; and Providence hath done you the justice at last, which
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it will one day or other render to all men" (3:226). But in Clarissa
Richardson's view of the state of probation is such as not to allow for
happy endings, nor for the reformation of rakes, because "he always
thought, that sudden conversions, such especially, as were left to the
candour of the Reader to suppose and make out, had neither Art, nor
Nature, nor even Probability, in them; and that they were moreover of
very bad example" (PHP, p. 349). Indeed, it is this mistaken expec-
tation of "sudden conversions" that dominates the various characters'
interpretations of Clarissa's letter, for they understand, because they
want to believe, that Clarissa's "reconciliation" will be with this
world, just as so many of Richardson's contemporaries desired a happy
ending.
Alan McKillop reports that among Richardson's contemporaries
Fielding was one of those who "wrote a letter to Richardson urging
a happy ending."18 But such a happy ending, based on the desired
reform of Lovelace, represents an accommodation to the world that
would undermine Richardson's sense of secular existence as a state of
probation. Part of the reason that Clarissa must die is that Richardson
wished to frustrate the reader's worldly expectations. For example, he
writes in his correspondence: "I had further intended to make her
[Clarissa] so faultless, that a Reader should find no way to account for
the Calamities she met with, and to justify Moral Equity but by looking
up to a future Reward" (SL, p. 73). Richardson further insists on
Clarissa's "triumphant Death" over "the World" (SL, p. 87), and he
addresses the following acrimonious response to Lady Bradshaigh who,
like Fielding, hoped for a happy ending: "I am sorry that it was sup-
posed that I had no other end in the Publication of so large a Piece,
the Opening of which had extended to four close printed Volumes, but
the trite one of perfecting a private Happiness, by the Reformation of a
Libertine, who sinning against the Light of Knowledge, and against the
most awaking Calls & Convictions, was too determined a Libertine to
be reformed, at least till he arrived at the Age of Incapacity" (SL,
p. 103).19
What finally differentiates the problematical effects of Amelia and
Clarissa is that they address and challenge the "incapacity" of their
readers in widely different ways. Both novels share an intense pre-
occupation with the trial of virtue, the possibility of reform, and the
relationship between secular and spiritual orders of experience. Yet
Fielding can adopt what Richardson calls "sudden conversions" be-
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cause his view of human nature presumes the possibility of reform
through providential interventions in the secular world. Thus he can
finally reinforce the reader's desire for solutions—rational and religious
—to the moral predicaments of this world, though Fielding is at the
same time distrustful of the characters' and reader's unassisted reliance
on reason. To this extent, I certainly agree with Eric Rothstein's state-
ment that "like the conclusion of Clarissa or of Rasselas, though not
so thoroughly, the end of Amelia admits the vanity of human wishes
in a tawdry and dangerous world."20
But where Fielding admits the vanity of human wishes only to clari-
fy them, Richardson no less appropriately both admits them and deep-
ens them, for he refuses to extricate his readers from moral predica-
ments. Clarissa alone escapes the clutches of this world, just as she
escapes the reader's desire for containment, and the novel thereby frus-
trates, in a way that Amelia does not, the reader's desire for secular
reconciliation. This continued frustration of the reader is a necessary
corollary to Richardson's dramatization of the problematical nature of
human existence. The state of probation from which the reader, unlike
Clarissa, is not removed continues as a condition of indeterminacy;
and though the dying Lovelace may remorsefully declare, "LET THIS
EXPIATE!" (8:277), there is in Clarissa no satisfactory expiation in
this world.
Johnson's Equipoise
and the State of Man
As I argued in the last chapter, Richardson and Fielding are both
concerned with the religious life of their characters and readers,
but these two authors address themselves te the reader's and
characters' "State of Probation" in vastly different ways. Field-
ing wishes to enact the possibility of religious conversion, even
in the face of an overwhelmingly defective secular world, but
Richardson rejects the possibility of Lovelace's conversion be-
cause this would falsify the uncompromising tragic severity of
Clarissa's Christian dying to the world. Like Richardson and
Fielding, Johnson takes for granted—more than he uses as his
focus—the fallen nature of man, but in The Life of Savage and
Rasselas Johnson opts neither for Richardson's Christian rigor
nor for Fielding's "sudden conversions." Instead, he attends to
the more modest possibility of choosing and acting virtuously in
a clearly imperfect world. I do not wish to be understood as
saying that Johnson rejects the realm of Christian faith; rather I
think it can be shown that he believes the state of religious belief
to surpass the affective possibilities of imaginative literature. The
fundamental appeal of literature, as Johnson understands it, must
be adjusted to the reader's secular existence—to the peculiar
blend of human strengths and weaknesses; correspondingly, what
Johnson's writings repeatedly evoke is the reader's sense of "vir-
tue not angelical, nor above probability . . .  but the highest and
purest that humanity can reach."'
The implications of what Johnson means by "the highest and
purest that humanity can reach" emerge most. forcefully in his
criticism of Paradise Lost. Before I quote this section, the reader
should be reminded, first, that it occurs after Johnson commends
Paradise Lost as "a poem which, considered with respect to
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design, may claim the first place, and with respect to performance the
second, among the productions of the human mind";2 and, second,
that Johnson's criticism arises, paradoxically, from what he takes to be
Milton's imaginative strength: namely, his magnificent sublimity which
has the "peculiar power to astonish" (Lives, 1:177).
The plan of Paradise Lost has this inconvenience, that it comprises neither
human actions nor human manners. The man and woman who act and suffer
are in a state which no other man or woman can ever know. The reader finds
no transaction in which he can be engaged, beholds no condition in which he
can by any effort of imagination place himself; he has, therefore, little natural
curiosity or sympathy.
We all, indeed, feel the effects of Adam's disobedience; we all sin like
Adam, and like him must all bewail our offences; we have restless and in-
sidious enemies in the fallen angels, and in the blessed spirits we have guardians
and friends; in the Redemption of mankind we hope to be included: in the
description of heaven and hell we are surely interested, as we are all to reside
hereafter in the regions of horrour or of bliss.
But these truths are too important to be new: they have been taught to our
infancy; they have mingled with our solitary thoughts and familiar conversa-
tion, and are habitually interwoven with the whole texture of life. Being there-
fore not new they raise no unaccustomed emotion in the mind: what we knew
before we cannot learn; what is not unexpected, cannot surprise. . . . Pleasure
and terrour are indeed the genuine sources of poetry; but poetical pleasure must
be such as human imagination can at least conceive, and poetical terrour such
as human strength and fortitude may combat. . . .
But original deficience cannot be supplied. The want of human interest is
always felt. Paradise Lost is one of the books which the reader admires and
lays down, and forgets to take up again. None ever wishes it longer than it is.
Its persual is a duty rather than a pleasure. (Lives, 1:181-83)
The drift of these paragraphs is clear, consistent, and possibly dis-
turbing. Johnson is saying that the reader can enter into acts of imagina-
tion only by virtue of what he has experienced. Acts of imagination
need not correspond to duplicate human experiences, but taking plea-
sure and terror as the root experiences of poetry, they must be such
that "human imagination can at least conceive" and "human strength
and fortitude may combat." Johnson is arguing that the images of
Paradise Lost, and hence its sentiments (or meaning), reside outside
the power of the reader's imagination, even though the poem is the
product of a human act. Thus Leopold Damrosch has accurately ob-
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served that Johnson's treatment of Paradise Last "depends upon the
idea that Milton has overreached the bounds of human nature."3 The
reader cannot fully participate in the sentiments of Paradise Lost be-
cause Adam and Eve "act and suffer in a state which no other man or
woman can ever know." For Johnson, the only experience of paradise
he can successfully imagine is the experience of paradise lost; he can-
not experience Adam and Eve's state of innocence. When Johnson
writes that the "reader finds no transaction in which he can be engaged"
he is referring to the initial experience of trying to read Paradise Lost,
and saying that the images are such that they do not elicit what, in
Rambler 60, he calls a "uniformity in the state of man." The state of
man, as Johnson understands it, is not a state of innocence. In Johnson's
reading, the only experience the reader can fully imagine is the loss of
paradise. Because the reader begins in a state of fallen experience where
Adam and Eve only end—namely, east of Eden—Adam and Eve can-
not exist until the end of the poem within the reader's experiential
frame of reference. Thus, in Johnson's view, Adam and Eve—and the
sentiments of Paradise Lost—remain primarily formulations, rather
than experiences, of truths. Or, as he writes of the sentiments: "Being
therefore not new they raise no unaccustomed emotion in the mind:
what we knew before we cannot learn; what is not unexpected, cannot
surprise."
Here we arrive at a crucial point in Johnson's understanding of the
relation between literature, religious belief, and human nature. Johnson
clearly suggests an inexorable division between the truths of religion
and the imaginative appeal of literature. This division assumes that
religious truths, such as those in Paradise Lost, are beyond the scope
of literary invention. This controversial assumption not only appears in
The Life of Milton; it is also vigorously asserted in both the Life of
Cowley and the Life of Waller:
The whole system of life, while the Theocracy was yet visible, has an appear-
ance so different from all other scenes of human action that the reader of the
Sacred Volume habitually considers it as the peculiar mode of existence of a
distinct species of mankind, that lived and acted with manners uncommuni-
cable; so that it is difficult even for imagination to place us in the state of them
whose story is related, and by consequence their joys and griefs are not easily
adopted, nor can the attention be often interested in any thing that befalls them.
(Lives, 1:51)
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Let no pious ear be offended if I advance, in opposition to many authorities,
that poetical devotion cannot often please. . . .  Contemplative piety, or the
intercourse between God and the human soul, cannot be poetical. Man ad-
mitted to implore the mercy of his Creator and plead the merits of his Re-
deemer is already in a higher state than poetry can confer. (Lives, 1:291)
On the other hand, the state of experience that poetry, or literature
generally, can confer is stated explicitly in Rambler 60:
All joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an
act of the imagination, that realises the event however fictitious, or approxi-
mates it however remote, by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him
whose fortune we contemplate; so that we feel, while the deception lasts,
whatever motions would be excited by the same good or evil happening to
ourselves. . . .  Those parallel circumstances, and kindred images, to which we
readily conform our minds, are, above all other writings, to be found in narra-
tives of the lives of particular persons; and therefore no species of writing
seems more worthy of cultivation than biography, since none can be more
delightful or more useful, none can more certainly enchain the heart by ir-
resistible interest, or more widely diffuse instruction to every diversity of con-
dition. (Rambler, 3:318-19)
The "motions" to which Johnson refers derive from his funda-
mental premise that "there is such an uniformity in the state of man,
considered apart from adventitious and separable decorations and dis-
guises, that there is scarce any possibility of good or ill, but is common
to human kind." This premise is the principle by which Johnson links
up the particular (an individual life) with the general (humankind).
Johnson assumes an underlying uniformity of mankind which is essen-
tially moral and cognitive: "We are all prompted by the same motives,
all deceived by the same fallacies, all animated by hope, obstructed by
danger, entangled by desire, and seduced by pleasure." This uniformity
combines a moral sense with a strong sense of individuation, and by
refusing to concentrate on the one to the exclusion of the other Johnson
generates an affective appeal that is flexibly adjusted to the reader's
strengths and limitations. Moreover, Johnson's writings are not simply
designed as acts of the imagination which the reader may intellectually
contemplate; rather Johnson continually appeals to the reader's will-
ingness to exert a corresponding act of imagination, wherein he places
himself for a time "in the condition of him whose fortune we con-
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template," so that the reader can apprehend—which is to say partici-
pate in—"whatever motions would be excited by the same good or
evil happening to ourselves."4
In other words, Johnson initially assumes his own ability, and sub-
sequently extends the reader's sympathetic capacity, to respond to the
underlying motions of mind of persons whose character, social situa-
tion, or human predicaments may at first glance appear to be totally
unlike his own. For example, the Life of Savage is certainly, on one
level, a biography of a particular man and his specific circumstances.
But because Johnson assumes that there exists "an uniformity in the
state of man," he eventually strips the particular life of Savage of its
"adventitious and separable decorations and disguises" in order to
make the reader participate in the emotional and intellectual correspon-
dences that exist between Savage's life and his own.5 In a sense, then,
the biography of Savage becomes the occasion for the reader to com-
pose in an act of imagination a biography of himself. We are asked to
measure ourselves against Savage, just as Johnson evidently realizes
some similarities between himself and Savage.6 In this way Johnson
transforms Savage's individual life into an analysis of what Clarence
Tracy has called "one of the strangest, most fascinating, and most
revealing specimens of human nature that any biographer ever dealt
with."7
One such passage that evokes Johnson's sense of humanity's virtues
and defects occurs when Savage meets the woman whose testimony
led to his imprisonment:
She informed him, that she was in Distress, and, with a Degree of Confidence
not easily attainable, desired him to relieve her. He, instead of insulting her
Misery, and taking Pleasure in the Calamities of one who had brought his Life
into Danger, reproved her gently for her Perjury, and changing the only Guinea
that he had, divided it equally between her and himself.
This is an Action which in some Ages would have made a Saint, and per-
haps in others a Hero, and which, without any hyperbolical Encomiums, must
be allowed to be an Instance of uncommon Generosity, an Act of complicated
Virtue; by which he at once relieved the Poor, corrected the Vicious, and for-
gave an Enemy; by which he at once remitted the strongest Provocations, and
exercised the most ardent Charity. (Savage, p. 40)
For most readers, I would suspect, this passage comes as a sur-
prise. Skeptical readers, especially, are no doubt tempted to dismiss
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the story as being both superficially tendentious and quite possibly
apocryphal. Moreover, even if the story is true, it smacks of melo-
drama: the unjustly imprisoned victim, falsely accused of murder,
emerges from prison and by an act of divine coincidence encounters
the woman whose perjured testimony—or so it is alleged—has helped
to convict him; the victim, in an act of magnificent charity, not only
forgives her and gently rebukes her, but gives her money—half of his
money—and sends her on her way. And yet I think, though I cannot
prove, that Johnson expected such extremes of response—be they senti-
mental or skeptical—not simply to shock or amaze his readers, but to
provoke us into further inquiry about how this "Act of Complicated
Virtue" is representative of the "state of man."
One way of examining this passage and its resonances is to consider
one of the definitions for the word "complicate" in Johnson's diction-
ary: "To entangle one with another; to join." To illumine this definition
Johnson quotes a passage from Watts: "There are a multitude of human
actions, which have so many complicated circumstances, aspects, and
situations, with regard to time and place, persons and things, that it is
impossible for any one to pass a right judgment concerning them, with-
out entering into most of these circumstances." Johnson's choice of the
word "complicated" in the Life of Savage is altogether appropriate, for
it serves as a shorthand term for the very process of reading that John-
son expects of his readers. That is, the only adequate way for us to
attempt an assessment of Savage is to enter into—rather than detach
ourselves from—the circumstances surrounding his life.
This process of "complicated" reading emerges quite forcefully
in the second paragraph of the quoted passage from the Life of Savage,
which is devoted to Johnson's interpretation of the event and to his
anticipation of how the reader may be responding to Savage's act.
The apparent aspects of melodrama are introduced, I believe, in antici-
pation of the reader's potential stock responses. It would not be sur-
prising if many readers thought of Savage's act, in light of the back-
ground of perjury and imprisonment, as one verging on the saintly or
heroic, but Johnson actually enhances the value of Savage's action, and
hence makes it more plausible, by reducing it from apparent heroism
to a level more familiar and more accessible to his readers.
The first part of Johnson's sentence reads, "This is an Action which
in some Ages would have made a Saint, and perhaps in others a Hero,
and which without any hyperbolical Encomiums, must be allowed to
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be an Instance of uncommon Generosity, an Act of complicated Vir-
tue." The effect of this sentence is to push back notions of saintliness
and heroism into a distant past, to associate these notions when intro-
duced into the present with "hyperbolical Encomiums," and yet to
maintain with determined authority ("must be allowed") the "uncom-
mon," which is not to say that it could not become common, generosity
of Savage's action. Through this reported event Johnson anticipates and
almost immediately deflates any temptation on the reader's part to react
to Savage's life either skeptically or sentimentally. For Johnson the
author, and Savage the ostensible subject, this event and the many
events of Savage's life are "complicated." Johnson's decision to relate
an event like this is evidently calculated to move the reader from a
position of detached observation to that of imaginative participation.
The relation of this event overturns stock responses by refusing to ele-
vate Savage's action out of a human context, and thus resisting the
temptation to "canonize" him on the basis of a single action. Yet the
event complicates the reader's psychological and moral understanding
because it reminds him, whether he has or has not suffered hardships
similar to Savage's, that acts of "complicated Virtue," even under the
most adverse circumstances, are well within human capabilities, hu-
manly desirable, and indispensable to our understanding of Savage.
I have tried to emphasize, through the example of one recorded
event in the Life of Savage, how the reader is required to participate
within the process of Johnson's narrative because I am convinced that
one of Johnson's great strengths is his sensitivity to human cognition
and psychology—to "what is common to human kind"—not by virtue
of some elaborate theoretical framework which he has rationally for-
mulated, but by virtue of his compassionate understanding of what it
means to be a human being. While I am not sure whether Johnson, as
Donald Greene has suggested, "may well be considered the originator
of modern psychological biography," I certainly do agree with Greene
that Johnson has a masterful practical grasp of human psychology.8
A failure to respond to the psychological processes in the Life has led
one critic to argue that the work "is conducted so that it becomes a
virtual eighteenth-century type-comedy of the dynamics of hopes and
'schemes.'"9 Such an abstract approach presumes the reader's de-
tached sense of superiority to Savage's experiences, while Johnson
continually undercuts such expectations. This very tendency or tempta-
tion toward abstract observation, as Johnson shows, is one of the fun-
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damental weaknesses of Savage's character, and I should think that the
following passage might well serve as a warning to readers and critics
alike about the danger of imposing abstract labels on The Life of Savage:
"But these Reflections, though they readily occurred to him in the first
and last Parts of his Life, were, I am afraid, for a long Time for-
gotten; at least they were, like many other maxims, treasured up in his
Mind, rather for Shew than Use" (Savage, p. 67). One danger of ab-
stractions, in other words, is that the reader may end up reading the
Life in the same way that Savage treasured up maxims—"rather for
Shew than Use." This would occur if the reader concentrated exclu-
sively on the purely formal qualities of the biography, and ignored
the imaginative processes enacted by the biography which give it its
"symbolic force."10
Another way of seeing how Johnson transforms a potentially ab-
stract theme into an experience shared by author, subject, and reader
would be to focus on what Johnson calls Savage's "first great Position,
'that Good is the Consequence of Evil,'" (Savage, p. 53). Before
examining the complexity of this position within the Life, it might be
well to consider some of Johnson's observations on this matter in his
essays. In Idler 89, he remarks that "almost all the moral good which
is left among us, is the apparent effect of physical evil," and he goes
on to conclude his essay by noting, "That misery does not make all
virtuous experience too certainly informs us; but it is no less certain
that of what virtue there is, misery produces far the greater part."
(2:276, 279). This statement, I believe, grows out of the general
position that Johnson advances in Rambler 70, wherein he extends
Hesiod's division of mankind into three orders of intellect to a division of
mankind according to their morals. The first class of men includes those
persons of such fixed principles that their life is steadfastly regulated
by "the divine commands" and "the approbation of God." The third
class includes those people whose life consists of immersion in pleasure
and an abandonment "to passion without any desire of higher good."
It is the second class, however, which Johnson asserts to be "so much
the most numerous, that it may be considered as comprising the whole
body of mankind." This class is described as follows: "There are others
in a kind of equipoise between good and ill; who are moved on one
part by riches or pleasure, by the gratifications of passion, and the de-
lights of sense; and, on the other, by laws of which they own the
Johnson's Equipoise 97
obligation, and rewards of which they believe the reality, and whom a
very small addition of weight turns either way" (Rambler, 4:3-4).
We should note, however, that even though Johnson does believe
that good is often the consequence of evil, and that mankind on the
whole lives in a state of "equipoise," straddling, as it were, good and
evil, it is not enough for a writer simply to observe these facts and
treat them as abstract themes. It is his responsibility to resist any
deterministic interpretation, for such a deterministic view naturally
leads to complacency and irresponsibility. Thus Johnson, even as he is
agreeing with Savage's "first great Position," qualifies it and makes it
more complicated, so that the reader will not succumb to the tempta-
tions that Johnson describes in Rambler 4: "For while men consider
good and evil as springing from the same root, they will spare the one
for the sake of the other, and in judging, if not of others at least of
themselves, will be apt to estimate their virtues by their vices. To this
fatal error all those will contribute, who confound the colours of right
and wrong, and instead of helping to settle their boundaries, mix them
with so much art, that no common mind is able to disunite them"
(3:24).
Because Johnson is so preoccupied with what constitutes the
"common mind"—both as pure cognition and as the exercise of moral
choice—we should look for the following principles as they are em-
bodied in the human experiences recorded in The Life of Savage: that
good is often the consequence of evil because man exists in a state of
equipoise between good and evil; that man is nevertheless a responsible
moral agent; and that it is the writer's duty to "settle" the boundaries
of good and evil in such a way that the reader's "common mind" is
able to distinguish them. The key activities of mind which join the
reader and Johnson are the processes of disuniting what is separable
and adventitious and determining what is common to humankind. To-
gether the reader and author sort out the reasons, causes, effects, vir-
tues, and defects of Savage's life without, however, separating them-
selves from the essential, as opposed to adventitious, human bonds
that the reader, author, and Savage share with one another as fellow
human beings.
Indeed, the dominant mode both of style and structure in the Life
is one of "equipoise," and it is because of this that the reader's sim-
plistic expectations are so often anticipated and made complicated. For
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where we may be in the habit of seeing things as either/or—that is,
reading the Life either skeptically or sentimentally—Johnson compli-
cates our reading by continually calling attention to the complementary
nature of apparent opposites. There is equipoise in a sentence such as
this: "The two Powers which, in the Opinion of Epictetus, constituted
a wise Man, are those of bearing and forbearing, which cannot indeed
be affirmed to have been equally possessed by Savage; but it was too
manifest that the Want of one obliged him very frequently to practise
the other" (Savage, p. 126). Or Johnson writes that Savage "scarcely
ever found a Stranger, whom he did not leave a friend, but it must
likewise be added, that he had not a Friend long, without obliging him
to become a Stranger" (Savage, p. 60). And this process of equipoise
is often explicitly directed at the reader as a way of reminding us of how
to read the Life: "Nor can his personal Example do any hurt, since
whoever hears of his Faults, will hear of the Miseries which they
brought upon him, and which would deserve less Pity, had not his
Condition been such as made his Faults pardonable" (Savage, p. 75).
On a larger structural level, whenever one is tempted to think of
Savage as purely a victim of circumstances, or as a man whom many
people are "out to get," Johnson makes us aware of Savage's own
deficiencies of character and reminds us that for every hostile person,
such as Savage's purported mother or Judge Page, there is a Mr. Wilks
or Mrs. Oldfield who respond to Savage with great compassion. Simi-
larly, through the use of an apparently trivial detail Johnson makes the
reader painfully aware of Savage's complicated state of mind, of his
desire for resoluteness in the midst of irresolution. We are told, for
example, that as a writer Savage "often altered, revised, recurred to his
first Reading or Punctuation, and again adopted the Alteration; he was
dubious and irresolute without End . . .  the Intrusion or Omission of a
Comma was sufficient to discompose him, and he would lament an
Error of a single Letter as a heavy Calamity" (Savage, p. 58). Johnson
is surely not just mocking Savage, nor making him an abstract type of
indecision and ineffectuality. Rather, he has shown us how deeply
Savage's irresolution runs, and yet how desperately (though unsuccess-
fully) Savage tries to exert some form of control, not just over his
sentences, but over his life. But lest the reader too quickly extricate
himself from Savage's circumstances, Johnson will extrapolate a gener-
al distinction from Savage's character so precisely and so forcefully
that its equipoise stands as a danger signal provided for the reader's
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benefit—as, for example, in this sentence: "The reigning Error of his
Life was, that he mistook the Love for the Practice of Virtue, and was
indeed not so much a good Man, as the Friend of Goodness" (Savage,
p. 74).
Moreover, if we do not acknowledge and exercise acts of "compli-
cated Virtue," then Johnson at once dismisses our judgment and re-
proves our insensitivity: "Those are no proper Judges of his Conduct
who have slumber'd away their Time on the Down of Plenty; nor will
any wise Man easily presume to say, 'Had I been in Savage's Condi-
tion, I should have lived, or written, better than Savage'" (Savage,
p. 140). The wisdom and judgment Johnson refers to emerge from his
strenuous conviction that equipoise is the general state of mankind, and
it is this conviction that entitles Johnson to expect and require the
reader's ability to sort out the fundamentally human experience of
Savage's life from the peculiarly individual events of his life. At one
point in the Life, Johnson observes that "though there are few who will
practise a laborious Virtue, there will never be wanting Multitudes that
will indulge an easy Vice" (Savage, p. 68). The principal challenge of
The Life of Savage—and it is characteristic of all of Johnson's writings
—is that in order to understand and judge it we must practice "a
laborious Virtue"—as readers, as critics, and as men.
Both in principle and in process, then, Johnson's use of biography
is adjusted to the fallen state of man which he calls equipoise. But this
principle and its corollary process of reader participation are far easier
to enact in biography, which is a form of literature more closely aligned
with the reader's sense of "reality," than in the apologue. Yet what
Johnson says about the rise of the novel may, as well, be used to
characterize biography: such a work exhibits "life in its true state,
diversified only by accidents that daily happen in the world, and in-
fluenced by passions and qualities which are really to be found in con-
versing with mankind" (Rambler, 3:19). But what of a work like
Rasselas, the apparent opposite in form of The Life of Savage? Rasselas
does not attempt to take hold of the reader's imagination through what
Johnson calls "historical veracity." Quite the contrary: its use of
conspicuously fictional devices operates almost exclusively at a level
of abstraction. Rasselas appears to conform readily to Sheldon Sacks's
definition of an apologue: "a work organized as a fictional example
of the truth of a formulable statement or a series of such statements."
Thus Sacks argues, with the full endorsement of studies by Bertrand
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Bronson and Gwin J. Kolb, that "stated in its most prosaic form, the
concept obviously illustrated in Rasselas is that earthly happiness does
not exist."11
Still, even on an abstract level there is some question as to whether
Rasselas simply illustrates concepts or exercises activities and "mo-
tions" of mind. I do not mean to quibble, but there is tied to the
notion of "illustration" an implied passivity, not to say futility, and
yet the knowledge that earthly happiness does not exist, or more exactly
does exist but is transient, seems to operate less as a theme than as the
incontrovertible background against which Johnson's characters attempt
to enact a variety of "choices of life."12 We should recall, in this
regard, that the original title of Rasselas was "The Choice of Life;
or, The History of Prince of Abissinia" (Letters, 1:117). Even if
these enacted choices of life in Rasselas are not fully satisfactory, nor
at times even partially satisfactory, they may nevertheless be acts of
"complicated virtue," acts that generate correspondences in the read-
er's imagination, just as they evidently did in Johnson's mind. Bos well,
after all, has reported Johnson to have remarked: "'Why sir,' said
Johnson, 'the greatest concern we have in this world, the choice of our
profession, must be determined without demonstrative reasoning. Hu-
man life is not yet so well known as that we can have it. And take the
case of a man who is ill. I call two physicians: they differ in opinion.
I am not to lie down, and die between them: I must do something'"
(Life, 5:47).13
Just as Johnson does something, so do the characters in Rasselas,
and so should the reader; and it is in the nature of these activities that
they are done "without demonstrative reasoning." The trouble with
reading Rasselas as if it were exclusively a fictional embodiment of an
abstract principle is that it reduces the reader's experience, and the
characters' experience as well, to a state bordering on paralysis. More-
over, such a concentration on abstract principle leaves the reader, and
by implication Johnson, outside the work in a position of detached
superiority with respect to the choices made by Johnson's characters.
Such an attitude of cool observation, an attitude perhaps fed by some
critics' confidence in the existence of "demonstrative reasoning," has
led to such observations on Rasselas as that "the only rational 'choice
of life' is the 'choice of eternity,' a 'mode of existence which shall
furnish employment for the whole soul, and where pleasure shall be
adequate to our powers of fruition'"14 (which presumes that Nekayah
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is demonstrably right); another critic has asserted that "actually Ras-
selas is a vastly (if subtly) comic performance. . . . We can see that
this tradition [the Oriental Tale] comes close to constituting an eigh-
teenth-century version of Camp," and we are finally cautioned to ob-
serve, clearly from the vantage point of Manhood and Maturity, that
"it has not always been noticed that the first sentence of Rasselas estab-
lishes it as virtually a boy's book."15 These views reach their inevitable
culmination in Arieh Sachs's statement that "this notion of a dis-
engaged state of being, a notion directly derived from his personal need,
guilt, and anguish, is the ideal Johnson sets up not only in his moral
theories and as the goal of religious experience, but, in an important
sense, as the point of departure for his literary criticism and aesthetic
judgments as well."16
The notion of a "disengaged state of being" simply flies in the face
of Johnson's description of his own understanding of humanity, as well
as the narrative appeal of Rasselas: "In narratives, where historical
veracity has no place, I cannot discover why there should not be ex-
hibited the most perfect idea of virtue; of virtue not angelical, nor
above probability, for what we cannot credit we shall never imitate, but
the highest and purest that humanity can reach, which, exercised in
such trials as the various revolutions of things shall bring upon it, may,
by conquering some calamities, and enduring others, teach us what we
may hope, and what we can perform" {Rambler, 3:24). It is not that I
disagree, for example, with the observation that Johnson is frequently
smiling in the background of Rasselas, but it is not the smile of
comedy, mockery, or cynicism: it is a gesture of sympathetic under-
standing, a gesture that does not wholly detach Johnson either from his
characters or from his readers, but attaches all of us in a series of
common human predicaments.17 W. K. Wimsatt has shrewdly noted
the uniformity of the style of Rasselas—"the aphoristic moralisms,
the lugubrious orotundity"—and the way all the characters speak in
essentially the same mode. But the real point is that this style joins all
the characters, separating out the essential from the adventitious, just
as the moral content within this style joins the author and reader in a
common language of humanity. In fact, there is a certain sense in which
Imlac and Dr. Johnson occupy parallel positions: we know that Imlac
has already engaged in wide travels and is a man of limited expecta-
tions, just as Johnson at this point in his life was not a man easily
deluded. So there may be a limited sense in which Imlac is to the
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characters in Rasselas what Johnson is to the readers of Rasselas:
namely, a man whose virtue has been "exercised in such trials as the
various revolutions of things shall bring upon it," and who, "by con-
quering some calamities, and enduring others, [will] teach us what we
may hope, and what we can perform." But even though Imlac and John-
son enjoy a position of some superiority, they continually speak the
language of "we" and "us," not the language of "they" and "them."
The "veracity" of Rasselas is thus not, as in the Life of Savage,
initially "historical," where the audience can immediately identify with
a person in a reasonably familiar setting; rather it is continually cogni-
tive and moral. We have already seen how Johnson, in the Life of
Savage, deals with the motives and the psychology of one individual.
No reader can emerge from the Life of Savage without a strong sense
of how Savage's mind works. Now in Rasselas Johnson seems to be
preoccupied with mind generally and with its principal mode of opera-
tion—the act of choice—which is an appropriate paradigm of reason.
What Johnson does in Rasselas is to offer us a range of choices repre-
senting both the variety and uniformity of humanity. The variety is
represented by the diversity of choices and individuals; but beneath this
variety there exists a uniformity of mind and experience, a common
desire to act virtuously which presumably joins the author, his charac-
ters, and the reader. The equipoise of Rasselas arises from the fact that
though all the characters are vulnerable, they are nevertheless virtuous;
taken together these two characteristics express the moral dilemmas of
Rasselas. It is this very complication that prevents Rasselas from being
predominantly comic or satiric, as I think we can see by examining
some representative passages which initially presume judgment on the
characters but which insist, finally, on the reader's compassionate
exercise of self-examination.
A good model of Johnson's procedures in Rasselas is the episode
with the learned astronomer. Many of the conventions of satire exist,
at least in potential, within this episode. Indeed, the astronomer might
have fit quite nicely in the Academy of Lagado of Gulliver's Travels
except for the fact that Johnson is not writing a satire. The astronomer
is crazy: he believes that he has possessed for "five years the regulation
of weather, and the distribution of the seasons: the sun has listened to
my dictates, and passed from tropick to tropick by my direction; the
clouds, at my call, have poured their waters, and the Nile has over-
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flowed at my command; I have restrained the rage of the dog-star, and
mitigated the fervours of the crab."18 If Johnson had left the episode
at this, it would be easy to write off the astronomer as a lunatic; but
despite his deluded belief, we learn in the next chapter that he has
attempted to act virtuously, unlike the projectors in the Academy of
Lagado. The astronomer, in other words, is exceedingly vulnerable—a
characteristic that satire would capitalize on—but he is also virtuous,
for we are reminded that despite the astronomer's "possession" of this
power, and despite his own unhappiness in the belief that he has such
power, "nothing but the consciousness of good intention could have
enabled [him] to support the weariness of unremitted vigilance" (Ras-
selas, p. 110). Already, then, Johnson has begun the process of short-
circuiting opportunities for the reader to dismiss the astronomer as a
mere lunatic. But Johnson goes still further and creates a situation
where reader response is objectified so as to establish a context for
subsequent self-examination. Imlac finishes his story about the astron-
omer without comment, thus allowing us, as well as the characters, to
form our own responses; and the characters do express a diversity of
responses: "The prince heard this narration with very serious regard,
but the princess smiled, and Pekuah convulsed herself with laughter"
(Rasselas, p. 113). The question at this point is how do we, as readers,
fit into this miniature spectrum of responses? Do we regard the story
seriously, or do we, like the princess and Pekuah, either smile or con-
vulse ourselves with laughter? The latter responses would certainly
be appropriate to a comic or satiric reading, and they might also be
the expected responses. But Imlac will have nothing to do with comedy
or satire and immediately addresses himself to the ladies' responses:
"'Ladies,' said Imlac, 'to mock the heaviest of human afflictions is
neither charitable nor wise. Few can attain this man's knowledge, and
few practise his virtues; but all may suffer his calamity. Of the un-
certainties of our present state, the most dreadful and alarming is the
uncertain continuance of reason'" (Rasselas, p. 113).
The rhetoric of Imlac's rejoinder—a characteristic rhetoric of Ras-
selas, I might add—is revealing: the contrast of "few" and "all"
reverses conventional expectations concerning madness. At the begin-
ning of the narrative it would appear that the astronomer, by virtue of
being mad, should be classified among the "few"—just as lunatics are
put into institutions out of general or "normal" society. The "all," of
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course, would be reserved for us normal people who, on the basis of
our superior understanding, reserve the right to judge and eventually
dismiss lunatics to the category of the "few." In his response to the
ladies, however, Imlac reverses and thus complicates conventional
formulations: the mad astronomer is among the "few," not because of
his madness but because of his knowledge and his practice of virtue.
On the other hand, the true bond he shares with us—"all" of us—
is his calamity, for as Imlac later remarks, "Disorders of intellect . . .
happen much more often than superficial observers will easily believe.
Perhaps, if we speak with rigorous exactness, no human mind is in its
right state" (Rasselas, pp. 113-16).
This episode of the learned astronomer, stretching over six short
chapters (40-45), is calculated to address itself not just to the charac-
ters' but to the readers' tendency to be "superficial observers." What
we assume to be stable and permanent, Johnson demonstrates to be
fluctuating and transient. Our most basic assumptions are rendered
problematical, just as Pekuah's ostensibly rational fear of and flight
from the unknown, in the hopes of remaining safe, ironically lead to
her kidnapping. Clearly, it is by the use of reason that we, much like
the astronomer, believe that we can control our lives, or, like Pekuah,
that we can rationally anticipate consequences. No man has been more
identified with the exercise of reason than Samuel Johnson, and yet it is
he who, altogether appropriately, insists on our consciousness of the
limitations of reason, not as a satirist would do to lead the reader into
a temporary paralysis of will, but to urge the necessity to act even, and
perhaps primarily, when we are uncertain. Robert Voitle has observed
that "the moral life is a life of constant activity. It is this belief that
most decisively sets Johnson apart from those moralists who emphasize
character and virtue."19 This position can be extended into a critical
framework describing Johnson's attempts to transform our customary
reading habits of passive acceptance and observation into vigorous
activity and participation. Many passages within the text of Rasselas
not only batter home the theme of action but seem designed to stimulate
the reader into activity.
The following passages, which are spread over the length of Ras-
selas, are dominated by the contrast between static observation and
active participation, between forms of rational self-imprisonment and
the necessary enactment of desire, however vulnerable it may be. Even
the apparently foolish mechanical artist who attempts to fly and crashes
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into the water voices the dominant note of Rasselas when he asserts,
"'Nothing . . . will ever be attempted, if all possible objections must
be first overcome'" (Rasselas, p. 17). Or Imlac, a man who has known
the life of activity and who voluntarily tries the sensual stasis of the
Happy Valley, prods the characters into activity by continually remind-
ing them of the complicated and insoluble nature of human needs and
motives:
"Inconsistencies," answered Imlac, "cannot both be right, but imputed to
man, they may both be true. Yet diversity is not inconsistency. My father
[a man of great wealth] might expect a time of greater security. However,
some desire is necessary to keep life in motion, and he, whose real wants are
supplied, must admit those of fancy." (Rasselas, p. 21)
"The causes of good and evil," answered Imlac, "are so various and uncertain,
so often entangled with each other, so diversified by various relations, and so
much subject to accidents which cannot be foreseen, that he who would fix
his condition upon incontestable reasons of preference, must live and die in-
quiring and deliberating." (Rasselas, pp. 46-47)
Or Nekayah, speaking on the subject of marriage and choosing a mar-
riage partner, cautions Rasselas: "There are a thousand familiar dis-
putes which reason never can decide: questions that elude investigation,
and make logic ridiculous; cases where something must be done, and
where little can be said. . . .  Wretched would be the pair above all
names of wretchedness, who should be doomed to adjust by reason
every morning all the minute detail of a domestic day" (Rasselas,
p. 77).
What this all leads to—perhaps surprisingly—is not an assertion of
irrationality or despair, but an ethic of activity based on a moral and
psychological tolerance for and compassionate understanding of ambi-
guity, inconsistency, and uncertainty. In this regard there is a sense in
which The Life of Savage is the specific example of which Rasselas
is the general embodiment: both works approach, from varying literary
perspectives, the human desire to enact choices that eventually fade into
irresolution. But Johnson reminds us that it is woven into the fabric
of life that such choices, though they do not assure stability, represent
genuinely virtuous attempts to sustain life and to avoid paralysis and
stagnation. Because Johnson is so preoccupied in Rasselas with the
workings and needs of the human mind, he emphasizes compassionate
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understanding—his own, his characters', and his readers'—over ab-
stract judgment, and sympathetic involvement over detached observa-
tion. What Imlac has to say about "our"—not "their"—minds in
chapter 35 will later be both structurally and thematically enacted in
Johnson's strangely indeterminate "conclusion":
Our minds, like our bodies, are in continual flux; something is hourly lost,
and something acquired. To lose much at once is inconvenient to either, but
while the vital powers remain uninjured, nature will find the means of repara-
tion. Distance has the same effect on the mind as on the eye, and while we
glide along the stream of time, whatever we leave behind us is always lessen-
ing, and that which we approach increasing in magnitude. Do not suffer life
to stagnate; it will grow muddy for want of motion: commit yourself again to
the current of the world (Rasselas, p. 93).20
This passage is a pure example of Johnson's equipoise: it both describes
and elicits a view that life is a process of loss and acquisition, of
recollection and anticipation, of stagnation and motion, all of which
occur within the flux that is called the "stream of time" and "the cur-
rent of the world."
This view may explain why Samuel Johnson, a man known for his
vigorous opinions and for a willingness to utter many pronouncements
decisively and authoritatively, has himself chosen to end Rasselas with
an unorthodox conclusion. If, indeed, Rasselas were the comedy or
even satire that some readers have claimed it to be, one would reason-
ably expect a conclusion of some decisiveness. Instead we are pre-
sented with a conclusion that has caused consternation among readers
chiefly because it is decisively indecisive. What we have is five charac-
ters in search of a conclusion within the formal context of a noncon-
clusive conclusion to an oriental tale. I have already spoken of John-
son's equipoise in the Life of Savage—of the delicate balancing evident
within the events and style of Johnson's biography. But the conclusion
of Rasselas pushes the experience of equipoise almost to its breaking
point, mainly because we are not asked, as we are in the Life of Savage,
to balance good against evil, nor virtue against vice. Rather, we are
required to appreciate distinctions between competing acts of virtue
and decisions among multiple choices of good, none of which will
yield themselves to a more than temporary stability. The formal con-
clusion fluctuates, even as some of the characters attempt to impose
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decisions to arrest fluctuation. Pekuah wants to choose piety in the form
of the convent of Saint Anthony, for she "would gladly be fixed in
some unvariable state." Nekayah wants to choose learning and later
establish "a college of learned women." Rasselas wants to choose
government, wishing to be a philosopher-king, but "he could never
fix the limits of his dominion, and was always adding to the number
of his subjects." Appropriately, the older men (Imlac and the astron-
omer) "were contented to be driven along the stream of life without
directing their course to any particular port."
Johnson has accomplished just what he talked about in Rambler 4.
In writing an oriental tale, a narrative where "historical veracity has
no place," he has exhibited characters of the highest and purest virtue
that humanity can reach, and their choices of life certainly are the occa-
sion for teaching us "what we may hope, and what we can perform."
Amid the diversity of choices all the characters are collected into
a community of virtue, and they return to Abissinia because their
journey through many places has, in fact, been a journey of mind
where place and rational control lose their expected importance, but
where our understanding and appreciation of human "equipoise" gain
in significance.
7
Sterne's Sixth Sense
There seems in some passages to want a sixth sense to do it
rightly.—What can he mean by the lambent pupilability of
slow, low, dry chat, five notes below the natural tone,—
which you know, madam, is little more than a whisper?
Lawrence Sterne, Tristram Shandy
We have seen how Johnson, particularly in Rasselas, accommo-
dates his sense of "equipoise" to the uncertainties of human life.
Such phrases as the "stream of time" and the "current of the
world" evoke a sense of indeterminacy, and the narrative process
of Rasselas, most dramatically its inconclusive conclusion, is
obviously adjusted to the prevailing idea of being "contented to
be driven along the stream of life without directing [our] course
to any particular port." On the face of it, it might appear that
the conclusion of Rasselas anticipates the whole of Tristram
Shandy, for neither work is in any great hurry to arrive at any
particular destination, but we know as well that Johnson is re-
ported to have dismissed Tristram Shandy simply by saying,
"Nothing odd will do long."1 Clearly the oddity of Tristram
Shandy represents a radical departure from Johnson's empirical
understanding of the human mind, for Sterne, unlike Johnson,
appeals to the reader's curiosity by transforming rationality, and
its dependence on the world of the five senses, into a celebration
of the world of the "sixth sense" which obliterates the moral and
cognitive distinctions so basic to Johnson's idea of "equipoise."
To put it another way, all the authors I have examined thus
far challenge the reader's rational expectations, but no work goes
to the extremes of Sterne's novel. As Sterne writes, "If I thought
you was able to form the least judgment or probable conjecture
to yourself, of what was to come in the next page,—I would
tear it out of my book."2 (TS, 1:80). What this quotation, as
well as the whole of Tristram Shandy, suggests is that the novel is
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one elaborate reading paradigm, explicitly designed to subvert the idea
of the reader as detached observer; the mode of the paradigm is unique.
Customarily, novels are written in such a way that the reader is
able to "form the least judgment or probable conjecture," and the reader
is able to do so because novels ordinarily represent human beings per-
forming familiar actions within familiar contexts. That is, readers ob-
serve human actions that are dependent on the five senses and deter-
mined by the coordinates of space and time. All of these customary
props, if they may be called such, are either removed or minimized
in Tristram Shandy. In their place Sterne substitutes a principle of
indeterminacy, which should not be construed as an absence of meaning
but rather as the plurality of meaning.3
Sterne writes, for example, "Observe, I determine nothing upon
this.—My way is ever to point out to the curious, different tracts of
investigation, to come at the first springs of the events I tell" (TS,
1:66); and near the end of his life he writes to Dr. John Eustace:
"Your walking stick is in no sense more shandaic than in that of its
having more handles than one—The parallel breaks only in this, that
in using the stick, every one will take the handle which suits his
convenience."4 Here Sterne demonstrates his awareness of how we
ordinarily read and how his book calls upon, and reeducates the reader
towards, different reading processes. Confronted with a variety of
choices—a number of handles, so to say—readers usually opt for one,
the one that suits their convenience. If reading and writing are structur-
ing activities of mind, then those activities tend to reduce the flux
of experience to an apparently more stable singularity. That singularity,
because it can be formulated, contained, and rationally inspected, we
call meaning; but it is precisely this habit of specifying and observing
that Sterne's novel resists. The reader may be closed-minded, for per-
fectly understandable reasons, but the book is open-ended, and our
life as conventional readers is thereby "put in jeopardy by words"
(TS, 1:87).
What is the difference, for instance, between a whisper and "the
lambent pupilability of slow, low, dry chat, five notes below the natural
tone?" A whisper is a word we recognize: it refers to an action we
have performed and observed. The word is singular, it is referential,
and it draws on our five senses. We feel we know its meaning. But
what of the "lambent pupilability of slow, low, dry chat"? Is this
phrase a synonym for whisper? Hardly. Instead of drawing on our
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ordinary senses it requires the reader to participate in, rather than
simply recognize from memory, the processes of its meaning. The
phrase lacks reference, but it invites us to activate our "sixth sense"—
our imagination, as distinguished from our rational understanding. The
meaning of the phrase exists in our imaginative experience of reading
it—possibly reading it out loud. Our ordinary habits of reading words
have been "put in jeopardy," which is to say that our customary reliance
on the referential meaning of words has been challenged. Though we
may feel threatened—the phrase is certainly odd—we may also be
pleased: pleased because our imagination has been set free to roam
among any number of possibilities.5 The phrase does not so much
describe a whisper as perform it. It whispers to our imagination by
bypassing our rational understanding, and we perform its meaning. Per-
haps we conjure up a woman to whom we would like to speak, or have
spoken, in this way. It is not difficult to make the phrase sensual,
though we need not insist on it. One could say that the cues are there,
but they are there in no specifiable way. Assuming we know—and it
is a huge assumption—what a "natural tone" is, we will have to
imagine what "five notes" below the tone is. There is no way we can
determine or measure our way "five notes below," but this very in-
determinacy, at the moment it removes referential meaning, simul-
taneously activates the reader's imaginative experience.
In the same letter to Dr. John Eustace, Sterne writes that "a true
feeler always brings half the entertainment along with him. His own
ideas are only call'd forth by what he reads, and the vibrations within,
so entirely correspond with those excited, 'tis like reading himself and
not the book" (Letters, p. 411). The vibrations emanating from the
author's and reader's imagination are the sixth sense to which Sterne
continually appeals. The imagination feeds on the five senses, but it
is not bound by them. To experience vibrations the reader must let go—
must release himself from the dominance of the five senses and the
coordinates of space and time. The imagination is without place, with-
out time, unrestricted by the five senses, and hence indeterminate. It is
its own world, a world of vibrations, but these vibrations may only be
experienced to the extent that reader and author abandon the props of
their ordinary habits and expectations. In this regard, the oddity of
Tristram Shandy is that it is not simply a conventional story "about"
Tristram, Uncle Toby, Walter, Yorick, Trim, Widow Wadman, and the
rest. Rather, it is the imaginative experience of writing and reading the
Sterne's Sixth Sense 111
experiences that are the indeterminate processes of their imaginations.
Tristram Shandy is thus not so much about the life and opinions of
Tristram Shandy as it is the life and opinions. The book is so calcu-
lated to defy our ordinary reading habits that it dissolves the most
basic of literary distinctions—that between the reader and the book. As
James Swearingen has persuasively argued, Tristram's "ideal requires
that both he and his reader abandon themselves and their methods of
procedure to the free play of the event in which new meanings un-
predictably occur."6 If it is true, as Sterne suggests, that for the
reader who is a "true feeler" the act of reading Tristram Shandy is
"like reading himself and not the book," then this very dissolution also
opens up the vibratory experience of the reader's sixth sense which
Sterne continually appeals to.
Speaking of the problem of reality in Sterne, John Traugott has
noted that "there is a very great consciousness in the reader, and in the
writer as well, of this problem of reality—what it is. And this is some-
thing that does not appear, it seems to me, in other eighteenth-century
writers."71 agree completely with this statement. The reader's ordinary
sense of reality is made problematical in large measure because Sterne,
as I have suggested, removes the conventional props of the five senses
and the coordinates of space and time; hence the seeming oddity that
Johnson notes in Sterne's fiction. Because Sterne activates the reader's
consciousness of the problematical nature of reality—to the point, per-
haps, that "Tristram's whole enterprise is a hermeneutics, a process of
self-interpretation"8—he is frequently thought of as a "modern" writer;
for Sterne's sense of reality is strangely akin to the more recent fiction
of Joyce, Beckett, Pynchon, Vonnegut, Borges, and Barth. The term
"modern," however, unless in some way specified, can become simply
an honorific term, a way of appropriating and congratulating alleged
precursors. By "modern" I mean to designate no single historical
period, but rather a characteristic method of a certain kind of writing
which Gabriel Josipovici describes as "an insistence on the fact that
what previous generations had taken for the world was only the world
seen through the spectacles of habit."9
If we examine Josipovici's formulation, it has a striking resem-
blance to Sterne's authorial procedures. What Josipovici describes as
"the world" is the conventional view of reality, or what philosophers
call "naive realism." This is a view which since the late seventeenth
century, at least, has passed for the world of reason and common sense.
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Novels written in accordance with this view tend either to assume the
existence of, or represent, an external world that is stable, verifiable,
and familiar. These "spectacles of habit," or what Howard Anderson
examines through Sterne's "parables of preconception," function anal-
ogously to Sterne's hobbyhorses.10 The "modern" view, however, is
less preoccupied with the world so-called than with the constitutive
power of individual perception.
Indeed, the characters in Tristram Shandy represent a spectrum of
perceptual models.11 Instead of a world, Sterne presents the reader with
a series of worlds, governed by the characters' particular hobbyhorses.
To these worlds, the reader, if he is a true feeler, contributes his own
spectacles of habit. Only insofar as the reader's experience of Tristram
Shandy is measured against the norms of ordinary reality, or conven-
tional story-telling, is it chaotic. If, on the other hand, the novel is
read in light of Sterne's principle of letting "people tell their stories
their own way" (TS, 9:633), then the overall effect is to break down the
familiar world of rational distinctions in order to activate the sixth sense
of the reader's and writer's imagination. What from a conventional
point of view indisputably appears to be an odd book with characters
seemingly isolated from "reality" becomes, in the context of Sterne's
appeal to the reader's sixth sense, "a strangely effective [symbol] of
liberty operating in the world of necessity," to quote Lionel Trilling.12
Thus it is that Sterne chooses to write not only the life but the
opinions of Tristram Shandy. The life alone, as fictional biography or
autobiography, would usually proceed in a linear movement from birth
to death or the approach of death. This linear movement would con-
form to the conventions of ordinary reality. That is, the emphasis would
be primarily on actions performed, on the events of life seen in retro-
spect and, for all intents and purposes, completed. These actions,
moreover, would be observed in familiar social contexts bound by the
coordinates of space and time. On the other hand, opinions do not neces-
sarily conform to a linear time scheme, for they are as much, if not
more, a part of interior time—the time of the mind rather than the
time of public life. Opinions make up their own interior history, a his-
tory heedless of cause and effect, space and time, and the boundaries
of the five senses. The paradox is that life and opinions go on simul-
taneously, but they are not necessarily interconnected. In a sense, the
life is a history of the body, while the opinions are the history of the
mind; and though they may influence one another, they may also carry
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on separate existences. It is precisely this doubleness that Sterne juggles
throughout Tristram Shandy, and which the reader must abandon him-
self to if he is to experience the liberating effects of Sterne's appeal to
our imagination. Like Sterne, the reader must read the book not just
from the point of view of his own public life, but in light of his own
opinions as well. Sterne not only "whispers" to us; he speaks to our
imagination in a "slow, low, dry chat, five notes below the natural
tone." Thus the book becomes less an object that we observe than a
process that we participate in. The book, as Sterne suggested to Dr.
John Eustace, becomes the reader, and the reader, on exercising the
sixth sense of his own imagination, ends up reading himself just as the
book reads the reader.
If it is evidence that a skeptical reader requires, Sterne provides
numerous passages in Tristram Shandy in which he attempts to educate
the reader into a wholly new process of reading. The novel is laced with
what I call reading paradigms. These paradigms at once encourage, if
they do not require, the reader to abandon his ordinary reading habits,
at the same time that Sterne appeals to the vibratory experiences of
imagination which will be the bridge joining the reader and the author.
In this regard, Sigurd Burckhardt has suggested that the element "com-
mon to bridges, ballistics, story lines and writing. . . . is that of 'get-
ting something across,' whether it is missiles or people or meanings.
. . . nothing seems so obvious to [Sterne]—and nothing should be so
obvious—as that, if you want to project something over a gap, your
line can never be straight, but must be inclined, parabolic, hyperbolic,
cycloid."13
This is how Sterne appeals to the true feeler's sixth sense, but the
reader and author, who initially approach one another as strangers, must
first become friends:
In the beginning of the last chapter, I inform'd you exactly when I was born;
but I did not inform you, how. No; that particular was reserved entirely for a
chapter by itself;—besides, Sir, as you and I are in a manner perfect strangers
to each other, it would not have been proper to have let you into too many
circumstances relating to myself all at once.—You must have a little patience.
I have undertaken, you see, to write not only my life, but my opinions also;
hoping and expecting that your knowledge of my character, and of what kind of
a mortal I am, by the one, would give you a better relish for the other: As you
proceed further with me, the slight acquaintance which is now beginning be-
twixt us, will grow into familiarity; and that, unless one of us is in fault, will
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terminate in friendship. . . .  Therefore, my dear friend and companion, if you
should think me somewhat sparing of my narrative on the first setting out,—
bear with me,—and let me go oh, and tell my story my own way. (TS,
1:10-11)
What does it mean, and imply, when Sterne says, "and let me go
on, and tell my story my own way"? For one thing, it means that
Sterne is completely aware of the reader's initial sense of disorientation.
It means that he knows, and wants us to know, that to perform a read-
ing of the novel we must first abandon our established reading habits
and expectations, and that we must trust the author, as well as our own
imaginations. We may know more than we are conscious of. Sterne
knows that we feel like strangers because the props of friendship nor-
mally established by authors—those props being the five senses and the
coordinates of space and time—are in the process of being removed.
We have been told when Tristram was born, which conforms with our
conventional need to know, but we have not been told how, though
eventually this will occur. How and when are ordinarily interrelated,
but Sterne is already beginning to split them up. A novel about "when"
would have much to say about public life, about cause and effect, but
Sterne is more interested in "how," particularly as it relates to opinion,
or the interior life of the mind. The journey metaphor that is evident
throughout Tristram Shandy serves to show that the "whens" of con-
ventional fiction—also the "wheres"—necessarily recede into the
"hows" of Sterne's imagination.
The conventional use of the journey appears repeatedly as an or-
ganizing principle in eighteenth-century fiction. Fielding, Defoe, Smol-
lett, Johnson, and Godwin all use it, though they use it in a variety
of ways, ranging from the purely social to the psychological and
spiritual. Sterne, however, uses it in at least two uniquely different
ways. First, Sterne thinks of the journey in an almost exclusively in-
terior manner. In volume 7, for example, Tristram travels to flee death,
but the external travel is important only as it occasions the interior pur-
suits of Tristram's mind. Tristram's concern for his own physical life,
in other words, excites the interior life of his opinions. He is less pre-
occupied with external observations of the wheres and whens of his
travel than with the reflections of his own mind as he travels; and these
reflections, because they are not governed by external time or place, are
therefore timeless and become their own place. How radically Sterne
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conceives of the imagination's absorption of external time and place
may be seen in the following passage:
I have been getting forwards in two different journies together, and with the
same dash of the pen—for I have got entirely out of Auxerre in this journey
which I am writing now, and I am got half way out of Auxerre in that which
I shall write hereafter. . . . I have brought myself into such a situation, as no
traveller ever stood before me; for I am this moment walking across the market-
place of Auxerre with my father and my uncle Toby, in our way back to
dinner—and I am this moment also entering Lyons with my post-chaise broke
into a thousand pieces—and I am moreover this moment in a handsome pavil-
lion built by Pringello, upon the banks of the Garonne. (TS, 7:515-16)
In this passage the "when" of Tristram's travels is played against
the "how." The passage tantalizes the reader with seemingly external
references to place—Auxerre, Lyons, Garonne—and yet the how of
Sterne's imagination enables him to be in three places at once. The co-
ordinates of space and time have been blithely annulled in a way that
no other fictional journey in eighteenth-century fiction either attempts or
dreams about. Moreover, Sterne has so scrambled tenses that the pur-
ported events of past and future, on which the reader customarily
determines "the least judgment or probable conjecture," have been an-
ticipated and undercut by the dominance of Sterne's irregular but imag-
inative use of the present tense. Just as Sterne defies the reader's
reliance on the five senses, so he scuttles the conventional uses of
tense. Tristram is entirely out of Auxerre in the journey about which he
is presently writing, he is half way out of Auxerre in a future journey,
and at the same time that he is in Auxerre he is also entering Lyons,
as well as being in a pavilion on the banks of the Garonne. This is a
clear defiance of time, of what the reader ordinarily thinks of as reality.
It is certainly odd, but it is not crazy.
What such a passage both requires and encourages in the reader is
an abandonment of ordinary reading habits and expectations, along with
the reader's activation of his own sixth sense. The reader's imagination
is liberated, as Trilling puts it, "in the world of necessity." Sterne's
imagination simply will not be bound, for it exists in its own interior
place, just as it absorbs all exterior places. His continual insistence on
"I am" is an exact linguistic analogue to the reader's experience of time
in Tristram Shandy. As Jean-Jacques Mayoux has shrewdly observed
about Sterne: "It has been the characteristic effort of his admirable
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willfulness to blend and confuse the time-structure of the story with the
time infrastructure of the writing. . . .  His writing . . .  is a sort of con-
versation, not so much between the characters as between the author
and the reader in yet another present, the time of their imaginary meet-
ing." 14 This "yet another present," the time of our imaginary meeting,
is the world of what I have called the sixth sense, where the singular
life of rational observation recedes into the plural effects of the reader's
imagination. The question is, How can Sterne's "I am" overcome the
apparent barriers of the reader's expectations in such a way as to mesh
with and activate the reader's sense of "I am"? Here we return to the
problem that Sterne earlier poses: namely, how will we readers, as
strangers, become Sterne's friend?
The key word is "become," and this leads to Sterne's second highly
original use of the journey metaphor. Tristram Shandy is not so much a
description of a journey, nor is it so much organized by a journey, as it
is a journey that the reader participates in. The journey is completely
identified with the process of writing and reading Tristram Shandy, and
in this sense the journey is no longer a metaphor. It is a process of
identity. In Sterne's terms, as strangers we read the book as if it were
an external journey—the history of Tristram's life and the life of the
Shandy household. But as friends or companions, we are, by virtue of
the sixth sense of our imagination, active participants in the journey,
and thus no longer separable from the interior journey of Tristram's life
and opinions. This is how the reader, to use Sterne's terms, is invited
to read not only the book but himself. We read ourselves when the
journey is no longer seen as a metaphor organizing the book, but as the
experience joining the reader, author, and book in a process of mutual
identification, or what Burckhardt calls the "cycloid curve." The net
effect of this process of experience is to dissolve past and future and to
lead the reader into an experience of a continuous present, the experi-
ence of "I am," set in the unique time of the imaginary meeting of the
reader, author, and book.
A wonderful example of how deliberately Sterne creates a unique
sense of time occurs when he discusses the several ways of writing
a travel narrative. He distinguishes between those "who have wrote and
gallop'd or who have gallop'd and wrote, which is a different way still;
or who for more expedition than the rest, have wrote-galloping, which
is the way I do at present" (TS, 7:482). Here Sterne is playing with
the conventional distinction between the act of writing and the expert-
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ence that writing ostensibly represents. This distinction grows out of the
familiar formulation of fiction as imitation—novels, for example, as a
realistic imitation of individual actions in social reality. There is the act
of imitation (what authors have "wrote") and the action represented (the
experiences drawn from having "gallop'd"). Such a distinction, seen as
a formula for writing, presumes any number of further distinctions, not
the least of which is the separation between the perceiver and the
perceived, and between observation and participation. That is, we are
not to identify the author with the book, nor are we to regard the book
as anything other than a representation. Moreover, such a distinction
presumes sequence; there is first one thing, then another. Writing and
galloping thus cannot occur simultaneously because such a distinction
presumes a unilinear sense of time, something akin to cause and effect,
or what Aristotle calls the beginning, middle, and end.
But as soon as Sterne declares that his way is to "write-galloping"
all these conventional distinctions instantly dissolve. They dissolve
because they are irrelevant. The book is a journey that identifies the
reader and the act of reading with the author and the act of writing.
We are all in it together by virtue of the time of our imaginary meeting.
The book is the occasion for the conjunction of the reader's time and the
author's time, and that time is one of a continuous present and con-
tinuous possibility. There is no before or after, no beginning or end: it
is all now and in the middle. The hyphen in the term "wrote-galloping"
is an enactment of the process joining the reader, author, and book.
The acts of writing and reading are the book, for the book is, rather
than represents, experience. This sense of an unfolding present, as ex-
pressed by the hyphen, is no less evident in Sterne's use of the dash,
about which Ian Watt has remarked: "Sterne's affront to conventional
syntax is essential to establishing the qualities he required for Tristram's
voice: Sterne didn't want unity or coherence or defined direction,
at least in any conventional sense; he wanted multiplicity, not unity;
he wanted free association of ideas, not subordination of them; he
wanted to go backwards or forwards or sideways, not in straight linear
patterns."15
If Sterne "wrote-galloping," then the reader, if he is a true feeler,
"reads-galloping." There is, in other words, no essential separation
between the activities of writing and reading and the experience of what
is written and read. Sterne overcomes conventional distinctions, just as
he defies conventional syntax, by continually halving matters, which is
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how the reader and author, as apparent strangers, grow to become
companions and friends. As Sterne writes:
Writing, when properly managed, (as you may be sure I think mine is) is
but a different name for conversation. As no one, who knows what he is about
in good company, would venture to talk all;—so no author, who understands
the just boundaries of decorum and good breeding, would presume to think all:
The truest respect which you can pay to the reader's understanding, is to halve
this matter amicably, and leave him something to imagine, in his turn, as well
as yourself.
For my own part, I am eternally paying him compliments of this kind,
and do all that lies in my power to keep his imagination as busy as my own.
(TS, 2:108-9)
The reader's imagination is kept busy because Sterne, in halving
matters, strictly speaking never finishes anything. He doesn't finish
anything because the world of imagination and opinion, as distin-
guished from the life of ordinary reality, is ongoing and unrestricted
by the five senses and the coordinates of space and time. The "place"
where Sterne and the reader meet is in the imagination, which makes it
no less real, but which does make matters a good deal less determinate.
There is, however, a peculiar sense of completion which occurs when
the reader and author halve matters. This completion, or act of friend-
ship, happens when the reader and author participate within one an-
other's imagination. The process of halving matters, which looks like
an act of separation, is accomplished, paradoxically, so that the author
and reader can put it together.
For example, the typographical and organizational conventions of a
book's physical appearance, which conventions are designed to promote
the illusion of a book as a representation of a sequential action, are
continually violated in Tristram Shandy.1* The book, we are frequently
reminded, is not a representation of an action so much as it is the pure
activity of imagination, freed from the bounds of convention. The
reader is presented with a blank page that we are invited to fill in,
with chapters deliberately out of numerical sequence, with a preface
that appears in the third volume, with a marbled page that serves as a
"motly emblem" of the novel (TS, 3:226), with a black page following
Yorick's death, with the formal beginning of Tristram's "Life and
Opinions" occurring in volume 4, chapter 32, and with the whole novel
concluding five years before Tristram's birth. In addition, Sterne fre-
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quently uses series of asterisks and lines of dashes, as well as a variety
of plot diagrams (i.e., TS, 6:473-74), all of which defy straight lines
and the conventions they symbolize. The effect of all this scrambling of
the physical appearance of the book is to turn it into a precursor of
a Rorschach test, where the reader ends up reading himself.
Moreover, even a cursory look at the book's interpolated stories
demonstrates another version of how Sterne "halves" conventional
matters. These interpolated tales—Trim's sermon in volume 2, the
announcement of Bobby's death in volume 4, the story of Le Fever
in volume 6, the story of the King of Bohemia and his seven castles
in volume 8—are all at least repeatedly interrupted, and either are left
unfinished, or are so interrupted that their conclusions are anticlimactic.
The interruptions are the necessary intrusions of the imagination, or the
interior life of opinions, into the ostensibly hard data of life. Every
one of these interruptions is an exercise and declaration of the life and
freedom of the imagination. Even the story of the amours of Uncle Toby
and Widow Wadman does not so much finish as fizzle. Widow Wad-
man's preoccupation with Toby's body disables her sixth sense. She
wants to enact completion; she wants to possess Toby's body if it is in
good repair; but her impulses are precisely those of a conventional read-
er (as opposed to a true feeler) who both assumes and wishes to impose
the laws of the physical world onto the life of Toby's imagination.
But to finish a  story, evidently, is to "kill" an experience, for the
act of completion is the cessation of imagination. This idea leads to
another conventional distinction—that between art and life—which
Sterne repeatedly defies and dissolves. Critics have debated for years,
with no promise, significantly, of resolution, the questions of whether
Tristram is a persona or Sterne himself, and whether the novel is in any
formal sense complete or unfinished. These questions are irrelevant, for
they presume the existence of definite, verifiable answers in the face of
the novel's overwhelming indeterminacy. Such questions also assume a
reading of the book as an object for observation, rather than an ex-
perience of the conjunction of the reader's and writer's imaginations.
But Sterne, both in the novel and in his correspondence, demolishes the
distinction between art and life, and instead identifies art and life as a
symbiotic process. This identity of art and life is necessary to preserve
an "openness toward the future,"17 and one way to see this is to con-
sider Sterne's many declarations of art as life. First from Tristram
Shandy:
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In short, there is no end of it. . . . [I shall] go on leisurely, writing and pub-
lishing two volumes of my life every year;—which, if I am suffered to go on
quietly, and can make a tolerable bargain with my bookseller, I shall continue
to do as long as I live. (TS, 1:37)
I have constructed the main work and the adventitious parts of it with such
intersections . . . that the whole machine, in general, has been kept a-going;—
and, what's more, it shall be kept a-going these forty years, if it pleases the
fountain of health to bless me so long with life and good spirits. (TS, 1:73-74)
Don't be exasperated, if I pass it by again with good temper,—being deter-
mined as long as I live or write (which in my case means the same thing)
never to give the honest gentleman a worse word or a worse wish. (TS, 3:162)
The more I write, the more I shall have to write—and consequently, the more
your worships read, the more your worships will have to read. . . . was it not
that my OPINIONS will be the death of me, I perceive I shall lead a fine
life of it out of this self-same life of mine. . . . I shall never overtake myself.
(TS, 4:286)
But this is neither here nor there—why do I mention it?—Ask my pen,—it
governs me,—I govern not it. (TS, 6:416)
For my own part, I am resolved never to read any book but my own, as long as
Hive. (75,8:544)
Although the context of the above passages changes, the content—
namely, that art and life are inseparable—does not. And in his cor-
respondence Sterne continues in a similar vein. He writes that Tristram
Shandy is "a picture of myself, and so far may bid the fairer for being
an Original" (Letters, p. 87); that "I shall write as long as I live, 'tis,
in fact, my hobby-horse" (Letters, p. 143); that "I must take up again
the pen.—In faith I think I shall die with it in my hand" (Letters,
p. 277); and, echoing Tristram Shandy, 6:416, that "the truth is this—
that my pen governs me—not me my pen" (Letters, p. 394). All of
these assertions express Sterne's firm conviction that "an author must
feel himself, or his reader will not" (Letters, p. 402).
Moreover what follows from Sterne's assertions is simply this: that
life is opinion is imagination is the book is the author is the reader is
life, ad infinitum. This is not the absence of meaning; it is the enclosure
of meaning in a space—the sixth sense of imagination—that embraces
and absorbs everything. The book is perpetual motion—what Coleridge
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calls the "infinite I am";18 for motion is life, and, like Sterne's digres-
sions, motion is the "sunshine . . . the life, the soul of reading" (TS,
1:73). Toby Olshin has summed up the process very nicely: "It is this
self-justifying surge of life, independent of all need for external mean-
ing, that Sterne celebrates."19 But to be separated from our customary
reliance on the props of external meaning is surely to be disoriented—
to be made to feel odd. Does not Sterne run the risk of making us
strangers at the same time that he tells his readers, "I beg only you will
make no strangers of yourselves, but sit down without any ceremony,
and fall on heartily" (TS, 2:84)? Yes, he runs the risk, but he has
repeatedly shown the reader ways to overcome it. We can overcome the
apparent isolation and chaos of Tristram Shandy if we abandon the
props of ceremony—our strict reliance on reason—and "fall on heart-
ily" with our imagination.
Still, if at every step in Tristram Shandy "the judgment is surprised
by the imagination" (TS, 8:539), some strange consequences follow.
For one thing, the world of contradiction—which is determined by the
physical laws of the five senses, the coordinates of space and time, and
the logical law of the excluded middle—gives way to the indeterminate
world of the sixth sense, the conjunction of the writer's and reader's
imaginations. The result, to borrow a title from one of John Barth's
books, is that the reader is lost in the funhouse; or to invoke a title
from Borges, we enter the world of labyrinths. Sterne is acutely aware
of this when he observes, "What nonsense it is, either in fighting,
or writing, or any thing else (whether in rhyme to it, or not) which a
man has occasion to do—to act by plan" (TS, 8:575). Sterne provides
an even better paradigm and analogue to the appeal of his book when
he talks about knots: "In the case of these knots then, and of the
several obstructions, which, may it please your reverences, such knots
cast in our way in getting through life—every hasty man can whip out
a penknife and cut through them.—'Tis wrong. Believe me, Sirs, the
most virtuous way, and which both reason and conscience dictate—is
to take our teeth or our fingers to them. . . . I shall never get the knots
untied as long as I live" (TS, 3:168).
We, too, will never get the knots untied—so long, that is, as we
acknowledge that the world of imagination is not the world of hasty
men whipping out their penknives. To cut into a knot, or a book, is to
cut through it. To take our teeth or fingers to a knot, or a book, is
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to become a part of it, as Sterne wishes us to do. Sterne, like another
modern author, Thomas Pynchon, writes for "true feelers" (Pynchon
calls them "sensitives"). And what Pynchon says about Gravity's Rain-
bow applies with equal force to the reader's participation in Tristram
Shandy: "No, this is not a disentanglement from, but a progressive
knotting into."20
8
Moral and Tendency
in 'Caleb Williams'
/ will write a tale, that shall constitute an epoch in the mind
of the reader, that no one, after he has read it, shall ever
be exactly the same man that  he was before.
William Godwin, Caleb Williams
It is true, as some critics have shown, that Caleb Williams may
be read to some extent as an analysis of the corrupting influences
of social and political institutions, but such a reading is unable
to account for the compelling psychological reverberations of the
novel.1 Because Godwin uses a reading model by which the in-
ternal workings of the imagination, activated by Caleb's curiosity,
elicit a fascinating sense of psychological complicity, I believe
that Caleb Williams is the most insistently psychological novel
to be considered in this study.
Godwin, as the original preface (which was withdrawn) of the
novel indicates, initially intended his work to be a fictional em-
bodiment of his own political interests—a kind of follow-up to
his earlier Enquiry; but Godwin also knew that social and political
institutions are themselves expressions of the latent fears and de-
sires of the human mind. Caleb Williams simply does not deal
exclusively with social injustice, a topic that would result in a
political melodrama where the reader oscillates between praise
and accusation.2 Rather it deals with human culpability and vul-
nerability, and the psychological experiences enacted by the char-
acters lure the reader into turning inward to the complexities of
his own and the characters' mental processes.
In his essay "Of Choice in Reading," Godwin distinguishes
between the moral of a literary work and its tendency, using the
Iliad, Gulliver's Travels, Paradise Lost, The Fair Penitent, and
Richardson's characterization of Lovelace and Grandison (i.e.,
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"It would not perhaps be adventurous to affirm that more readers have
wished to resemble Lovelace, than have wished to resemble Grandi-
son") as examples of how the moral and the tendency of a work may be
antithetical to one another. From these examples Godwin offers the
following observations:
The moral of any work may be defined to be that ethical sentence to the illus-
tration of which the work may most aptly be applied. The tendency is the actual
effect it is calculated to produce upon the reader, and cannot be completely
ascertained but by the experiment. . . .  From the distinctions here laid down it
seems to follow, that the moral of a work is a point of very subordinate con-
sideration, and that the only thing worthy of much attention is the tendency.
It appears not unlikely that, in some cases, a work may be fairly susceptible
of no moral influence, or none but a bad one, and yet may have a tendency in
a high degree salutary and advantageous. . . .  The principal praise is certainly
due to those authors, who have a talent to "create a soul under the ribs of
death," whose composition is fraught with irresistible enchantment; who pour
their whole souls into mine, and raise me as it were to the seventh heaven; who
furnish me with "food for contemplation even to madness"; who raise my
ambition, expand my faculties, invigorate my resolutions and seem to double
my existence.3
Tendency, in other words, translates as the psychological appeal by
which the reader participates in the fullness of a work's meaning; and
there is no question that Richardson would be appalled, but perhaps not
surprised, by Godwin's observations on Lovelace and Grandison. Ten-
dency is that sort of imaginative transaction which supersedes the
claims of purely rational observation, and which deals exclusively with
psychological effect. The supreme embodiment of tendency in Caleb
Williams is Caleb himself, who initially wishes to function as a moral
observer, but who rapidly becomes the surrogate reader—the basic
principle of curiosity—who enacts experiences which the reader re-
enacts. In the same essay, Godwin writes: "Curiosity [Caleb's singular
mental characteristic] is one of the strongest impulses of the human
heart. To curiosity it is peculiarly incident to grow and expand itself
under difficulties and opposition. The greater are the obstacles to its
being gratified, the more it seems to swell, and labour to burst the
mounds that confine it" (ENQ, p. 131).
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that Caleb Williams is singular-
ly preoccupied with the "epoch of mind"—the psychological encoun-
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ter with fears and desires—of which social and political institutions
are the most visible manifestation. Caleb is both the vehicle of and a
participant in Godwin's essentially psychological exploration. He is a
principle of curiosity: "The spring of action which, perhaps more than
any other, characterized the whole train of my life, was curiosity. . . .
I was desirous of tracing the variety of effects which might be produced
from given causes. . . . I could not rest until I had acquainted myself
with solutions that had been invented for the phenomena of the uni-
verse."4 Caleb also excites the reader's curiosity, and as a participant
in the novel's actions he expresses the desires of the reader's curiosity
which, in the face of numerous obstacles, necessarily grow and expand
"under difficulties and opposition."
If there is a metaphor that operates as the reading paradigm of the
novel's psychological tendency, it is Falkland's trunk, whose contents
are never explicitly revealed, whose contents Falkland and Caleb are
obsessed with, and whose implicit meaning is the subject and stimulus
of Caleb's and the reader's curiosity. The trunk appears at three signifi-
cant moments—once in each volume—and at each appearance it ac-
crues increased psychological meaning. Like the reader, Caleb becomes
preoccupied with the contents of the trunk. The trunk stimulates Caleb's
curiosity: that is, it stirs not only his desire to discover its meaning, but,
failing that, his need to attach meaning to it. At the beginning of the
novel Caleb, who is Falkland's secretary, goes to Falkland's room and
as he opens the door
I heard at the same instant a deep groan expressive of intolerable anguish. The
sound of the door in opening seemed to alarm the person within; I heard the
lid of a trunk hastily shut, and the noise as of fastening a lock. I conceived
that Mr. Falkland was there, and was going instantly to retire; but at that
moment a voice that seemed supernaturally tremendous, exclaimed, "Who
is there?" The voice was Mr. Falkland's. The sound of it thrilled my very
vitals. I endeavoured to answer, but my speech failed, and being incapable of
any other reply I instinctively advanced within the door into the room. . . .
"Villain!" cried he, "what has brought you here?" I hesitated a confused and
irresolute answer. "Wretch!" interrupted Mr. Falkland, with uncontrollable
impatience, "you want to ruin me. You set yourself as a spy upon my actions;
but bitterly shall you repent your insolence. Do you think you shall watch my
privacies with impunity?" I attempted to defend myself. "Begone, devil!"
rejoined he. "Quit the room, or I will trample you into atoms." (CW, p. 8)
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Caleb and Falkland are each stunned by the other's presence, and
the passage suggests that each is interpreting the other in light of some
compulsive desire either to project onto, or defend himself from, the
other's presence. Caleb is continually, and I would say compulsively,
attaching meaning to Falkland's appearance, gesture, and sound, as if
he were shaping Falkland to satisfy some inner psychological necessity.
Falkland's groan, he believes, is "expressive of intolerable anguish,"
his voice seems "supernaturally tremendous," the lid of the trunk is
"hastily shut," and Caleb's vitals are "thrilled." Caleb is as much pro-
jecting meaning onto Falkland as he is describing what occurs. Falkland
does the same thing: Caleb is a "villain," a "Wretch," a "devil,"
and Falkland threatens to "trample" him, all this without Caleb having
uttered a word. It seems fair to ask why such a seemingly mundane
event produces such intense emotion; the event is calculated to elicit
this question not only from Caleb and Falkland, but from the reader as
well. The trunk is the focus of the encounter, and the reactions of the
characters begin to arouse the reader's interest in its contents. No spe-
cific meaning is attached to the trunk, and yet its affective appeal is
striking. Indeed, immediately after his encounter with Falkland, Caleb
relates this event to Mr. Collins, who in turn tells Caleb the history of
Falkland's past, which narration occupies the whole of volume 1. It is
as if Collins's narration is to serve as a provisional, but finally unsatis-
factory, answer to the question, "What is in the trunk?"
One sentence in this passage is peculiarly apposite to Caleb's sub-
sequent behavior and to the development of the novel's psychological
tendency: "I endeavoured to answer, but my speech failed, and being
incapable of any other reply, I instinctively advanced within the door
into the room." Although Caleb at this point is speechless, all of his
activities in the remainder of the novel are governed by his compulsive
desire to raise the contents of the trunk from obscurity to the level of
meaningful speech. Caleb cannot psychologically tolerate the absence
of meaning: his curiosity, like the reader's, requires—indeed, feeds on
—meaning. In Caleb's world secrets must become public, not merely to
satisfy his curiosity, but to defend his obsessive attachment to the idea
that all human activity is rationally accessible and that all human prob-
lems are soluble. The other important point of this sentence is the
phrase: "I instinctively advanced within the door into the room."
Caleb's curiosity is not entirely governed by conscious control: his in-
stincts exceed his control and always drive him forward. This attribute
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is not only necessary as a narrative device for providing interest and
momentum; it is a psychological attribute by which the reader is lured
into reenacting Caleb's mental processes. The meaning of the novel is in
the experience of Caleb's pursuit of meaning, rather than at the end of
his rational inquiry. Successive appearances of the trunk neither pro-
gressively refine on nor cancel the prior meanings attached to the trunk.
It is all part of a dynamic process of flight and pursuit, an interior
journey of mind precipitated by exterior events but governed by inner
psychological necessity.
In volume 2 a fire breaks out on Falkland's estate, and in Falkland's
absence Caleb rightly takes the responsibility of looking after the emer-
gency. Once again, however, Caleb's actions are governed less by the
immediate fact of the fire than by his preoccupation with the contents
of the trunk. By this time Caleb strongly suspects that Falkland is the
murderer of Squire Tyrrel; his curiosity, in other words, appears to be
motivated by a specific intent, and he is convinced that the contents
of the trunk will prove his case. Nevertheless, his interest in the trunk,
as the passage suggests, is governed by more than a simple desire for
justice:
My steps, by some mysterious fatality, were directed to the private apartment
at the end of the library. Here, as I looked round, my eye was suddenly
caught by the trunk mentioned in the first pages of my narrative. My mind was
already raised to its utmost pitch. In a window-seat of the room lay a number
of chisels and other carpenter's tools. I know not what infatuation instantane-
ously seized me. The idea was too powerful to be resisted. . . . I snatched a
tool suitable for the purpose, threw myself upon the ground, and applied with
eagerness to a magazine which inclosed all for which my heart panted. After
two or three efforts, in which the energy of uncontrollable passion was added
to my bodily strength, the fastenings gave way, the trunk opened, and all that
I sought was at once within my reach. I was in the act of lifting up the lid,
when Mr. Falkland entered, wild, breathless, distracted in his looks! . . . He
no sooner saw me, than his eyes emitted sparks of rage. He ran with eagerness
to a brace of loaded pistols which hung in the room, and seizing one, pre-
sented it to my head. . . . but with the same rapidity with which he had formed
his resolution, he changed it, and instantly went to the window, and flung the
pistol into the court below. . . .  The reader can with difficulty form a concep-
tion of the state to which I was now reduced. My act was in some sort an
act of insanity; but how undescribable are the feelings with which I looked back
upon it! It was an instantaneous impulse, a short-lived and passing alienation
of mind; but what must Mr. Falkland think of that alienation? . . .  My offence
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had merely been a mistaken thirst of knowledge. Such however it was, as to
admit neither of forgiveness nor remission. This epoch was the crisis of my fate,
dividing what may be called the offensive part from the defensive, which was
the sole business of my remaining years. (CW, pp. 152-54)
Accident again plays an important part in the events of this en-
counter. Caleb "accidentally" goes into Falkland's apartment in volume
1, he is accidentally ("by some mysterious fatality") directed to Falk-
land's apartment here in volume 2, and Falkland accidentally appears
in the apartment in time to prevent Caleb from observing the contents—
if, in fact, there are any—of the trunk. Once again, the reader's atten-
tion is directed away from the overt to the implicit, from the external
event to the implied processes behind the event. There is a force clearly
larger than the characters themselves which impels them into activity.
Such a force Caleb refers to as a "passing alienation of mind," as if
to suggest that his actions may be measured against some unnamed
rational norm of behavior and thereby be classified as deviant or ab-
errant. But the fact that the norm, or what Godwin might call the
"moral," is unnamed suggests that this is a passage preoccupied with
tendency, with the psychological effects of mind rather than the ethical
categories of reason. The passage reads like psychodrama, with the
characters acting out their latent fears and desires. Caleb calls his own
activity "a mistaken thirst for knowledge," but he only calls it "mis-
taken" after he has been discovered. Similarly, Falkland regards
Caleb's actions as a threatening violation of his privacy and is prepared
to kill his tormentor, and yet relents, realizing, evidently, that killing
him will not put a stop to what he is doing.
What is extremely peculiar, but psychologically suggestive, about
this passage is that Caleb and Falkland do not speak to one another.
Their actions defy discourse; their strength of feeling defies descrip-
tion. The effect of this absence of discourse is to drive the reader in-
ward, to a form of participation in what is apparently unnameable. The
scene, to use Caleb's phrase, is "too powerful to be resisted," just as
Caleb and Falkland find one another too powerful to be resisted. This
all suggests that what Caleb most desires is to become an active par-
ticipant in Falkland's mind, to share his guilt and fear, and to act them
out so violently that Falkland will have to accept him as a psycholog-
ical accomplice. Caleb wishes to reenact Falkland's torment, not merely
to discover and experience the other's feelings, but to raise himself—
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at least psychologically, if not socially and politically—to the level of
Falkland's coequal. The epoch of mind, to which Godwin earlier re-
ferred, represents Caleb's attempt to appropriate Falkland to his own
consciousness, and to possess Falkland's experiences as if they were his
own. Caleb speaks of his own offense as admitting "neither of forgive-
ness nor remission," which is a precise equivalent to Falkland's estima-
tion of the consequences of his murder of Tyrrel. Caleb further asserts
that this "epoch was the crisis of my fate," but it is well to see that
it is also the crisis of Falkland's fate. Similarly, Caleb speaks of the
scene as "dividing what may be called the offensive part from the de-
fensive, which was the sole business of my remaining years," but this
sentence applies with equal force to Falkland. He, like Caleb, is on the
defensive for the remainder of the novel. Thus what occurs to both
Falkland and Caleb is that they imprison one another within their own
consciousness, and they alternately escape and pursue one another
throughout the remainder of the novel.
By attaching a shared language of psychological complicity to both
characters, Godwin circumvents the possibility of his novel becoming a
kind of melodrama, with one character the hero and the other the
villain. Instead, we have a form of psychological doubling, where each
character becomes a part of the other's mind, and the doubling will
culminate with Caleb's desire to identify himself fully with Falkland's
experiences. In fact, what immediately follows this scene is that Falk-
land confesses to Caleb that he is the murderer of Tyrrel, that he is
responsible for the mistaken execution of the Hawkinses for that mur-
der, and that because of this confession Caleb must swear an oath as
his accomplice. As Falkland says, "I had no alternative but to make you
my confidant or my victim. . . .  My tongue has now for the first time
for several years spoken the language of my heart" (CW, p. 157). The
result of this bond is, according to Caleb, that "I had made myself a
prisoner, in the most intolerable sense of that term, for years—perhaps
for the rest of my life" (CW, p. 159). But the act of imprisonment is
as much desired as feared; for it means that Caleb has become a per-
manent part of Falkland's mind, it means that he can more fully ex-
perience Falkland's psychological agony, it means that the novel's basic
language is now "the language of the heart," and it means that Caleb,
who is as much as a prisoner of Falkland's consciousness, has now
moved several steps closer to the discovery, or so he hopes, of the
contents of Falkland's trunk.
130 Moral and Tendency in Caleb Williams
Caleb's third and final mentioning of the trunk is precipitated by his
discovery that Falkland has been circulating a narrative about him
which eventually drives him out of his idyllic retreat in Wales. The
narrative, designed to prove Caleb's criminality, is entitled "Wonderful
and Surprising History of Caleb Williams" (CW, p . 349); and in
response to this narrative Caleb "began to write [his own story] soon
after" (CW, p. 351). I have mentioned before how Caleb and Falkland
are imprisoned within each other's consciousness, and now their mutual
complicity permits us to view them, literally, as vying authors, each
attempting to write the nature of the other's existence and experiences.
What this experience of vying authorship accomplishes within the reader
is a dissolution of rational detachment; affective tendency supplants
abstract moral. There is no adequate way to assess Caleb or Falkland
either externally or independently, for psychologically they are pro-
cesses of the same epoch of mind. They are attempting to write each
other's story, but theirs is a single story of mutual disclosure and con-
cealment. For both characters, as we can see in the following passage,
the trunk is simultaneously an object of projection and entrapment:
Falkland! art thou the offspring in whom the lineaments of these tyrants are
faithfully preserved? Was the world, with all its climates, made in vain for thy
helpless, unoffending victim? Tremble! Tyrants have trembled surrounded with
whole armies of their Janissaries! What should make thee inaccessible to my
fury? No, I will use no daggers! I will unfold a tale—! I will show thee to
the world for what thou art; and all the men that live shall confess my truth!
. . . I will tell a tale—! The justice of the country shall hear me! the elements
of nature in universal uproar shall not interrupt me! I will speak with a voice
more fearful than thunder! . . .  This is a moment pregnant with fate. I know—
I think I know—that I will be triumphant, and crush my seemingly omnipotent
foe. . . .  With this little pen I defeat all his machinations; I stab him in the very
point he was most solicitous to defend! . . .  The pen lingers in my trembling
fingers! Is there anything I have left unsaid?—The contents of the fatal trunk,
from which all my misfortunes originated, I have never been able to ascertain.
I once thought it contained some murderous instrument or relic, connected with
the fate of the unhappy Tyrrel. I am now persuaded that the secret it incloses,
is a faithful narrative of that and its concomitant transactions, written by Mr.
Falkland, and reserved in case of the worst, that if by any unforeseen event
his guilt should come to be fully disclosed, it might contribute to redeem the
wreck of his reputation. But the truth or the falsehood of this conjecture is
of little moment. If Falkland shall never be detected to the satisfaction of the
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world, such narrative will probably never see the light. In that case this story
of mine may amply, severely perhaps, supply its place (CW, pp. 364-66).
If a tendency is revealed in this passage it is Caleb's desire to re-
place Falkland by a process of reenactment. He will substitute his
narrative for what he believes may be a "faithful narrative" enclosed
in Falkland's trunk, and thus he will raise to consciousnes what Falk-
land wishes to conceal. But substitution is not Caleb's only motive;
he will reenact Falkland's crime, not purely as a matter of narrative
description, with Caleb as an outside observer looking in. No: he will
do to Falkland with words what Falkland did to Tyrrel with a knife.
The process of reenactment has led Caleb to a form of murder. He
says he will "use no daggers," but his tale is a weapon used to "crush
my seemingly omnipotent foe"—"crush" being a word normally as-
signed to Falkland's vocabulary (i.e., p. 177). More important, the tale
will "stab [my italics] him in the very point he was most solicitous to
defend." Caleb's final attempt to take possession of Falkland's mind,
his final attempt to fill the trunk with meaning, is to write a narrative,
based on the projected contents of Falkland's suspected narrative hidden
in the trunk, to "supply its place." But Caleb's apparent desire to get
out the truth is, in fact, a confession both of his own culpability and
of the limitations of his commitment to the power of purely rational
description.
One section in this passage, especially, shortcircuits the possibility
of construing all this as melodrama, with Falkland the vicious oppressor
and Caleb his unwitting victim. It is the section referring to Falkland:
"I will unfold a tale—! I will show thee to the world for what thou
art; and all men that shall live shall confess my truth!" There is a strik-
ing approach-avoidance quality to these sentences, where Caleb alter-
nates between the very familiar use of "thee" and "thou," suggesting
an intimate relationship, and then pulls away with "my truth." The
whole passage, in fact, alternates between questions, suggesting un-
certainty, and bold declarations enforcing the idea of absolute convic-
tion. The effect on the reader is to make us waver between political
melodrama and psychological obsession. We are lured by the former
only to be plunged into the latter. Caleb and the reader have got in
more deeply than they realized or consciously desired. What they have
got into is the convolution of mind rather than the expected revolution
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in society. Caleb wants Falkland to appear a tyrant and murderer, and
by social standards of equity and justice Falkland certainly is these
things. But psychologically Caleb is as much a tyrant and murderer
as Falkland is socially, and a case might be made that Caleb is here
tyrannizing the reader with his "truth." Caleb wishes to destroy Falk-
land not because he is a murderer but because, voluntarily or involun-
tarily, he has taken possession of Caleb's mind. But in order to destroy
Falkland by revealing his secret, Caleb must reveal more of himself
than he intends or would find desirable. He expects to show Falkland
for what he is, so that men "shall confess my truth"—suggesting that
the two are separable—but if there is truth to be found it can only be
discovered so long as the reader refuses to separate the one character
from the other.
Much has recently been made of the fact that Godwin wrote, and
then rejected, an alternate conclusion to the one we presently possess.
One critic has argued that the present conclusion, in effect, falsifies the
novel, but I see it as enhancing the psychological tendency and affective
appeal and rightly minimizing the overt political theme of injustice.5
The original (or alternate) conclusion keeps the novel on the level of
political melodrama, with Caleb as victim, and with the reader left
hearing only Caleb's "truth." Falkland has not publicly confessed,
Caleb is imprisoned, and there is a strong implication that he has been
drugged by Falkland's agents. The effect of this conclusion is to see
Caleb as the monumental victim of injustice, complete with gravestone
("HERE LES WHAT WAS ONCE A MAN!"):6
I understand that Mr. Falkland contrary to all previous appearance still lives,
nay, that he is considerably better in his health. Alas! Alas! it too plainly
appears in my history that persecution and tyranny can never die! . . . There
was once a poor traveller—he was very good natured—and very innocent—
and meant no ill to any living soul—he met with a wild beast—the creature
seemed to be in great distress, and moaned most piteously—I forget whether
it had hurt itself—but the traveller came up to it, and asked it what it wanted,
and would have assisted it—but the cries of the beast were only an imposition!
—It was a CROCODILE! (Appendix, 332-33)
Everything in this passage is explicit, dichotomous, and melodra-
matic: the innocent soul, Caleb, has been conquered by the arch-
villain, Falkland. The charitable traveler has been mauled by a vicious
beast. But this conclusion, as Godwin evidently realized, simply does
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not mesh with the novel's tendency. Perhaps this is the sort of scene
Godwin originally intended, for we know that he wrote the three vol-
umes of the novel in reverse order (CW, p. xxv). But by the time he
had read or written his way through volumes 2 and 1 back to volume
three he may have realized that the novel had changed direction from
its original political intent. We also know that Godwin ran into con-
siderable trouble writing volume 3—he was stalled for three months
(CW, p. xxx)—and this, coupled with the rejection of the original con-
clusion, suggests that the psychological tendency of the first two vol-
umes simply did not correspond to the intended political moral of the
third.
In the present conclusion, however, Falkland does publicly confess,
Caleb is not imprisoned, and the interests of the political moral are
subordinated to the larger claims of psychological tendency:
"Williams," said he [Falkland], "you have conquered! I see too late the great-
ness and elevation of your mind. I confess that it is to my fault and not yours,
that it is to the excess of jealousy that was ever burning in my bosom, that I
owe my ruin. I could have resisted any plan of malicious accusation you might
have brought against me. But I see that the artless and manly story you have
told, has carried conviction to every hearer. All my prospects are concluded.
. . . I stand now completely detected. . . ." He survived this dreadful scene but
three days. I have been his murderer. . . . It would have been merciful in
comparison if I had planted a dagger in his heart. . . .  Why should my re-
flections perpetually centre upon myself?—self, an overweening regard to
which has been the source of my errors! Falkland, I will think only of thee,
and from that thought will draw ever-fresh nourishment for my sorrows!. . . .
I began these memoirs with the idea of vindicating my character. I have now
no character that I wish to vindicate: but I will finish them that thy story may
be fully understood, and that if those errors of thy life be known, which thou
so ardently desiredst to conceal, the world may at least not hear and repeat a
half-told and mangled tale. (CW, pp. 376-78)
The first part of this section, where Falkland publicly confesses,
could have maintained the sense of political melodrama, with Falkland,
the oppressor, confessing his injustice to Caleb. But the second part of
the passage undermines the political moral, for Falkland's confession
clearly does not satisfy Caleb, nor is it allowed to satisfy the reader.
Although the reader is lured repeatedly throughout the novel into believ-
ing that a public confession will provide a satisfactory resolution, based
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on the rational establishment of truth, it multiplies complexity rather
than reduces it. Falkland becomes an object of sympathy, and so does
Caleb. Falkland may believe himself to stand "completely detected,"
but he is not, nor is Caleb. What the final scene repeatedly emphasizes
is a sense of mutual complicity, where the desire to detect and con-
fess strongly accentuates not the expected rational illumination but
psychological frustration. The reader is led to a sense of psychological
truth larger than any political intent. Both characters are simultaneously
vindicated and vanquished. As two apparently separate men, they have
lived out one story, or one epoch of mind. They are antagonists—polit-
ically, socially, and psychologically—but their conflict is one of paral-
lel lines which, paradoxically, intersect. Their apparent opposition cul-
minates in a process of mutual identification.
Falkland, for example, says that Caleb's "artless and manly story
. . . has carried conviction to every hearer," but I daresay that Falk-
land's confession, as well, carries a similar amount of conviction with
the reader. Falkland says his "prospects are concluded," but Caleb
believes his own "prospects" to be concluded. Falkland confesses that
he is a murderer, but Caleb believes himself to be one, and he is—at
least psychologically. The dagger is mentioned to reinforce their mur-
derous sense of identity. Falkland and Caleb are both preoccupied with
vindicating their characters, and now neither man believes himself to
have a character worth vindicating. Just as important, Caleb and Falk-
land, and, I believe, the reader as well, are led to ponder the question,
prompted throughout the novel by external events: "Why should my
reflection perpetually centre upon myself?" There is no explicit answer
to this question, but the last words of the novel imply a direction, if
not an ultimate destination: so that "the world may at least not hear and
repeat a half-told and mangled tale."
The "half-told and mangled tale" would emerge if in reading Caleb
Williams the reader were to adopt, exclusively, either Caleb's or Falk-
land's point of view. Such a procedure, which is represented by the
original (but rejected) conclusion of the novel, would distort the read-
er's experience of the novel by focusing on abstract moral at the ex-
pense of psychological tendency, observation at the expense of partici-
pation. Such melodramatic readings are evident in recent criticism.
James Boulton and David McCracken view the novel politically, with
Falkland emerging as the victim of his own obsessive commitment to
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the principles of chivalry and aristocracy. D. Gilbert Dumas voices
strong reservations about the novel's conclusion because "Truth, that is,
innocence [by which Dumas means Caleb] triumphs by default, not by
its own strength," and he further argues, sustaining a melodramatic
reading, that "in exchanging his role of political philosopher and propa-
gandist for that of ethical exhorter, Godwin becomes guilty in the novel
of contradictions in doctrine and style similar to those in the first
edition of Political Justice."7 But what appear to be contradictions, in
strictly rational terms, are encompassed by the novel's much larger
psychological interests.
I have concentrated on how one central object—the trunk—en-
closes and unfolds the psychological tendency of the novel. The trunk
acts as a lure and a source of illumination both for the reader and for
Caleb, who acts as a participant in, and agent of, curiosity. When I
say "illumination" I do so paradoxically: strictly speaking, there is
nothing discovered within the trunk, but the trunk serves as an occasion
for eliciting and stimulating the reader's own psychological awareness.
The trunk is an analogue to the novel's narrative process; it does not,
in Godwin's terms, contain a moral so much as it is an embodiment of
psychological tendency. The interesting critical question, then, is How
does one rationally describe the meaning of Caleb Williams in such a
way as to account for the affective appeal of the novel's psychological
tendency?
Here I would take my cue from two critics, William Hazlitt and
Rudolf Storch. What Hazlitt says about the Enquiry Concerning Politi-
cal Justice applies, as well, to Caleb Williams:
If it is admitted that Reason alone is not the sole and self-sufficient ground of
morals, it is to Mr. Godwin that we are indebted for having settled the point.
No one denied or distrusted this principle (before his time) as the absolute
judge and interpreter in all questions of difficulty; and if this is no longer the
case, it is because he has taken this principle, and followed it into its re-
motest consequences with more keenness of eye and steadiness of hand than
any other expounder of ethics. His grand work is (at least) an experimentum
crucis to show the weak sides and imperfections of human reason as the sole
law of human action.8
How Hazlitt's observations may be applied to the novel can be seen in
Rudolf Storch's essentially psychological approach to Caleb Williams:
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In Caleb Williams the conflict between rebellion and guilt remains unresolved.
. . . The remarkable thing about Caleb Williams is that it shows life to be com-
pletely irrational. . . . the two characters [Caleb and Falkland] are not separate
and interacting, but aspects of one and the same soul, so that their conflicts
and the fate that binds them together have indeed the force of inescapable
destiny. . . .  Falkland, Tyrrel, Caleb and Clare are not so much separate per-
sons with their own motivations (or characters in an observed society) as ele-
ments within the mind of one person who projects them warring one against
the other onto the figures moving in this strange dreamlike story.9
Such readings certainly conform with Godwin's comment on the
composition of Caleb Williams: "The thing in which my imagination
revelled the most freely, was the analysis of the private and internal
operations of the mind" (CW, p. xxviii), and with his further assertions:
"Human affairs are so entangled, motives are so subtle and variously
compounded, that the truth cannot be told" (ENQ, pp. 288-89), and
"The mere external actions of man are not worth the studying: Who
would have ever thought of going through a course of history, if the
science were comprised in a set of chronological tables? No: it is the
hearts of men we should study. It is to their actions, as expressive of
disposition and character, we should attend."10
What all these comments suggest is that the structure of Caleb
Williams is not progressive, but obsessive, cyclical, and recapitulatory.
The events of the novel are primarily the occasion for psychological
inquiry.11 Every trial in the narrative is not just an external event, point-
int toward a specified moral or rational solution, but rather a vehicle
for internal psychological examination whereby the reader, like Caleb,
not only observes but participates within the dynamics of the novel's
tendency. The novel thus becomes an epoch in the mind of the reader,
in which the reader is led to abandon the idea that "reason alone is . . .
the sole and self-sufficient ground of morals." Beginning as an observ-
er who is both confident of, and expects to describe, the truth, the
reader, like Caleb, becomes entangled in the experience of psycholog-
ical truth—in what Godwin calls "the hearts of men." This inward
tendency which drives the reader away from politics and society into
psychology and the processes of mind, away from the abstractions of
reason to an affective appeal to the human heart, stands as Godwin's
supreme response to the idea of the impossible observer.
9
Criticism and
the Idea of Nature
It was Samuel Johnson who made the provocative statement that
"there is always an appeal open from criticism to nature" (Shake-
speare, 7:67). The matter of precisely defining the concept, or
concepts, of nature in the eighteenth century is, as Arthur Love-
joy has memorably demonstrated, a very tricky problem.1 How-
ever, my interests are determined less by the exact meaning of the
term than by the significance of the gesture, especially as it
illumines the diverse views of human nature in the texts I have
considered. Concepts of nature are often tacit assumptions, as we
have seen in the way that Swift and Mandeville use reason or
in Richardson's and Fielding's differing responses to the "state of
probation." But these are also the very assumptions that allow
authors, readers, and critics to proceed in their own activities with
a sense, however problematical, of common understanding.
Johnson's criticism is exemplary in this respect, for it reveals
how the appeal to nature can determine both the strengths and
limitations of any critical approach. Thus when he repeatedly
reaffirms that "nothing can please many and please long, but just
representations of general nature" (Shakespeare, 7:61), that
Shakespeare is above all writers "the poet of nature" who "always
makes nature predominate over accident" (Shakespeare, 7:62,
65), and that his plays exhibit "the real state of sublunary nature"
(Shakespeare, 7:66), he is confident that we, like Johnson, at
least tacitly know and are responsive to the experience of nature
to which he appeals. However, like customs, ideas of nature
may and do change, though more slowly than customs; and
as they change so do the possibilities of meaning.2 Thus when
Johnson remarks on the oddity of Tristram Shandy, commenting
that nothing odd will last—a view, by the way, that he shares
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with Richardson—his observation demonstrates that he as a reader and
critic has reached a point where his idea of nature cannot accommodate
the experience proposed by a particular literary text.3 As we have seen
earlier, the same thing happens when Johnson reads Paradise Lost.
Because Paradise Lost, in his view, "comprises neither human actions
nor human manners"—both determined by Johnson's idea of nature—
he argues that the reader "finds no transaction in which he can be
engaged." Johnson's idea of nature, then, does not refer to external
nature, but to his own sense of human nature as the affective basis
of literary meaning.
The boundaries of Johnson's idea of nature may be generally defined
by sacred verse on the one hand and the oddity of Tristram Shandy on
the other. Though Johnson recognizes the "Theocracy" as a vital part of
human history, he no longer regards it as a live part—that is, within
the imaginative literary experience—of the literary audience of the
eighteenth century. This assumption is so strong that the very term
"sacred poetry" involves a process of mutual exclusion; for, as Johnson
declares in the Life of Waller, "Contemplative piety, or the intercourse
between God and the human soul, cannot be poetical. Man admitted
to implore the mercy of his Creator and plead the merits of his Re-
deemer is already in a higher state than poetry can confer" (Lives,
1:291). Such a conviction may explain why Johnson has more to say
about the moral and psychological impact of Clarissa than about its
Christian meaning. Even so, Johnson is clearly aware that his own limi-
tations are conditioned by his idea of nature, and his criticism demon-
strates how such limitations necessarily influence his experience of
reading and his practice of criticism. If, as Johnson said, "Imitations
produce pain or pleasure, not because they are mistaken for realities,
but because they bring realities to mind" (Shakespeare, 7:78), it ob-
viously follows that what he cannot imaginatively reenact cannot bring
realities to mind and thus cannot have an affective appeal.
In this regard, Johnson's comments about the reader's ability to
participate in literature, and how this ability is ultimately tied to an idea
of nature, anticipate R. G. Collingwood's doctrine of historical thought
and the idea of history:
Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the past, and
at the same time it is the redoing of this, the perpetuation of past acts in the
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present. Its object is therefore not a mere object, something outside the mind
which knows it; it is an activity of thought, which can be known only in so
far as the knowing mind reenacts it and knows itself as so doing. To the his-
torian, the activities whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be
watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own mind; they are objec-
tive, or known to him, only because they are also subjective, or activities of
his own.
It may thus be said that historical inquiry reveals to the historian the powers
of his own mind. Since all he can know historically is thoughts that he can
rethink for himself, the fact of his coming to know them shows him that his
mind is able (or by the very effort of studying them has become able) to
think in these ways. And conversely, whenever he finds certain historical mat-
ters unintelligible, he has discovered a limitation of his own mind; he has dis-
covered that there are certain ways in which he is not, or no longer, or not
yet, able to think.4
The key idea in Collingwood's formulation is that the experiences
reenacted are both objective and subjective—that, in fact, only experi-
ences which we can subjectively re-create, either through reason or
imagination, can become meaningful for us. Indeed, Collingwood's dis-
tinction between "spectacles to be watched" and "experiences to be
lived through" closely approximates my distinction between observa-
tion and participation and parallels Johnson's dismissal of what I call
the impossible observer. The ideal reader, like the ideal historian, is
one who, not exclusively dependent on abstract observation, has the
imaginative ability to apprehend the motions and experiences of other
minds. But it should also be evident that the reader's apprehension of
meaning is largely determined by his idea of nature (or human nature),
which operates as a conscious or unconscious assumption both prior to
and during the experience of reading and the act of criticism. Further-
more, since the idea of nature is so frequently a tacit assumption, it
is entirely possible that when we consider literary texts from the past—
perhaps even from the present—we may have difficulty determining the
idea of nature informing a particular act of composition, not to say an
entire literary tradition.
What makes our understanding of literature even more complicated
is that, while the idea of nature is often tacit, it is also often in a state
of flux. This was particularly true in the eighteenth century, for, as
Melvyn New has persuasively argued:
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A proper "conceptual context" for Defoe and Richardson, Fielding and Smol-
lett, must embody not only the providential design, but also what was happen-
ing to that design in the course of the century and in different hands. That is
to say, the major novelists of the age imaged forth in their writings neither
the Christian world view, which was slowly giving way, nor the secular world
view, which we now recognize as having replaced it; rather . . . their fictions
reflect . . .  that historical moment when the intellectual and imaginative re-
sources of their culture were transferred from one system of ordering experience
to another. The proper frame of reference, then, for the great English fictions
of the eighteenth century is one that defines this transition.5
The crucial word is transition, and I believe New can document this
transition because, for one thing, he considers individual texts without
presuming larger generalizations about an author's entire corpus. In
other words, instead of assuming that all of Defoe's works enact a simi-
lar spiritual meaning, it is safer to say, as I have argued, that spiritual
meaning is clearly evident in Robinson Crusoe, but much less so in
Moll Flanders and Roxana. Indeed, the very transition between spiri-
tual and secular views appears to occur within Defoe's fiction. The same
thing might be said for Fielding's fiction, where providential design
predominates in Tom Jones, but is far more problematical in Amelia.
In the case of Clarissa one might argue that the novel powerfully
dramatizes the transition between Clarissa's religious convictions and
the secular assumptions of the majority of characters in the novel, as
well as of a good many readers. It is not until Caleb Williams that
the transition from spiritual to secular meaning is complete.
Moreover, the presence of this transition between secular and reli-
gious orders of experience may help us to understand not only why the
critical views of eighteenth-century literature differ so widely, but why
the individual works I have discussed are so problematical. They are
problematical because, in diverse ways, they straddle different ideas of
nature which are in the process of transition. By examining a broad
range of works that address themselves to what I have called the im-
possible observer, I have attempted to take into account the transition
in the eighteenth-century idea of nature and the author's manipulation of
this change in order to question the reader's traditional assumptions
concerning human nature. All these works, I have argued, construct
their affective appeal by at once anticipating the reader's habits of de-
tached contemplation and creating occasions that are calculated to
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encourage or enforce a more intimate, and sometimes less determinate,
participation with the text. Inevitably the affective impact of such par-
ticipation takes different forms; but in every case the authors chal-
lenge the reader's uninspected exercise of, and dependence on, reason.
On the other hand, some of the most familiar and influential ap-
proaches to eighteenth-century literature presume the stability of reason
and the adequacy of detached observation. This faith in a tradition of
order, reason, and stability is eloquently expressed in the preface of
Martin Battestin's The Providence of Wit:
The poetry of Pope and Gay, the fiction of Fielding and Goldsmith, the music
and building and gardens of the period—all, in various ways, attest to the
faith of the age in Order, to the conviction that Art is the attribute of Reality.
. . . that some at least of the salient formal features of Augustan literature and
the arts—balance and proportion and design, for example, whether conceived
geometrically or as a movement through time toward some pre-determined
ending—are best understood in terms of the ontological assumptions of the
Christian humanist tradition.6
Now it would be foolish to argue that no such tradition exists in the
eighteenth century, but there are many eighteenth-century works, such
as those I have examined, which do not satisfy such expectations of
balance, proportion, and design. Battestin himself concedes this point
when he refers to his last chapter on Swift and Sterne as a "negative
demonstration" (p. ix) of his argument; he is quite aware that the con-
fident use of art and artifice in many of the works of Pope, Fielding,
Gay, and Goldsmith may not apply to other eighteenth-century writers.
In a sense, therefore, my book is a positive demonstration of an
eighteenth-century tradition of literature which is different from, but
exists along side of, the providential tradition that Battestin discusses.
Briefly put, the tradition that Battestin examines tends to situate the
reader in the position of an observer, and continually appeals to the
reader's reason, reinforcing his expectations of order, because there is
within this tradition a strong underlying assurance of providential de-
sign. However, the tradition I have discussed elicits the reader's active
participation with the text, and it appeals beyond his reliance on reason
to a less determinate, but no less vital, awareness of the problematical
aspects of human reason. Battestin speaks of "a movement through time
toward some pre-determined ending," whereas I have concentrated on
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works whose endings are less predetermined and providential than they
are problematical. Even Clarissa, whose Christian meaning would
seem to accord with Battestin's providential tradition, presents itself as
a highly problematical novel because of Richardson's strong views
about this life as a "state of probation."
What is especially fascinating about these two traditions and their
diverse appeals to nature is that they appear to require different methods
of reading and thus different modes of criticism. For example, Battes-
tin focuses on how the presence of balance, proportion, and design
"are best understood in terms of the ontological assumptions of the
Christian humanist tradition." Yet these same properties of art are the
subject of Eric Rothstein's Systems of Order and Inquiry in Later
Eighteenth-Century Fiction, but he does not find the same idea of
nature, if you will, that Battestin does. Rothstein writes, "in all five
novels [Rasselas, Tristram Shandy, Humphry Clinker, Amelia, Caleb
Williams] form—pattern, design, order—is keyed to a concern with
epistemological inquiry."7 Thus we see two intelligent and responsible
critics considering the same attributes of art (though not always the
same texts), and arriving at wholly different ideas of nature: the one
arguing for a predominantly religious meaning, while the other empha-
sizes a secular concern with epistemology.
Since both approaches are persuasive, we are clearly faced with a
critical dilemma; but it may be a revelation in disguise. That is, I
would say that this dilemma is, in fact, convincing evidence of two
traditions of literature—call them providential and problematical—
existing simultaneously in the eighteenth century. I see no reason why
we have to choose one over the other.
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Negation, and The Uses of Irony," Eighteenth-Century Studies 5 (Fall 1971):
122-44; John N. Morris, "Wishes as Horses: A Word for the Houyhnhnms,"
Yale Review 62 (Spring 1973): 372-91. The critic to whom I am most indebted
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is Stanley E. Fish, particularly his liberating essay, "Literature in the Reader:
Affective Stylistics," first published in New Literary History 2 (Autumn 1970):
123-62, and most of it reprinted in Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972).
9. Swift and the Satirist's Art, p. 31.
10. See especially R. C. Elliott's fine essay, "Swift's 'I, '" Yale Review
62 (Spring 1973): 372-91.
11. With respect to Ireland, for example, see Swift's bitter remarks con-
cerning such distinctions in An Answer to a Paper Called a Memorial: "A
fair Issue of Things, begun upon Party Rage, while some sacrificed the Publick
to Fury, and others to Ambition! While a Spirit of Faction and Oppression
reigned in every Part of the Country: where Gentlemen, instead of consulting
the Ease of their Tenants, or cultivating their Lands, were worrying one
another, upon Points of Whig and Tory, of High Church and Low Church;
which no more concerned them, than the long and famous Controversy of
Strops for Razors" (12:22-23).
12. Correspondence, 3:103.
Chapter 3
1. Bernard Mandeville, Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and Na-
tional Happiness (London: T. Jauncy and J. Roberts, 1720), p. 81. Some of the
language of my opening paragraph is taken from my review of two books on
Mandeville—Richard I. Cook, Bernard Mandeville (New York: Twayne,
1974), and Hector Monroe, The Ambivalence of Bernard Mandeville (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975)—in Eighteenth-Century Studies 9 (Spring 1976):
457-59.
2. The Fable of the Bees, ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1924), 1:405. This chapter, it should be noted, deals exclusively with
part 1 of The Fable.
3. Here I am in agreement with Phillip Harth who, in his introduction to
The Fable of the Bees (New York: Pelican Books, 1970), has argued that
"Mandeville's remarkable talent as a satirist emerges as fully in the prose re-
marks and essays as in the little poem at the beginning of The Fable of the
Bees. They show him turning from verse to prose, not in order to abandon
satire, but to exploit it with greater freedom" (p. 40).
4. See Robert Adolph's essay, "Style, Satire, and Paradox," in Mande-
ville Studies, ed. Irwin Primer (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1975), pp.
159-61. This entire collection of essays—hereafter cited as Mandeville Studies
—should prove indispensable to all future studies of Mandeville.
5. See, for example, Martin Price's remark in To the Palace of Wisdom
(Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1965), that "Mandeville's Fable, like
Swift's account of the Yahoos, is an ironic attempt to show how much of
human complexity can be reduced to a few low principles of compulsion"
(p. 116). See also Thomas R. Edwards, "Mandeville's Moral Prose," ELM
31 (1964): "My view, in short, is that his irony, like Swift's, is based on a
remarkable talent for parody, for giving dramatic embodiment to attitudes that
are not, in any easy sense, his own" (p. 203).
146 Notes to Pages 30-37
6. Mandeville Studies, pp. 162-63.
7. My use of the term "manifest fiction," in relation to satire, is somewhat
akin to Sheldon Sacks's definition of satire as "a work organized so that it
ridicules objects external to the fictional world created in it" (Fiction and the
Shape of Belief [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1967], p. 26). With respect to Swift's use of the Houyhnhnms, for instance,
I agree with Sacks that "the virtues ascribed to the Houyhnhnms have been
chosen according to how well they facilitate the ridicule of certain of the traits,
manners, and institutions of men" (p. 9).
8. Mandeville Studies, p. 176 (my italics).
9. I am thinking, for example, of the recent book by the anthropologist
Colin Turnbull, The Mountain People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972),
which could be read as the scientific verification of what for Swift was a mani-
fest fiction—namely, the Yahoos. B. F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dig-
nity (New York: Bantam, 1971) is another work that examines latent assump-
tions. Because it is so strikingly similar to Mandeville's Fable, I will say more
about Skinner's book later.
10. Mandeville Studies, p. 39.
11. See Irwin Primer's introduction to The Fable of the Bees (New York:
Capricorn, 1962): "Much of the strength of Mandeville's argument lies in the
fact that he repeatedly claims to be dealing with the facts" (p. 9).
12. Mandeville Studies, pp. 174, 40.
13. I am here unable to accept Phillip Harm's suggestion that "what uni-
fies the disparate elements of his [Mandeville's] book is the single-mindedness,
not of his argument, but of his satirical purpose" ("The Satiric Purpose of
The Fable of the Bees," Eighteenth-Century Studies 2 [Summer 1969]: 334).
I think Mandeville's empirical arguments are more wide-ranging than, though
not exclusive of, his satirical purpose.
14. See F. A. Hayek, "Dr. Bernard Mandeville," Proceedings of the
British Academy 52 (1966): 125-41. Hayek writes: "It is difficult to remember
now . . .  how closely religion was not long ago still associated with the 'argu-
ment from design.' The discovery of an astounding order which no man had
designed was for most men the chief evidence for the existence of a personal
creator. In the moral and political sphere Mandeville and Hume did show that
the sense of justice and probity on which the order in this sphere rested, was
not originally implanted in man's mind but had, like that mind itself, grown in
a process of gradual evolution which at least in principle we might learn to
understand. The revulsion against this suggestion was quite as great as that
caused more than a century later when it was shown that the marvels of the
organism could no longer be adduced as proof of special design" (p. 141).
15. It should be remembered that I am here confining my discussion to
part 1 of The Fable of the Bees. Elias J. Chiasson examines part 2 in con-
siderable detail in his article, "Bernard Mandeville: A Reappraisal," Philolog-
ical Quarterly (October 1970): 489-519. Chiasson argues that "Mandeville's
major thrust, in spite of the pyrotechnics and tomfoolery, must be placed in
the context of that perennial problem of determining the relationship which
exists between reason and faith, nature and grace" (p. 519). This is a fair
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enough abstract description of much of part 2, but Professor Chiasson mistaken-
ly downplays the rich effects of Mandeville's style when he refers to their
"pyrotechnics and tomfoolery." See also Mandeville Studies, pp. 41-42.
16. See Leland D. Peterson's article, "Swift's Project: A Religious and
Political Satire," PMLA 82 (March 1967): 54-63, and Phillip Harth's con-
vincing rebuttal, "Swift's Project: Tract or Travesty?" PMLA 84 (March 1969):
336-43.
17. F. A. Hayek, in "Dr. Bernard Mandeville" (pp. 133-34), quotes Josiah
Tucker's version of "Private Vices, Publick Benefits" in The Elements of
Commerce and Theory of Taxes (1755), "that universal mover in human nature,
SELF-LOVE, may receive such a direction in this case (as in all others) as to
promote the public interest by those efforts it shall make towards pursuing its
own."
18. See Primer's observation, "[Mandeville's] views on human psychology
consist mainly in specific analyses of pride, shame, fear, envy, jealousy,
avarice, prodigality, ambition, courage and other passions. Such cataloguing
and description in Mandeville seem to follow lines set down by Montaigne,
Hobbes, Locke, Bayle and La Rochefoucauld, among others. What is new in
Mandeville, or at least singularly accented, is his sense of a slowly developing,
evolutionary psychology" (introduction, The Fable of the Bees, p. 10).
Chapter 4
1. Everett Zimmerman, Defoe and the Novel (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1975), p. 17.
2. John J. Richetti, Defoe's Narratives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975),
p. 9.
3. G. A. Starr, Defoe and Casuistry (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1971), p. viii. See also the valuable appendix to Starr's book entitled "Fic-
tion and Mendacity."
4. The Letters of Daniel Defoe, ed. George Harris Healey (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1955), pp. 42-43. Hereafter cited as Letters. See also Maximillian E.
Novak's discussion of dissimulation in "Defoe's Use of Irony," The Uses of
Irony (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1966), pp.
7-38.
5. For another approach to Defoe's dissimulation, see Homer O. Brown,
"The Displaced Self in the Novels of Daniel Defoe," ELH 38 (1971): 562-90.
Brown argues, for example, that "Defoe's narrators seem under a double com-
pulsion to expose and to conceal themselves" (p. 563).
6. Virginia Woolf, Collected Essays, 4 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1966),
1:66. Hereafter cited as CE.
1. Charles Gildon, Preface to The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures
of Mr. D. . . .  De F. . . (1719), in the Norton edition of Moll Flanders,
ed. Edward Kelly (New York: Norton, 1973), pp. 324-25. Hereafter cited as
MF.
8. The works I am referring to are as follows: Maximillian E. Novak's
two books, Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), and Defoe and the Nature of
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Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); John Robert Moore, Daniel Defoe:
Citizen of the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); G. A.
Starr's two books, Defoe and Spiritual Autobiography (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, 1965), and Defoe and Casuistry (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, 1971); J. Paul Hunter, The Reluctant Pilgrim (Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), and Ian Watt's two studies,
"Robinson Crusoe as a Myth," in Eighteenth-Century English Literature, ed.
James L. Clifford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 158-79,
and The Rise of the Novel (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1964), pp. 60-92.
9. By my count, forms of the term "deliverance" (including "deliver" and
"delivered") appear in excess of fifty times in Robinson Crusoe.
10. Robinson Crusoe, ed. James Sutherland (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1968), p. 78. Hereafter cited as RC.
11. Brown, "Displaced Self," p. 589.
12. Allan McKillop makes a similar point in The Early Masters of English
Fiction (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1968), p. 30.
13. See Starr, Defoe and Casuistry, pp. 111-64.
14. Zimmerman, Defoe and the Novel, p. 5.
15. G. A. Starr, "Sympathy V. Judgement in Roxana's First Liaison,"
in The Augustan Milieu, ed. Henry Knight Miller, Eric Rothstein, and G. S.
Rousseau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 59-76.
16. Ibid., p. 75.
17. Ibid., p. 71.
18. Roxana, ed. Jane Jack (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 17.
Hereafter cited as R.
19. Richetti argues that Roxana's "ultimate ambition lies in a powerful
androgyny" (Defoe's Narratives, p. 195).
20. Michael Shinagel, Daniel Defoe and Middle-Class Gentility (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 193-94.
21. Robert D. Hume, "The Conclusion of Defoe's Roxana: Fiasco or Tour
de Force?" Eighteenth-Century Studies 3 (Summer 1970): 490; Everett Zim-
merman, "Language and Character in Defoe's Roxana," Essays in Criticism
21 (1971): 234. Much of this essay is reprinted in his Defoe and the Novel;
Maximillian E. Novak, "Crime and Punishment in Defoe's Roxana," Journal
of English and Germanic Philology 65 (1966): 456. See also Wallace Jackson,
"Roxana and The Development of Defoe's Fiction," Studies in the Novel,
Summer 1975, 181-94.
22. David Leon Higdon, "The Critical Fortunes and Misfortunes of De-
foe's Roxana," Bucknell Review 20 (Spring 1972): 74-75.
23. Colonel Jack, ed. Samuel Holt Monk (London: Oxford University
Press, 1965), p. 163.
24. Richetti, Defoe's Narratives, p. 192.
Chapter 5
1. For further comments on this matter, see J. Paul Hunter, Occasional
Form (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pjh 212-14;
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C. J. Rawson, Henry Fielding and the Augustan Ideal under Stress (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 88-89, 95-96; Mark Kinkead-Weekes,
Samuel Richardson (London: Methuen, 1973), pp. 468-72; and T. C. Duncan
Eaves and Ben D. Kimpel, Samuel Richardson (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1971), pp. 292-306.
2. Selected Letters of Samuel Richardson, ed. John Carroll (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1964), p. 89. Hereafter cited as SL.
3. Samuel Richardson, "Clarissa": Preface, Hints of Prefaces, and Post-
script, intro. R. F. Brissenden (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial
Library, 1964), pp. 1, 350-51. Hereafter cited as PHP. I should also note
that although Brissenden has cautioned that "it is impossible to determine how
much of Hints of Prefaces or of the published Preface or Postscript is Richard-
son's own work" (p. ii), it seems reasonable to assume, as I have throughout
this chapter, that these writings accurately reflect Richardson's point of view,
especially since they are consonant with the views expressed in his corres-
pondence.
4. The Richardson-Stinstra Correspondence and Stinstra's Prefaces to
Clarissa, ed. William C. Slattery (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1969), p. 200. Hereafter cited as Stinstra.
5. Amelia, 3 vols. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1926), 3: 25-26. Another passage
that suggests Harrison functions as the novel's, and perhaps the author's,
spokesman is the following: "Of all mankind the doctor is the best of com-
forters. As his excessive good-nature makes him take vast delight in the office;
so his great penetration into the human mind, joined to his great experience,
renders him the most wonderful proficient in it; and he so well knows when to
sooth, when to reason, and when to ridicule, that he never applies any of those
arts improperly" (1: 111).
6. My examination of the trial of virtue in Amelia and Clarissa possibly
invites comparison with R. F. Brissenden's basically thematic reading of
Clarissa in Virtue in Distress (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 159-86. Per-
haps surprisingly, Brissenden does not discuss Amelia.
I. Hunter, Occasional Form, p. 196.
8. Rothstein, Systems of Order and Inquiry in Later Eighteenth-Century
Fiction (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975),
pp. 157, 165; Rawson, Henry Fielding, p. 86; Hunter, Occasional Form,
pp. 193, 209; Andrew Wright, Henry Fielding, Mask and Feast (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 50.
9. Elizabeth Bergen Brophy, Samuel Richardson (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1974), p. 94.
10. Clarissa, 8 vols. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1930), 1:66. I also wish to ex-
press my indebtedness to Shirley Van Marter, with whom I corresponded about
the various editions of Clarissa, and from whose articles I learned a great
deal. See especially, "Richardson's Revisions of Clarissa in the Second Edi-
tion," Studies in Bibliography 26 (1973): 107-32, and "Richardson's Revisions
of Clarissa in the Third and Fourth Editions," Studies in Bibliography 28
(1975): 119-52.
II. Comparing the characters of Anna and Clarissa, Richardson himself
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expresses some dismay about how they affected some contemporary readers.
He writes: "I have often been surprized, that these two Characters have been
very much mistaken by Persons of Taste, Virtue, Honour, who nevertheless
have favoured the History with their particular Attention. Can it be, that to the
one we know we are superior, and therefore are not Jealous?" (Si, p. 204).
12. Robert Alter, Fielding and the Nature of the Novel (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1968), p. 158; Kinkead-Weekes, Samuel Richardson,
p. 161.
13. John Preston discusses the importance of attention in The Created
Self (London: Heinenman, 1970), pp. 78-80.
14. Kinkead-Weekes, Samuel Richardson, p. 126; Eaves and Kimpel,
Samuel Richardson, p. 280.
15. Morris Golden, Richardson's Characters (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1963), p. 17; Margaret Anne Doody, A Natural Passion
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 124; Leo Braudy, "Penetration and Im-
penetrability in Clarissa," in New Approaches to Eighteenth-Century Litera-
ture, ed. Phillip Harth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 205.
16. The Rise of the Novel (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1974), p. 216.
17. Preston, Created Self, p. 61.
18. Alan Dugald McKillop, Samuel Richardson, Printer and Novelist
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936), p. 170. McKillop
further suggests that the "Concluding Note" to Grandison, where Richardson
rejects "hasty reformation[s], introduced, in contradiction to all probability,
for the sake of patching up what is called a happy ending," is directly aimed
at Fielding (pp. 204-5).
19. See also Stinstra's wonderful discussion of poetic justice, Stinstra,
pp. 194-205.
20. Rothstein, Systems of Order and Inquiry, p. 167; see also the discus-
sion of the role of Providence in Amelia in Sheldon Sacks, Fiction and the
Shape of Belief (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1967), pp. 260-62.
Chapter 6
1. The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, vols. 3-5, The
Rambler, ed. W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1963), 3:24. Subsequent volume and page citations in text
refer to this edition (hereafter cited as Rambler).
2. Lives of the English Poets, ed. G. B. Hill, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1905), 1:170. Hereafter cited as Lives.
3. Leopold Damrosch, Jr., The Uses of Johnson's Criticism (Charlottes-
ville: University of Virginia Press, 1976), p. 99.
4. Damrosch argues that Johnson's "postulate [in Rambler 4] is that art
appeals to the imagination at an emotional level over which the intellect has
only intermittent control" (p. 112). While the reader's emotional participation
is certainly crucial, I also share William Edinger's view that "unlike most of his
contemporaries Johnson repeatedly emphasizes the cognitive value of fiction"
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{Samuel Johnson and Poetic Style [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1977], p. 99).
5. To an extent, some of what I have to say has been discussed in William
Vesterman's essay, "Johnson and The Life of Savage" ELH 36 (December
1969): 659-78. For other recent examinations of the Life of Savage, see the
following essays: John A. Dussinger, "Style and Intention in Johnson's Life of
Savage," ELH 37 (December 1970): 564-80, which appears in altered form in
Dussingefs book, The Discourse of the Mind in Eighteenth-Century Fiction;
Paul K. Alkon, "The Intention and Reception of Johnson's Life of Savage?
Modern Philology 72 (November 1974): 139-50; and Martin W. Maner,
"Satire and Sympathy in Johnson's Life of Savage" Genre 8 (June 1975):
107-18.
6. Donald Greene, for example, has remarked about the Life of Savage:
"In the brilliant psychologizing he put into it, he may have purged some of
his own bitterness toward life"; and he later observes about the Life: "The
greatness of the work lies in the amount of himself that Johnson put into it"
(Samuel Johnson [New York: Twayne, 1970], pp. 29, 113). For an opposing
view, which seems overstated, see Clarence Tracy, The Artificial Bastard
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953): "Johnson was strong
precisely where Savage was weak: in prudence, common sense, and manly in-
dependence. But Savage fascinated him as a study in human behavior, as one of
those 'modes of life' that Imlac was to find an essential part of a poet's knowl-
edge" (p. 134).
7. Life of Savage, ed. Clarence Tracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971),
p. xix. Hereafter cited as Savage.
8. Greene, Samuel Johnson, Preface, p. [9].
9. Paul Fussell, Samuel Johnson and the Life of Writing (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 261.
10. Marshall Waingrow has dealt with the "symbolic force" of The Life of
Savage in his unpublished essay, "Johnson's Life of Savage: Biography as
Conjecture," that was read and distributed to MLA seminar 13 in Chicago,
December 1973.
11. Sheldon Sacks, Fiction and the Shape of Belief (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 26, 49. The works Sacks
refers to by Bronson and Kolb are: Bertrand H. Bronson, ed., Samuel Johnson:
Rasselas, Poems, and Selected Prose (New York: Rinehart, 1958), p. xvi;
and Gwin J. Kolb, "The Structure of Rasselas," PMLA 66 (1951): 698-717.
See also Carey Mclntosh, The Choice of Life (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1973), pp. 163-212.
12. This incontrovertible background is precisely formulated in Johnson's
Sermon XII: "We may be content, at last, to conclude, that if happiness had
been found, some would have found it, and that it is vain to search longer
for what all have missed." This quotation is cited in James Gray, Johnson's
Sermons: A Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 172.
13. This quotation is referred to in Chester F. Chapin, The Religious
Thought of Samuel Johnson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968),
pp. 75-76.
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14. Chapin, Religious Thought, p. 159.
15. Fussell, Samuel Johnson, pp. 217, 221, 224.
16. Arieh Sachs, Passionate Intelligence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1967), p. 17.
17. W. K. Wimsatt, "In Praise of Rasselas: Four Notes (Converging),"
collected in Imagined Worlds, ed. Maynard Mack and Ian Gregor (London:
Methuen, 1968), pp. 111-36. The specific comments in this essay that I am
responding to are, in order of quotation, on pages 128, 126-27, and 124.
18. The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia, ed. Geoffrey Tillotson
and Brian Jenkins (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 109-10.
Hereafter cited as Rasselas.
19. Robert Voitle, Samuel Johnson the Moralist (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1961), p. 135.
20. See Rambler, 3:223-24: "Almost all that we can be said to enjoy is
past or future; the present is in perpetual motion, leaves us as soon as it arrives,
ceases to be present before its presence is well perceived, and is only known to
have existed by the effects which it leaves behind. The greatest part of our
ideas arises, therefore, from the view before or behind us, and we are happy
or miserable, according as we are affected by the survey of our life, or our
prospect of future existence."
Chapter 7
1. Joseph Epes Brown, The Critical Opinions of Samuel Johnson (New
York: Russel & Russel, 1961), p. 514.
2. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, ed. James Aiken
Work (New York: Odyssey, 1940), 4:273. Hereafter cited as TS. See also
Martin Battestin's brief reference to Sterne's "sixth sense" in The Providence
of Wit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 253.
3. See, for example, George Goodin's essay, "The Comic as a Critique of
Reason: Tristram Shandy" College English 29 (December 1967): 215, where
Goodin writes: "Tristram serves also to propound a view of reason which has
become a twentieth-century commonplace in various forms such as Heisen-
berg's Uncertainty Principle. Stated very generally, this view of reason is that
the measure or assessment of an 'object' is a function of the scale of values or
perspective which is used to measure or assess with."
4. The Letters of Laurence Sterne, 2d ed., ed. Lewis Perry Curtis (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 411. Hereafter cited as Letters.
5. See especially Richard A. Lanham, Tristram Shandy: The Games of
Pleasure (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973)
and James E. Swearingen, Reflexivity in "Tristram Shandy" (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).
6. Swearingen, Reflexivity, p. 12.
7. Traugott's remarks are included in a panel discussion collected in The
Winged Skull, ed. Arthur H. Cash and John M. Stedmond (London: Methuen,
1971), p. 85.
8. Swearingen, Reflexivity, p. 6.
Notes to Pages 111-123 153
9. Gabriel Josipovici, The World and the Book (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford
University Press, 1971), pp. xiii-xiv. See also Helene Moglen, The Philosoph-
ical Irony of Laurence Sterne (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1975),
pp. 147-62, where Professor Moglen briefly discusses Sterne's relationship to
contemporary literature.
10. Howard Anderson, "Tristram Shandy and the Reader's Imagination,"
PMLA 86 (October 1971): 970.
11. William Freedman writes that in Tristram's history of the mind, "he
takes it upon himself to make clear that past, present, and future, that events,
emotions, and opinions all impinge upon one another as arbitrarily differenti-
ated bands in the same experiential spectrum" ("Tristram Shandy: The Art of
Literary Counterpoint," Modern Language Quarterly 32 [September 1971]:
272-73).
12. Lionel Trilling, "Art and Fortune," in The American Novel since
World War II, ed. Marcus Klein (New York: Fawcett, 1969), p. 94.
13. Sigurd Burckhardt, "Tristram Shandy's Law of Gravity," ELH 28
(1961): 80-81.
14. Jean-Jacques Mayoux, "Variations on the Time-Sense in Tristram
Shandy" in Winged Skull, ed. Cash and Stedmond, p. 3. See also Swear-
ingen, Reflexivity, pp. 107-9.
15. Ian Watt, "The Comic Syntax of Tristram Shandy" in Studies in
Criticism and Aesthetics, 1660-1800, ed. Howard Anderson and John S. Shea
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), p. 320.
16. See William V. Holtz, Image and Immortality: A Study of Tristram
Shandy, (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1970), pp. 80-89.
17. Swearingen, Reflexivity, p. 254.
18. Biographia Literaria, in The Selected Poetry and Prose of Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, ed. Donald A. Stauffer (New York: Modern Library, 1951),
p. 263.
19. Toby A. Olshin, "Genre and Tristram Shandy: The Novel of Quick-
ness," Genre 4 (December 1971): 361.
20. Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow (New York: Bantam, 1974),
p. 3.
Chapter 8
1. See, for example, James T. Boulton, The Language of Politics (London:
Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1963), pp. 226-32; David McCracken, "Godwin's
Caleb Williams: A Fictional Rebuttal of Burke," Studies in Burke and His
Time 11 (1969-70): 1442-52; and Gary Kelly, The English Jacobin Novel,
1780-1805 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 179-208.
2. Here I am using the term melodrama in the specific sense in which
Robert Heilman defines the term: "In the structure of melodrama, man is
essentially 'whole'; this key word implies neither greatness nor moral per-
fection, but rather an absence of [a] basic inner conflict"; moreover, Heilman
argues that the "emotional concomitants" of melodramatic structure are that
"in one direction we are lured toward high confidence, in the other, toward
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despair; in one direction toward self-glorification, in the other, toward feeling
sorry for ourselves." Tragedy and Melodrama (Seattle: University of Wash-
ington Press, 1968), pp. 79, 87.
3. William Godwin, The Enquirer (New York: August M. Kelly, 1965),
pp. 135, 136, 137, 139-40. Hereafter cited as ENQ.
4. Caleb Williams, intro George Sherburn (San Francisco: Rinehart, 1960),
p. 4. Hereafter cited as CW.
5. D. Gilbert Dumas, "Things as They Were: The Original Ending of
Caleb Williams," Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 6 (1966): 575-97.
6. The original conclusion is included as Appendix I of David McCracken's
edition of Caleb Williams (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 327-
34. Hereafter cited as Appendix.
7. Dumas, "Things as They Were," pp. 585, 593. On the other hand, the
following recent articles do not succumb to melodramatic readings: Donald
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of Order and Inquiry in Later Eighteenth-Century Fiction (Berkeley and Los
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Chapter 9
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